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ABSTRACT 
 
Emotion, memory and the self in complex post-traumatic stress following repeated 
interpersonal trauma by Dr Georgina Clifford 
 
Individuals who experience repeated interpersonal trauma often present with 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with more complex features than those exposed to single-
incident traumas. However, there is contention in the literature regarding whether PTSD and 
Complex PTSD can be conceptualised as different disorders, and there is currently no 
consensus regarding whether tailoring current evidence-based interventions for PTSD for 
complex features will improve treatment outcomes. This thesis is structured as a series of five 
stand-alone research papers, with each addressing one of the overarching themes associated 
with PTSD following repeated traumas (outlined in chapter one); The first study (chapter 2) 
explores the structure of autobiographical memory, by examining the organisation of past 
autobiographical knowledge. The second study (chapter 3) explores self-identity by 
examining the structure of the self-concept. The third study (chapter 4) explores the 
prevalence of pseudohallucinations in a sample of adult survivors of repeated physical and 
sexual trauma. The fourth study (chapter 5) explores the relationship between emodiversity 
and clinical manifestations of PTSD. The fifth study (chapter six) outlines the development 
and preliminary evaluation of a group intervention for individuals following repeated 
interpersonal trauma. Finally, in the General Discussion (chapter seven) the findings from all 
five research papers are considered in light of current theories of PTSD. I critically evaluate 
whether the extant theories are adequate in their conceptualisations of more complex 
presentations of the disorder and whether the current treatments available are adequate in 
effectively treating more complex presentations of PTSD. This thesis contributes to the 
conceptualisation of CPTSD through the identification of particular symptoms in a client group 
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who have experienced repeated interpersonal trauma, but only with more research in this area 
can we further refine our understanding and of and develop efficacious treatments for these more 
complex presentations of CPTSD. Limitations and future directions are considered. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
Overview 
1.1 Trauma and PTSD  
“Traumatized people chronically feel unsafe inside their bodies: The past is alive in the form 
of gnawing interior discomfort. Their bodies are constantly bombarded by visceral warning 
signs, and, in an attempt to control these processes, they often become expert at ignoring 
their gut feelings and in numbing awareness of what is played out inside. They learn to hide 
from their selves.”  - Bessel van der Kolk (1994) 
 
‘Trauma’, from a Greek word meaning ‘wound’, now evokes thoughts of  
internal and emotional injury more immediately than it does a laceration or broken bone. 
During the First World War, the term“shell shock”was first used to describe the range of both 
physical and psychological symptoms experienced by soldiers in combat. Shell shock has 
been identified as an important marker in the recognition and gradual development in the 
understanding of psychological symptoms caused by traumatic experiences (Loughran, 
2010). 
Exposure to traumatic events, such as war, conflict, natural disasters, assault and life 
threatening illnesses are common, with over two thirds of the general population likely to be 
exposed to a traumatic incident in their lifetime (Neria, Nandi, & Galea, 2008). Exposure to 
such events can have adverse psychological consequences, including both mood and anxiety 
disorders, and in the last three decades there has been an increase in the discussion of the 
impact of trauma, with particular focus on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Jones & 
Wessely, 2005). Previous systematic reviews have documented PTSD to be the most 
commonly studied psychopathology in the aftermath of trauma (Breslau, 2002; Neria et al., 
2008; Norris, Friedman, Watson, Byrne, Diaz & Kaniasty, 2002). The lifetime prevalence of 
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PTSD has been estimated to be 7% (De Vries & Olff, 2009; Kessler et al., 2005).  The risk of 
someone developing PTSD following a traumatic experience has been found to be associated 
with both individual characteristics and the type of event they have experienced (Yehuda, 
2002). Trauma of an interpersonal nature has been found to result in a greater risk of 
developing PTSD than traumatic events that were unintentional/not of an interpersonal 
nature (e.g. Kessler et al., 2014). Women are four times more likely to develop PTSD than 
men, after adjusting for exposure to traumatic events (Vieweg et al., 2005).  
An analysis from a survey of a large, representative community-based sample in 24 
countries (Kessler et al., 2014) estimated the conditional probability of PTSD for 29 types of 
traumatic events. The prevalence of PTSD following sexual relationship violence (e.g., rape, 
childhood sexual abuse, intimate partner violence) was 33%, following interpersonal-network 
traumatic experiences (e.g., unexpected death of a loved one, life-threatening illness of a 
child, other traumatic event of a loved one) was 30%, following Interpersonal violence (e.g., 
childhood physical abuse or witnessing interpersonal violence, physical assault, or being 
threatened by violence) was 12%. And following other life-threatening traumatic events (e.g., 
life-threatening motor vehicle collision, natural disaster, toxic chemical exposure) was 12%. 
By the time of the publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Third Edition-Revised (DSM-III-R, American Psychiatric Association, 1987), 
PTSD was already one of the most complex diagnoses in the manual (Brewin et al., 2017). It 
included 17 symptoms divided into three clusters (re-experiencing, avoidance and numbing, 
and physiological arousal), with different thresholds for each cluster, and two additional 
criteria concerning the nature of the stressor and the duration of symptoms. The DSM-IV 
(APA, 1994) included another criterion: the presence of clinically significant distress or 
impairment. In the DSM-V (APA, 2013), the three symptom clusters were increased to four 
(including ‘negative alterations in cognitions and mood’) on the basis of factor analytic 
 3 
findings (e.g., Zelazny & Simms, 2015) and three further symptoms were added. A 
dissociative subtype was also included for the first time, along with a separate subtype for 
preschool children. PTSD was also taken out of the category of anxiety disorders and 
recharacterized within its own category of stressor-related disorders. A "text revision" of 
the DSM-IV, known as the DSM-IV-TR, was published in 2000 (APA, 2000). The diagnostic 
criterion for PTSD were unchanged. 
A diagnosis of PTSD in the DSM-V requires a person to have had direct or indirect 
(e.g., witnessing or learning about the experience of a close friend or relative) death, 
threatened death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence 
(Criterion A; see Table 1.1). The symptoms of PTSD develop in response to a specific 
incident (or incidents), and there is commonly an observable relationship between the 
characteristics of the traumatic incident experienced and the content of the intrusive images 
the triggers to these as well as the associated distress and physiological reactivity. 
According to the DSM-V, PTSD symptoms are divided into four clusters: intrusive 
re-experiencing, avoidance, negative alterations in cognitions and mood and physiological 
arousal (Criterion B – E; see Table 1.1). Symptoms of re-experiencing can include: thoughts, 
images, flashbacks and nightmares evoking extreme feelings of distress and fear. Flashbacks 
are an intrusive, vivid reminder or sense of ‘reliving’ the trauma memory and can be re-
experienced as images, smells, sounds or sensations (or a combination). People with PTSD 
often report feeling as though the traumatic experience is happening again in the present and 
re-experiencing symptoms can sometimes cause people to lose touch with the “here and 
now” and react in ways they did when the trauma originally occurred (due to a reliving/re-
experiencing of the same thoughts, emotions and physiological sensations). For example, 
many victims of assault report sitting in a particular room in their house with the lights off, 
having ensured that all of the doors and windows are locked. Flashbacks tend to re-occur in 
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response to reminders of the traumatic experience (such as being asked to talk about what 
happened or seeing something related such as a similar event on the television) and are 
associated with strong feelings and physiological sensations that were experienced at the time 
of the traumatic experience.  
Symptom Cluster (A – E) Criteria 
 
A. The person was exposed to 
one or more of the following 
event(s): death or threatened 
death, actual or threatened 
serious injury, or actual or 
threatened sexual violation, in 
one or more of the following 
ways:  
 
1. Experiencing the event(s) him/herself. 
 
2. Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as they occurred 
to others. 
 
3. Learning that the event(s) occurred to a close relative 
or close friend; in such cases, the actual or threatened 
death must have been violent or accidental. 
 
4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to 
aversive details of the event(s) (e.g., first responders 
collecting body parts; police officers repeatedly 
exposed to details of child abuse); this does not 
apply to exposure through electronic media, 
television, movies, or pictures, unless this exposure 
is work related. 
B. Intrusion symptoms that are 
associated with the traumatic 
event(s) (that began after the 
traumatic event(s)), as 
evidenced by one or more of the 
following:  
 
1. Spontaneous or cued recurrent, involuntary, and 
intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic 
event(s). 
 
2. Recurrent distressing dreams in which the content 
and/or affect of the dream is related to the event(s). 
 
3. Dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) in which the 
individual feels or acts as if the traumatic event(s) 
were recurring. 
 
4. Intense or prolonged psychological distress at 
exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize 
or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event(s). 
 
5. Marked physiological reactions to reminders of the 
traumatic event(s). 
C. Persistent avoidance of 
stimuli associated with the 
traumatic event(s) (that began 
after the traumatic event(s)), as 
evidenced by efforts to avoid 
1. Internal reminders (thoughts, feelings, or physical 
sensations) that arouse recollections of the 
traumatic event(s). 
 
2. External reminders (people, places, conversations, 
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one or both of the following:  activities, objects, situations) that arouse 
recollections of the traumatic event(s). 
D. Negative alterations in 
cognitions and mood that are 
associated with the traumatic 
event(s) (that began or 
worsened after the traumatic 
event(s)), as evidenced by three 
or more of the following:  
 
1. Inability to remember an important aspect of the 
traumatic event(s) (typically dissociative amnesia; 
not due to head injury, alcohol, or drugs). 
 
2. Persistent and exaggerated negative expectations 
about one’s self, others, or the world. 
 
3. Persistent distorted blame of self or others about 
the cause or consequences of the traumatic 
event(s). 
 
4. Pervasive negative emotional state (for example, 
fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame). 
 
5. Markedly diminished interest or participation in 
significant activities. 
 
6. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others. 
 
7. Persistent inability to experience positive emotions 
(e.g., unable to have loving feelings, psychic 
numbing). 
E. Alterations in arousal and 
reactivity that are associated 
with the traumatic event(s) (that 
began or worsened after the 
traumatic event(s)), as 
evidenced by three or more of 
the following:  
 
 
1. Irritable or aggressive behavior. 
 
2. Reckless or self-destructive behavior. 
 
3. Hypervigilance. 
 
4. Exaggerated startle response. 
 
5. Problems with concentration. 
 
6. Sleep disturbance (for example, difficulty falling or 
staying asleep, or restless sleep). 
Table 1.1: DSM-V Criteria for PTSD 
Symptoms of PTSD also typically include persistent avoidance of stimuli associated 
with the trauma, such as attempts to avoid talking or thinking about what happened, avoiding 
contact with the assailant and anything that might trigger re-experiencing symptoms and the 
associated unpleasant emotions. PTSD symptoms also commonly include persistent 
symptoms of increased physiological arousal, such as concentration and memory problems, 
sleep difficulties, irritability and anger, being easily startled and hypervigilant to threat.  
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The cardinal symptoms of PTSD centre on intrusive memories of the traumatic 
experience that are prototypically high in frequency, sensorily-laden, involuntary, distressing, 
fragmented and relatively immune to attempts at prevention. Research suggests traumatic 
memories are likely to be fragmented into several key ‘hotspots’ (e.g. Grey, Holmes & 
Brewin, 2001). Hotspots are typically the ‘worst moments’ for the person during the 
traumatic event, and it is these moments that tend to come back as intrusive memories. While 
the hotspots may be recalled in a jumbled, non-sequential order, they are generally 
remembered as vivid and clear, whereas other details of the traumatic event may be more 
difficult to recall. Therefore, it is common for there to be gaps, and in some cases 
inaccuracies in the trauma narrative. 
The reliving or reactivation of trauma memories in people with PTSD involves a 
reactivation of the body’s threat response. For example, Van Der Kolk 2006 emphasises the 
notion that sensory triggers reinstate hormonal and motoric responses relevant to the original 
trauma. Therefore, a range of fear-related physiological symptoms are commonly reported. 
These can include: a pounding heart, sweating, shaking, feeling nauseous, dizziness or 
fainting, shortness of breath and headaches. However, the body’s response to threat is 
idiosyncratic and therefore individuals tend to report a different combination of symptoms. 
Commonly reported thoughts and cognitive difficulties in people with PTSD include: 
disbelief, horror, confusion, poor concentration, disorientation, memory difficulties, poor 
attention (finding it difficult to retain information for example), poor decision making 
abilities and a preoccupation with the trauma memories. Commonly reported feelings include 
the following: shock, anxiety, agitation, panic, anger (at self and/or others), sadness, 
helplessness, hopelessness, guilt and shame.  
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1.2 Complex PTSD (CPTSD)  
‘...repeated trauma in childhood forms and deforms the personality. The child trapped in an 
abusive environment is faced with formidable tasks of adaptation. She must find a way to 
preserve a sense of trust in people who are untrustworthy, safety in a situation that is unsafe, 
control in a situation that is terrifyingly unpredictable, power in a situation of helplessness.’ 
– Herman (1997) 
 
Individuals presenting with PTSD are not a homogenous group. Individuals who 
experience repeated interpersonal trauma (including sexual and domestic violence and abuse in 
childhood) often present with PTSD with more complex features than those exposed to single-
incident traumas (Herman, 1997). The diagnostic conceptualisation of Complex PTSD 
(CPTSD) described in the clinical and empirical literature has varied over time, with 
symptom clusters between these conceptualisations overlapping but not identical. CPTSD has 
been alternately named Disorders of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified (DESNOS) 
(Herman, 1997; Pelcovitz, Van der Kolk, Roth, Mandel, Kaplan, & Resick, 1997), ‘PTSD 
and its Associated Features’ in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), and Enduring Personality Change 
after Catastrophic Events (EPCACE) in the World Health Organisation (WHO) International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10, 1992).  
The ICD-11 includes a proposal for diagnosis of CPTSD (due to be published in 2018) 
and this is the first time a diagnostic manual has included CPTSD, reflecting increasing clinical 
interest and research in the area, with many supporting the inclusion of CPTSD as a distinct 
construct. Diagnosis of CPTSD in the proposed ICD-11 includes the defining criteria of PTSD 
(re-experiencing, avoidance, numbing, and hyperarousal), as well as the presence of at least one 
symptom in each of three self-organisation features: affect, negative self-concept and 
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relational disturbance. The affective domain problems are characterised by emotion 
dysregulation (including alterations in attention and consciousness e.g., dissociation, including 
depersonalisation and derealisation), self-disturbances are characterised by negative self-
concept (including persistent beliefs about oneself as diminished, defeated or worthless) and 
interpersonal disturbances are defined by persistent difficulties in sustaining relationships 
(Briere, Kaltman, & Green, 2008; Cloitre et al., 2009; Cloitre, Garvert, Brewin, Bryant, & 
Maercker, 2013).  
Presentations consistent with the ICD-11 criteria have been more frequently reported in 
survivors of repeated interpersonal and/or sexual trauma, relative to other trauma survivors (e.g., 
Karatzias et al., 2017; Powers et al., 2017).  As a result, much of the research into CPTSD has 
focused on survivors of childhood sexual abuse (e.g., Finkelhor & Dziuba-Leatherman, 
1994). The conceptualisation of CPTSD has been influenced by developmental research, 
which has shown that childhood abuse (including neglect, emotional abuse, absent or 
mentally ill parents) commonly results in impairment in developmental processes including 
the ability to regulate emotion and to have effective interpersonal relationships (e.g., 
Shipman, Edwards, Brown, Swisher, & Jennings, 2005; Shipman, Zeman, Penza, & 
Champion, 2000). Further, there is evidence to suggest in the growing evidence base for 
CPTSD that both children and adults demonstrate a relationship between exposure to 
traumatic experiences and the presence of an increasing number of theoretically based and 
empirically constrained symptoms (Cloitre et al., 2009).  
Further support for the relationship between childhood trauma and CPTSD comes 
from a study of a nationally representative sample of Danes (Hyland et al., 2017), which 
found that cumulative exposure to multiple forms of childhood interpersonal violence created 
a greater risk of developing CPTSD as compared to PTSD classification in a dose-response 
fashion. The presence of one type of childhood interpersonal violence produced twice the risk 
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of CPTSD relative to PTSD and that risk substantially increased with every additional event 
type.  
Early relationships with parents or other caregivers provide the relational context in 
which children develop the earliest psychological representations of self, other, and self in 
relation to others. These working models form the foundation of a child's developmental 
competencies, including distress tolerance, curiosity, sense of agency, and communication 
(Spinazzola et al., 2005). When the child-caregiver relationship is the source of trauma (as is 
commonly the case with abuse that occurs in in childhood), the attachment relationship can 
be severely compromised. When attachment to a primary caregiver is severely disrupted, this 
can engender lifelong risk of mental illness (e.g. Spinazzola et al., 2005). Resulting 
impairments can include a heightened threat response, increased susceptibility to stress (e.g., 
difficulty focusing attention and modulating arousal); inability to regulate emotions without 
external assistance (e.g., feeling overwhelmed by intense or numbed emotions); and altered 
help-seeking (e.g., excessive help-seeking and dependency or social isolation and 
withdrawal). 
Early trauma and the development of CPTSD, therefore, can have a pervasive impact 
on one’s life history and sense of self, changing how people construct their life narrative and 
perceive themselves, their emotions and their relationships with others, in a way that simple 
PTSD does not.  Some studies (e.g. Cloitre et al., 2009) suggest that exposure to multiple or 
repeated forms of maltreatment and trauma in childhood can lead to outcomes that are not 
simply more severe than the sequelae of single incident trauma, but are qualitatively different 
in their tendency to affect multiple affective and interpersonal domains. An increasing 
number of different types of traumatic experiences have been associated with an increasingly 
greater number of different types of symptoms experienced simultaneously (i.e., symptom 
complexity; Briere, Kaltman, & Green, 2008; van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & 
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Spinazzola, 2005) and this association can occur following repeated trauma in adulthood as 
well as childhood. In adulthood, Herman (1992) emphasises the importance of subordination 
to coercive control in the development of CPTSD and proposes that this can occur in 
situations where adults are exposed to multiple, repeated traumas such as within domestic 
violence relationships or during kidnapping or being held in captivity (Cloitre et al., 2009). 
1.3       PTSD and the Sense of Self  
“In the broad sense, as a processing of everything one hears or witnesses, all fiction is 
autobiographical – imagination ground through the mill of memory. It’s impossible to 
separate the two ingredients.” Rohinton Mistry 
 
People with PTSD commonly report their traumatic experiences as being a 
fundamental part of their current identity, and having been an organising principal for their 
autobiography. PTSD can be considered as a disorder inherently driven by the 
autobiographical past. PTSD develops in response to past traumatic events and experiences 
and memories of the personal past can intrude into and dominate one’s awareness in the 
present.  
1.3.1 Autobiographical Memory and PTSD 
Autobiographical memory refers to memory for one’s personal history (Robinson, 
1976). Examples might include memories for particular childhood experiences, learning to 
ride a bike or a memory of your grandparent’s home. Brewer (1986) divided autobiographical 
memories into categories of personal memories, autobiographical facts, and generic personal 
memories. Personal memories are memories for specific events in one’s life that tend to be 
represented by particular images and are dated in space and time. In contrast, 
autobiographical facts are facts about an individual that are devoid of personally experienced 
temporal or spatial context information. For example, you will know the date and location of 
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your own birth, but you will not have a personal memory of the event. Generic personal 
memory refers to more abstract knowledge about oneself (e.g., aspects of your personality) or 
to acquired procedural knowledge such as how to drive a car or play a musical instrument. 
Despite the conceptual overlap these classifications, a unique feature of autobiographical 
memory is that it must directly relate to oneself or one’s sense of personal history (Deak & 
Holt, 2008). 
The profound impact of traumatic events on autobiographical memory is something 
that has been discussed for over 100 years. Beginning with Freud (Breuer & Freud, 1895, 
cited in Corsini & Wedding, 2000) and Janet (1919/1925, cited in van der Kolk, 1994), the 
theoretical understanding has been that the occurrence of traumatic events, particularly 
during childhood, leads to dramatic alterations in memory functioning. More recent 
discussions have included the impact of trauma on memory fragmentation or disorganisation 
(e.g., van der Kolk, 1994) and the dissociation of trauma memories from other 
autobiographical memories (e.g., Brewin, 2001; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; van der Kolk, 1994), 
as a way of protecting one from the emotional distress associated with their traumatic 
experience(s).  
It has been suggested that traumatic experiences could change the way memories are 
accessed, with trauma survivors learning to halt memory retrieval in order to avoid intense 
emotional distress. This can occur through mechanisms such as memory fragmentation or 
dissociation but also impaired retrieval of memories of specific autobiographical events (e.g., 
J. M. G. Williams, 1996), resulting in a difficulty in describing specific memories and what 
has been termed autobiographical memory overgenerality (e.g., Moore & Zoellner, 2007). 
Overgenerality in the retrieval of autobiographical memories is evident in PTSD and has been 
associated with the development of PTSD after trauma (e.g., Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998). 
Williams et al., (2007) suggested that trauma-exposed children learn to avoid painful 
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emotions by halting autobiographical memory retrieval before a recollection of a specific 
event can be retrieved. Overgenerality of memory can therefore be viewed as a functional 
response to traumatic childhood events that serves to regulate intense negative emotions.  
1.3.2 Self Identity and PTSD 
Following extreme negative events, victims often struggle to rebuild and maintain 
positive views of themselves and their world (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1985, 1989, 1992). PTSD 
can persist and symptoms can become exacerbated due to excessive negative appraisals of the 
traumatic event and its sequelae (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and thus can be perpetuated by 
negative social reactions such as criticism, attribution of blame or not being believed by 
others, which can then be internalised. Negative self-beliefs can have an impact on an 
individual’s self-concept and psychological adjustment (Showers, Zeigler-Hill & Limke, 
2006). 
It has been argued that traumatic events can become central in the organisation of an 
individual’s identity and life story (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). As humans, we adapt to 
changes and difficulties in the environment by organising personally experienced events in 
terms of self-reference (e.g. Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). This allows us to process and 
find meaning in our experiences. More specifically in relation to PTSD, intrusive memories 
of our traumatic experiences are believed to structure our autobiographical narratives, inform 
our sense of self, and act as a reference point for our expectations and attributions in daily life 
(e.g. Robinaugh & McNally, 2011).  Researchers have used Berntsen and Rubin’s (2006) 
Centrality of Events Scale (CES) to examine this and positive associations have been found 
between CES scores for traumatic or highly aversive events and PTSD symptom severity 
among undergraduates (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007; Robinaugh & McNally, 2010) 
and combat veterans (Brown, Antonius, Kramer, Root, & Hirst, 2010). 
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1.3.3 Negative Self-Talk and Pseudohallucinations  
Symptoms of PTSD can include negative beliefs about the self being broken or 
damaged in some way, about others being difficult to trust and about the world being 
dangerous. In fact, one criterion in the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
diagnosis for PTSD is ‘Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations about 
oneself, others, or the world (e.g., “I am bad,” “No one can be trusted,”’ In the proposed 
ICD-11 diagnosis for CPTSD, the negative self-concept cluster includes the following 
criterion: ‘Persistent beliefs about oneself as diminished, defeated or worthless.’ Karatzias et 
al (2018) investigated the association between negative trauma-related cognitions and a 
CPTSD diagnosis. The most important correlate of CPTSD was negative cognitions about the 
self, characterised by a generalised negative view about the self and one’s own symptoms of 
CPTSD. Negative self-concept is a central aspect of the both the PTSD and CPTSD 
formulation, which are commonly defined by persistent beliefs about the self being 
diminished, defeated or worthless, accompanied by feelings of shame, guilt or failure 
(Maercker et al., 2013).  
The psychological phenomenon of “splitting” the self into distinctly positive and 
negative aspects (the good me vs. the bad me) is said to be an important mechanism for 
coping with both negative experiences and negative knowledge about the self (e.g. Bowlby, 
1980; Sullivan, 1953). The “bad”, damaged or broken parts of the self tend to be split off or 
compartmentalised into particular aspects of self (e.g. me with sexual partners), whilst people 
retain parts of themselves that are more positive and functional (e.g. me in a work 
environment). There are also mechanisms which people with PTSD frequently use to inhibit 
the reliving symptoms and overwhelming emotions associated with the disorder, including 
suppression repression, and dissociation (including depresonalisation and derealisation; e.g. 
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Holmes et al., 2005). Dissociation during traumatic events is a well-recognised phenomena 
(Holmes et al., 2005; Murray, Ehlers & Mayou, 2002). The term dissociation encapsulates a 
range of responses for victims of traumatic experiences and involves a partial or complete 
disruption of the normal integration of a person’s conscious or psychological functioning 
(Dell & O’Neill, 2009).   
Another element of a dissociative mechanism that may occur as a response to trauma 
may be the experience of auditory verbal hallucinations. Auditory verbal hallucinations 
(AVHs) have been defined as the experience of hearing a voice in the absence of an 
appropriate external stimulus (Stanghellini & Cutting, 2003). In non-psychotic conditions, 
AVHs are most commonly reported in cases of combat-related Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) (David, Kutcher, Jackson, & Mellman, 1999; Hamner, Frueh, Ulmer & 
Arana, 1999; Seedat, Stein, Oosthuizen, Emsley, & Stein, 2003), but have also been reported 
in studies with civilian samples (e.g. Brewin & Patel, 2010). Both theory and a number of 
research studies in this area suggest that the experience of AVHs in PTSD may be better 
understood as a dissociative experience and thus conceptualised as ‘pseudohallucinations.’ 
A recent review (Steel, 2015) explored the relationship between hallucinations 
(including AVHs) and stressful or traumatic life events. Steel (2015) concluded that the 
relationship between hallucinations and past traumatic experiences remains elusive and that 
further research is needed in this area to more fully establish the link. If AVHs are 
conceptualised as the auditory re-experiencing of past traumatic events then this has 
important implications for treatment. 
The first three studies of this thesis (described in chapters two, three and four) explore 
the components of autobiographical memory, self-identity and pseudohallucinations in 
PTSD, respectively.  
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1.4 Emotions, Emotion Regulation and PTSD  
“Emotions are central to human functioning, guiding thought and action from the earliest 
days of life” Frijda, 1988 
 
As outlined above, the affective domain problems identified in CPTSD have been 
characterised by emotion dysregulation. Multiple early traumatic experiences commonly 
result in impairment in developmental processes including the ability to recognise, identify 
and regulate emotion. This has been understood in the context of early attachment 
relationships with caregivers. It has been suggested that, in early life, regulation of emotion is 
situated outside of the individual, with caregivers playing a primary role in influencing 
infants’ emotions, by teaching them to recognise and name their own emotions, as well as to 
comfort and self-soothe in times of distress (e.g. Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & 
Nesselroade, 2000).  
Over time, regulatory processes become internalised; cognitive appraisals – the 
meaning people attribute to their experiences begin to influence their emotional responses 
(Lazarus, 1991). As stated above, in relation to self-identity and PTSD, PTSD can persist and 
symptoms can become exacerbated due to excessive negative appraisals of the traumatic 
event and its sequelae (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model of PTSD 
emphasises the role of self-relevant appraisals of traumatic experience and/or its sequelae in 
the maintenance of PTSD. The model suggests that appraisals function to maintain a sense of 
current threat in the survivor’s life and are instrumental in promoting the use of maladaptive 
strategies intended to control this threat and the current symptoms.  Ehlers, Clark and 
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colleagues (e.g. Ehlers, Hackmann & Michael, 2004; Dunmore, Clark & Ehlers, 1997; Ehlers 
et al., 2002) interviewed individuals with chronic PTSD and found that they showed 
excessively negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae. These appraisals tended to 
represent highly idiosyncratic personal negative meanings (rather than being the expected or 
“normal” response to a particular experience). 
It follows that repeated unpleasant, traumatic experiences over time commonly result 
in more fully entrenched beliefs about the self, others and the world, but also beliefs in 
relation to one’s own ability to adequately understand, validate and manage distressing 
emotions. Impairments in regulating emotion can compromise one’s ability to cope with the 
distress associated with the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD. Current conceptualisations 
suggest that individuals with PTSD over-utilise relatively ineffective emotion regulation 
strategies, such as expressive suppression and under-utilise more effective emotion regulation 
strategies such as cognitive reappraisal (Boden et al, 2013). Adults with a history of 
childhood abuse often report problems with modulating emotional states (van der Kolk, 
1996), higher levels of hostility and anxiety compared to other clinical samples (Zlotnick et 
al., 1996) and chronic problems with anger management (Briere, 1988).  
It is not only emotional awareness and effective emotion regulation that have been 
associated with good mental health, emphasis has also been placed on the diversity of 
emotional experience that an individual reports (Quoidbach et al., 2014; although see 
Sommers, 1981, for discussion of ‘emotional range’). Beyond the individual differences in 
awareness and recognition of different emotions, there are individual differences in how 
people understand, interpret and communicate their own emotional experience. It has been 
suggested that more specific, differentiated emotional states (e.g., happiness, excitement, and 
joy) have greater adaptive value than less differentiated, more global affective states (e.g., 
feeling good) because differentiated emotional states can be more easily identified and 
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understood by others and are less subject to misattribution (e.g., Kehner, Locke & Aurain, 
1993). Moreover, differentiated emotional states are argued to provide richer information to 
guide the use of specific strategies to effectively regulate emotion (Barrett & Gross, 2001; 
Barrett et al., 2001). 
Quoidbach et al., (2014) examined the benefits of greater emotional diversity – or 
emodiversity as it has been termed, deriving their definition from the literature on 
biodiversity. The fourth study of this thesis (described in chapter five) seeks to expand 
existing research findings on the association between emodiversity and mental health to 
explore the relationship between emodiversity and clinical manifestations of PTSD.  
1.5 Simple and Complex PTSD  
An important initial question that has been raised regarding the proposed ICD-11 
diagnosis of CPTSD is whether CPTSD describes a class of individuals who are distinct from 
those with PTSD and who differ from those with PTSD by having a more “complex” 
symptom profile comprised of a greater number and type of clinically significant symptoms, 
not simply just more complicated cases of simple PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 2017, Resick et 
al., 2012). According to a recent review by Brewin et al. (2017), the distinction between 
PTSD and CPTSD has been supported in several latent class and latent profile analyses. 
Brewin et al (2017) identified 10 studies that had been published and nine of them identified 
the presence of at least two distinct symptom profiles, one describing a group of individuals 
endorsing high levels of CPTSD symptoms in all six clusters (re-experiencing, avoidance, 
sense of threat, affect dysregulation, negative self- concept, and disturbances in 
relationships), and another reporting high levels of PTSD symptoms but low levels of 
symptoms related to disturbances in self organization (reflecting a simple PTSD profile).  
There is also a question regarding whether current evidence-based interventions for PTSD 
(e.g. eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing [EMDR], trauma-focused cognitive 
behavioural therapy [TF-CBT]) need to be tailored for to better account for complex features 
 18 
(Cloitre et al., 2012; van Minnen, Harned, Zoellner, & Mills, 2012). Guidelines recently 
published by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2018) state ‘Offer an 
individual trauma-focused CBT intervention to adults with a diagnosis of PTSD or clinically 
important symptoms of PTSD who have presented more than 1 month after a traumatic event 
and consider EMDR for adults with a diagnosis of PTSD or clinically important symptoms of 
PTSD who have presented between 1 and 3 months after a non-combat-related trauma if the 
person has a preference for EMDR.’ They further suggest that ‘trauma-focused CBT 
interventions for adults should: be based on a validated manual and typically be provided 
over 8 to 12 sessions, but more if clinically indicated, for example if they have experienced 
multiple traumas’ (NICE guidelines, NG 116).  
The most recent NICE guidelines (December 2018, NG116, section 1.7.3) also 
include some recommendations for individuals with additional needs, including those with 
complex PTSD:  
 build in extra time to develop trust with the person, by increasing the duration or 
the number of therapy sessions according to the person's needs 
 take into account the safety and stability of the person's personal circumstances 
(for example their housing situation) and how this might affect engagement with 
and success of treatment  
 help the person manage any issues that might be a barrier to engaging with 
trauma-focused therapies, such as substance misuse, dissociation, emotional 
dysregulation, interpersonal difficulties or negative self-perception  
 work with the person to plan any ongoing support they will need after the end of 
treatment, for example to manage any residual PTSD symptoms or comorbidities. 
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However, at this time, there are not any specific interventions recommended for individuals   
who have more complex presentations of PTSD or meet the proposed ICD-11 criteria for 
CPTSD. 
NICE (2018) guidelines indicate that PTSD can be treated somewhat effectively with 
specifically tailored psychological interventions (including cognitive processing therapy; 
CPT, cognitive therapy for PTSD, narrative exposure therapy; NET and prolonged exposure 
therapy) and current best practice comprises a range of techniques, predominantly based on 
the CBT approach. Trauma Focused-CBT (TF-CBT) involves a collaborative development of 
an individualised formulation, commonly a version of the Ehlers and Clark (2000) cognitive 
model of PTSD, by identifying the relevant appraisals, memory characteristics and triggers, 
and behavioural and cognitive strategies that maintain an individual’s PTSD. A treatment 
plan is constructed, with specific interventions tailored to the formulation. Analysis of 
memory processes in PTSD and their link with problematic appraisals and behaviors that 
maintain PTSD has led to the development of specific theory-guided memory-based treatment 
procedures for this condition (e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & 
Fennell, 2005). For example, The Updating Trauma Memories procedure (e.g. Ehlers 2015) 
addresses the disjointedness of memories of the worst moments of the trauma from information 
that gives them a less threatening meaning. This procedure includes (1) identifying the moments 
during the trauma that create the greatest distress and sense of “nowness” through imaginal 
reliving or writing a narrative, and identification of the patient’s intrusive memories, (2) 
identifying the personal meanings of these moments, and (3) identifying “updating” information 
that puts the impressions the patient had at the time or the problematic meanings into perspective.  
Treatment also commonly involves behavioural experiments designed to help clients reduce 
unhelpful behaviors and cognitive processes, such as rumination, hypervigilance to danger, 
 20 
thought suppression, and “safety behaviours” (behaviours considered to be excessively 
cautious due to heightened threat perception) (Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008).  
Recent figures for PTSD suggest an average recovery rate of 37.8% (Health and Social 
Care Information Centre, 2016) following TF-CBT but dropping as low as 15–20% for some 
services, making it one of the disorders with lowest recovery in UK-based Improving Access 
to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services (Murray, 2017). One reason proposed for the low 
recovery rates following treatment for PTSD relates to the recognised complexity of the 
disorder. It is widely accepted that the effects of trauma exposure are heterogeneous and 
according to a number of researchers, this heterogeneity is not addressed in many of the 
evidence-based therapies available to date (e.g. Cloitre, 2015). 
A number of authors propose that trauma-focused treatments can be offered to those who 
have experienced multiple and/or repeated traumatic experiences without any major 
modifications (e.g., Cook, Schnurr, & Foa, 2004; Resick, Nishith, & Griffin, 2003; van 
Minnen et al., 2012). However, others argue that interventions should be adapted to address 
the additional symptoms identified in individuals presenting with more complex 
presentations of the disorder. An expert consensus survey (Cloitre et al., 2011) indicated that 
84% of 50 expert clinicians endorsed a phase-based or sequenced approach as a first line 
treatment for CPTSD, involving three phases, each with a distinct function. Phase one focuses on 
ensuring the individual’s safety, reducing symptoms, and increasing important emotional, social 
and psychological competencies. Phase two focuses on processing the unresolved aspects of the 
individual’s memories of traumatic experiences (this phase emphasizes the review and re-
appraisal of traumatic memories so that they are integrated into an adaptive representation of self, 
relationships and the world). Phase three involves consolidation of treatment gains to facilitate 
the transition from the end of the treatment to greater engagement in relationships, work or 
education, and community life. 
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There was also strong consensus that the treatment be patient-centered and that interventions 
be tailored to prominent symptoms: ‘The symptom profile of Complex PTSD recognizes the loss 
of emotional, social, cognitive and psychological competencies that either failed to develop 
properly or that deteriorated due to prolonged exposure to complex trauma. The treatment for 
Complex PTSD, then, emphasizes not only the reduction of psychiatric symptoms, but equally, 
improvement in key functional capacities for self-regulation and strengthening of psychosocial 
and environmental resources.’ (ISTSS guidelines, page 5, 2012). In light of these 
recommendations, some clinicians and researchers are of the opinion that treatment for CPTSD 
should focus on the core symptoms of PTSD as well as on an individual’s associated functional 
capacities and resources.  
The efficacy of the phase-based treatment approach for treating CPTSD has only been 
addressed in two studies to date. The first study (Cloitre, Koenen & Cohen, 2002) used a 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) to compare the efficacy of Skills Training in Affective and 
Interpersonal Regulation (STAIR) followed by prolonged exposure versus a waiting-list 
condition in a sample of female patients that suffer from PTSD as a result of childhood 
physical and/or sexual abuse. STAIR is a phase-based, sequential treatment that was specifically 
developed to treat women (in individual therapy) who had experienced childhood sexual abuse. 
The first phase (STAIR) emphasises skills training to improve daily life functioning, while the 
second phase (Narrative Story Telling; NST) focuses on the re-appraisal of trauma memories.  
The STAIR/exposure condition resulted in significant symptom reductions (i.e., PTSD 
severity, depression, general anxiety, dissociation), plus significant improvements in mood 
and anger regulation skills. In the STAIR phase, depression, anxiety, anger expression, and 
negative mood regulation improved significantly. This change occurred following the 
facilitation of Phase 2 of the treatment programme. There were no improvements in PTSD 
symptoms, dissociation, and alexithymia. The prolonged Exposure (PE) phase showed 
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reductions in PTSD symptoms, dissociation, and alexithymia, and further improvements in 
depression and anxiety. More specifically, relative to the women on wait list, those who 
received STAIR–modified PE showed significant improvement in three specifically targeted 
problem domains: affect regulation problems, interpersonal skills deficits and PTSD 
symptoms. No improvements were found in negative mood regulation and in anger 
expression in the PE phase. The results of Cloitre et al’s (2002) study suggest that the 
combination of STAIR/exposure is feasible and leads to a decrease in PTSD and a broad 
range of other symptoms associated with CPTSD. 
A second study by Cloitre et al. (2010) evaluated the efficacy of a phase-based treatment 
(STAIR/exposure) versus supportive counselling followed by prolonged exposure (support/ 
exposure) and versus STAIR followed by supportive counselling (STAIR/support) with 
women who had PTSD related to childhood sexual and/or physical abuse. The application of 
STAIR/exposure was found to be associated with greater benefits compared to the 
support/exposure condition in terms of self-reported reduction in PTSD symptom severity, 
interpersonal problems, and emotion regulation, but only at the three and six month follow 
up. Immediately after treatment, all three experimental treatment conditions resulted in a 
substantial proportion of patients no longer meeting criteria for PTSD. However, it has been 
argued that the lack of a treatment condition in which patients were directly exposed to their 
traumatic memories prevents definite conclusions being made about the relative benefits of a 
phase-based treatment approach over an immediate trauma-focused approach for patients 
suffering from PTSD related to childhood abuse (De Jongh et al., 2016). At present, there is 
no clear evidence-base to demonstrate consistently superior treatment effects for the use of a 
standard or phase-based approach to treating complex features (e.g.,Wagenmans, Van 
Minnen, Sleijpen, & De Jongh, 2018; Bongaerts, Van Minnen, & De Jongh, 2017; Cloitre, 
2016; Van Minnen et al., 2012). 
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The fifth study of this thesis (described in chapter six) therefore involved the 
development and preliminary evaluation of a group-based intervention for individuals who 
had experienced repeated interpersonal trauma. To facilitate group-based delivery, we replaced 
the NST phase of the STAIR programme with a number of different mnemonic control 
techniques. Given the key role of memory characteristics in predicting prognosis, we aimed to 
include greater emphasis (relative to STAIR) on memory-processing work, in line with existing 
evidence-based treatments (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & 
Fennell, 2005). The final protocol consisted of a skills in affective and interpersonal regulation 
phase, a memory processing phase, and a skills consolidation phase, delivered over twelve group-
based sessions. 
1.6 Structure of Thesis and Description of Research Participants  
1.6.1 Structure of Thesis 
 This thesis is for consideration for a degree of PhD by research papers. This means 
that the thesis is structured as a series of five stand-alone research papers, with each paper 
addressing one of the overarching themes identified in this first chapter. Each paper has either 
been accepted for publication or is currently under review and published as a preprint. 
Broadly speaking, the five presented papers that comprise the thesis explores some of the 
proposed features of PTSD and CPTSD, by exploring how memory systems may become 
disrupted by trauma and what this means for the sense of self and consequent psychological 
symptoms and the treatment of those symptoms through the use of a number of different 
research studies (which have all been published or submitted for publication). 
The first study (see chapter 2) explores the components of autobiographical memory, 
by examining the organisation of past autobiographical knowledge in a sample of sexual 
trauma survivors with PTSD compared to a sample of individuals with depression and 
healthy controls using a self-descriptive card-sorting task. 
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The second study (see chapter 3) explores self-identity by examining the structure of 
the self-concept in a sample of sexual trauma survivors with PTSD compared to healthy 
controls using a self-descriptive card-sorting task. 
The third study (see chapter 4) explores the prevalence of pseudohallucinations in a 
British sample of adult survivors of repeated physical and sexual trauma. 
The fourth study (see chapter 5) seeks to expand existing research findings on the 
association between emodiversity and mental health to explore the relationship between 
emodiversity and clinical manifestations of PTSD. 
The fifth study of this thesis (see chapter six) outlines the development and 
preliminary evaluation of a group intervention for individuals who had experienced repeated 
interpersonal trauma. 
 Each stand-alone research paper will be introduced at the start and discussed at the 
end of the relevant chapter, with an overview of how the research related to the overarching 
questions of the thesis, which were: whether the organisation of past autobiographical 
knowledge and self-concept differed in individuals with PTSD following sexual trauma and 
non-clinical controls, whether pseudohallucinations were prevalent in those with PTSD, 
whether there was an association between emotional diversity and clinical manifestations of 
PTSD and whether a group intervention incorporating some of the emerging interventions for 
PTSD with more complex features would be effective. Some of the content relevant to the 
research carried out (but not included in the publication of the paper) will be included in the 
appendices. 
 The screening and assessment measures used in each of the studies will be described 
within the relevant manuscript in each chapter. Copies of the measures themselves will be 
included in the general appendices in section 1.0. 
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 Ethics approval for all of the studies described here was obtained from the NHS 
National Research Ethics Service (reference 11/H0305/1). The full ethics application is included 
in the general appendices in section 2.0 
 For ease of reference, for each research paper we have included the numbering system 
utilised in the rest of the thesis. 
 
1.6.2 Description of Research Participants 
 For Studies 1-4 presented in this thesis (see chapters 2 – 5), we recruited adults (aged 
18 and over) for our clinical group with a current diagnosis of chronic1 PTSD according to 
the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) – studies commenced prior to the publication of the DSM-V – 
following a history of sexual, physical and/or emotional abuse (as Criterion A events), and a 
healthy control group with no history of disordered mental health.  
The majority of these PTSD participants were recruited from The Haven: A Sexual 
Assault Referral Centre (SARC) in London, UK. They were invited to take part following 
attendance at The Haven follow-up clinic or during an assessment for counseling or 
psychological therapy.The remainder of the chronic PTSD participants were recruited from 
the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Mental Health Panel – a database of some 
400 community volunteers with a history of mental health problems who have agreed to help 
with psychological research. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via advertisements in local 
newspapers.  
For the studies presented in this thesis, we selected participants with PTSD with a 
similarly chronic history. We focused on PTSD following sexual assault or abuse due to the 
recognition that presentations consistent with the ICD-11 criteria have been more frequently 
reported in survivors of repeated interpersonal and/or sexual trauma, relative to other trauma 
survivors (e.g., Karatzias et al., 2017; Powers et al., 2017). We anticipated that the long-lasting 
                                                        
1 duration of symptoms is 3 months or more (APA, 2013) 
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effects of such significant interpersonal trauma might have the clearest effects on the 
variables we sought to measure such as autobiographical memory, self-concept and overall 
life structure (Herman, 1992). 
There was some overlap in terms of the PTSD and control participants who took part 
in the individual studies. Ten participants in the PTSD group took part in both the life-
structure (study 1) and self-structure (study 2) and 8 participants in the control group took 
part in both. All of the participants in both the PTSD group and control group for studies 1 
and 2 also completed the auditory pseudo-hallucination semi-structured interview (study 3) 
and the emodiversity metrics (study 4) were calculated from the data collected from studies 1 
and 2. 
In each of the studies, PTSD diagnosis and history and other Axis I and II psychiatric 
comorbidity according to the DSM-IV were determined using the Structured Clinical 
Interview for the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders – Clinician Version (SCID, Version 2.0; First, 
Spitzer, Williams & Gibbon, 1996) and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR 
Axis II Personality Disorders (Borderline, Avoidant and Dependent) either by, or under the 
supervision of, a Clinical Psychologist, and by trained interviewers.  
In each of the studies, a control group of participants was recruited. These participants 
had no history of PTSD according to the SCID. They were recruited from the Cognition and 
Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Panel – a database of some 2000 community volunteers who 
have agreed to help with psychological research. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via 
advertisements in local newspapers. 
The clinical group in Studies 1-4 consisted of a sample of individuals who 
experienced sexual/physical abuse and/or assault and who, as a consequence, had developed 
PTSD. Our controls comprised individuals who did not report traumas of this nature and who 
did not meet criteria for PTSD. The reason for a lack of trauma-matched control group is that 
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it is very difficult to find individuals with this kind of trauma history, at the level of severity 
of our sample, who are without mental health problems and so any trauma-matched control 
group would likely present with significant symptoms of PTSD (alongside diagnoses of other 
disorders) even though they might not meet criteria for a full diagnosis. 
To be eligible for the study, participants had to be fluent in English and over 18 years 
of age. Exclusion criteria comprised a diagnosis of substance dependence, a history of 
psychosis, and organic brain injury. No participants were excluded on these bases. 
For Study 5 (see chapter 6), inclusion criteria were that participants experienced complex 
features of PTSD, had been raped or sexually assaulted in the 12 months prior to the group and 
had also experienced at least one prior interpersonal trauma in their lives. Complex features of 
PTSD were operationalized by cross-referencing participants’ scores on the Complex Trauma 
Symptoms Questionnaire (CTSQ; Cloitre et al., unpublished) with the ICD-11 criteria for 
CPTSD, providing a measure of perceived threat, emotion regulation difficulties, sense of self, 
self-recognition and agency, interpersonal difficulties, emotional blunting, and meaning attached 
to the trauma. Exclusion criteria were insufficient knowledge and understanding of English and 
current substance dependence. No participants were excluded on these bases. 
Participants (N= 15) for Study 5 were recruited following assessment at the Haven Sexual 
Assault Referral Centre (n=11); by the Sexual Offences Investigative Team (n=1); by the Sexual 
Health Psychology service (n=2); from the Praed Street Project (supporting women in the sex 
industry; n=1); from Eaves (a voluntary sector organisation supporting female victims of 
violence; n=1).  
Finally, for study 1 (see Chapter 2), we compared our PTSD and healthy control 
particpants with a pooled set of participants with chronic major Depressive Disorder using 
two datasets where the same past autobiographical life structure task had been used 
(Dalgleish et al., 2011; Werner-Seidler et al., 2018). We removed any participants from this 
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pooled sample who also met criteria for present or past PTSD, to create a chronic, recurrent 
MDD /No PTSD Group. We also removed participants from the MDD study control samples 
with current or past PTSD to create a No MDD/No PTSD Control group. Full details are 
included in the paper presented in Chapter 2. 
CHAPTER 2 
Research paper: Fractured pasts: The structure of the life story in sexual trauma 
survivors with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Authors: Clifford, G., Hitchcock, C. & Dalgleish, T. 
Submitted for publication at Clinical Psychological Science on 15/01/2019 
Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/tpxdr/ 
Citation: Clifford, G., Hitchcock, C., & Dalgleish, T. (2019). Fractured pasts: The structure  
of the life story in sexual trauma survivors with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  
Preprint: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/tpxdr 
For this paper, the candidate planned the study, collected the data for individuals with 
PTSD and matched control participants, analysed the results and wrote the paper. The co-
authors supervised the research process and made comments on iterative drafts of the 
manuscript. 
Preamble 
For each of chapters 2-6, there is a short ‘Background to the Study’ section setting the 
scene for the research paper that forms the heart of the chapter, as well as a short discussion 
section following the paper. These sections tie the stand-alone research papers into the 
overall programme of research and signpost the reader to additional research materials where 
relevant. 
2.1 Background to the Study 
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As outlined in Chapter 1, it has been argued that traumatic events can become central 
in the organisation of an individual’s identity and life story (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) and 
further to that, it has been suggested that traumatic experiences could change the way 
memories are accessed. The DSM-V avoidance symptoms of PTSD (avoiding reminders of 
the trauma, attempts not to think or talk about the trauma, social withdrawal, emotional 
numbing, loss of interest in particular activities, and psychogenic amnesia) (APA, 2013) have 
been proposed as an observable feature of the nature of autobiographical memory in 
individuals with PTSD – with individuals demonstrating an ‘overgeneral’ response, due to a 
relative difficulty in accessing specific memories of past events (e.g. Harvey, Bryant, & 
Dang, 1998; McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; McNally, Prassas, Shin, & 
Weathers, 1994; see Moore & Zoellner, 2007, for a review). 
Further to this, these avoidance strategies in PTSD and other strategies, including 
dissociation, suppression and repression are believed to be employed by individuals with 
PTSD in order to inhibit traumatic recollections of their past traumatic life experiences 
(Holmes et al., 2005). It has been argued that behavioural strategies are commonly employed 
by those with PTSD as a way of protecting themselves against the intrusive, distressing 
reminders that are characteristic of the disorder.  
The aim of study 1 was to examine the structure of the autobiographical life story in 
those with PTSD in order to establish the ways in which the disorder impacts on how 
individuals represent and organise personal memories of their life history. The life structure 
task used in this study allowed the computation of several metrics which allowed us to 
compare the personal narratives of individuals with PTSD, with individuals with depression 
and a non-clinical control group in order to establish whether these narratives had been 
chronically shaped by the experience of trauma. In this study, we focused on PTSD following 
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sexual assault or abuse as we anticipated that such significant interpersonal trauma might 
have the clearest effects on life structure (Herman, 1992). 
2.2 Research paper: Fractured pasts: The structure of the life story in sexual trauma 
survivors with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
2.2.1 Abstract  
This study primarily examined the organization of past and future autobiographical 
knowledge in a sample of sexual trauma survivors with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
compared to a sample of healthy controls, using a self-descriptive card-sorting task. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they had to write their autobiography and in 
preparation that they should divide their past (and future) life into chapters (e.g. ‘school 
years’ and ‘marriage’). They then characterized each chapter using a list of positive or 
negative attributes. We explored whether individuals with PTSD possessed a more 
affectively-compartmentalized life-structure, whereby positive and negative self-attributes 
showed greater disaggregation into separate chapters. We also examined redundancy (i.e., 
consistent endorsement) of positive and negative self-attributes across the different life-
chapters. Results revealed that the PTSD group overall utilized a greater proportion of 
negative descriptors, along with greater affective compartmentalization and reduced positive 
redundancy, across their past life-structure relative to the control participants. Groups did not 
differ on negative redundancy for the past life structure nor on any metrics for future life 
structure. Follow-up secondary analyses compared the past life-structure profile for those 
with PTSD to that of individuals with chronic depression, revealing significantly greater 
negative redundancy in the depressed group. Our findings are consistent with the prior 
theoretical and empirical literatures on mechanisms, such as avoidance and dissociation, that 
are implicated in PTSD as a means of inhibiting the negative impact of past traumatic 
experiences specifically, and negative information more generally.  
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2.2.2 Introduction  
Maladaptive responses to psychological trauma such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) are fundamentally defined by how the autobiographical past is remembered and 
processed. Most clearly, the cardinal symptoms of PTSD and associated syndromes center on 
intrusive memories of the traumatic experience itself. These intrusions are prototypically high 
in frequency, fragmented, sensorily-laden, involuntary, distressing, and relatively immune to 
attempts to prevent them. Intrusions often take the form of images or thoughts but can also 
occur as ‘flashbacks’ – the intense reliving of the original experience as if in the present 
moment (Brewin, 2014; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition 
[DSM-5]; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). 
Another core feature of PTSD is the way that these past memories of trauma are 
managed by those who experience them. Those suffering from PTSD commonly exhibit a 
variety of different of psychological and behavioral strategies to protect themselves against 
potentially toxic or damaging information stemming from their traumatic experiences and its 
impact upon the self.  Many of these strategies are included among the DSM-5 Avoidance 
Symptoms of PTSD (avoiding reminders of the trauma, attempts not to think or talk about the 
trauma, social withdrawal, emotional numbing, loss of interest in particular activities, and 
psychogenic amnesia) (APA, 2013). Other strategies include dissociation (including 
depersonalization and derealization), suppression and repression, which are employed by 
sufferers of PTSD to inhibit traumatic recollections and the overwhelming emotions 
associated with the trauma (Holmes et al., 2005).  
These avoidance features of PTSD are proposed to be related to a second observable 
feature of autobiographical memory in the disorder – a relative difficulty in accessing specific 
memories of all past events, whether positive, negative or neutral in valence (e.g. Harvey, 
Bryant, & Dang, 1998; McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 1995; McNally, Prassas, Shin, 
 32 
& Weathers, 1994; see Moore & Zoellner, 2007, for a review). For example, in laboratory 
studies, when explicitly asked to retrieve a specific memory from their lives in response to a 
cue word (e.g., happy) on the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) – the standard 
paradigm for examining memory specificity – those with PTSD are more likely to generate 
an overgeneral response (e.g., Whenever I visit my friend) instead of a memory of a single, 
circumscribed event (e.g., Going to my friend’s place last Saturday afternoon). The leading 
hypothesis is that this tendency for overgeneralized recollection of the past reflects an 
avoidant processing style that is initially focused on preventing detailed recollection of 
specific trauma memories, but which has subsequently generalized to all autobiographical 
material (Williams et al., 2007). There is some support for this view, with those PTSD 
sufferers exhibiting higher levels of avoidance symptoms showing the greatest overgenerality 
when remembering non-trauma material (e.g. Kuyken & Brewin, 1995, Williams, Stiles, & 
Shapiro, 1999, Williams et al, 2007).  
This extension of the effects of PTSD to how other non-trauma personal memories are 
processed is proposed to reflect a more pervasive influence of the syndrome on the 
autobiography. For all of us, memories of past traumatic experiences are thought to provide 
meaning and structure to our life narratives, as well as helping to stabilize our conceptions of 
ourselves (e.g., Baerger & McAdams, 1999; Pillemer, 1998, 2003). However, for those with 
PTSD, it has been argued that trauma memories form a central reference point for the 
individual’s whole life and identity infusing other, non-traumatic, experiences with trauma-
related meaning (Bernsten & Rubin, 2006, 2008). Such meanings include negative beliefs 
about the self being broken or damaged by past traumatic experiences, or the world being 
untrustworthy and toxic, as reflected in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013). 
The aim of the present study was to examine the structure of the autobiographical life-
story in those with PTSD to further elucidate the impact of the syndrome on how individuals 
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represent and organize information about their past. To do this we used a card-sorting 
methodology originally formulated within the self-organization literature (Dozois & Dobson, 
2001a, 2001b; Linville, 1985, 1987; Showers, 1992; Showers & Kling, 1996; Zajonc, 1960) 
but subsequently applied to study of the autobiographical past (Dalgleish et al., 2011; Jobson 
et al., 2018). The advantage of this approach is that, rather than extracting meta-beliefs about 
the life narrative, using self-report, the task instead requires participants to map out their life 
structure and to think independently about each ‘chapter’ of their lives (Conway, 2005; 
Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). This allows us to examine patterns that manifest across the 
different chapters and that systematically differ between those with and without PTSD.  
2.2.2.1 The Life Structure Task  
The central premise of the Life Structure Task (Dalgleish et al., 2011) is to request 
participants to generate a list of the important time periods – life chapters – from their past 
(e.g. ‘my time at college’, ‘my marriage’). Participants are then asked asked to allocate sets of 
negative and positive adjectives (pre-selected as prototypical descriptors of life periods) to 
those chapters for which they are relevant. Life chapters have been identified as a component 
in theories of autobiographical memory (e.g. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) that provide 
the basic scaffolding for mental representation of an individual’s life story. Life chapters are 
thought to contain knowledge and information relating to places, activities and people 
associated with a particular period of time in an individual’s life and to be associated with a 
certain emotional valence (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Chapters 
appear to be of no fixed length, with most lasting from months to years (e.g. Thomsen & 
Berntsen, 2008). 
The Life Structure Task permits the computation of several metrics where one might 
predict systematic differences for those whose personal narratives had been chronically 
shaped by the experience of trauma. The first is the overall relative proportions of negative 
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and positive descriptors seen as applicable across chapters. Related to this are indices of 
positive and negative ‘redundancy’ – the degree to which the same descriptors are repeatedly 
applied across all chapters (Linville, 1987). Finally, we can compute a measure of 
‘compartmentalization’ – the extent to which positive and negative descriptors are 
disaggregated into different life chapters. Utilizing these metrics, in the original study 
employing the Life Structure Task, Dalgleish et al. (2011) found that individuals with chronic 
and recurrent Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) used a greater proportion of negative cards 
and showed greater negative redundancy, reduced positive redundancy, and greater 
compartmentalization in the way the cards were allocated, relative to a never-depressed 
control group, across their life structure.  
In the present study we selected participants with PTSD with a similarly chronic 
history. We focused on PTSD following sexual assault or abuse as we anticipated that the 
long-lasting effects of such significant interpersonal trauma might have the clearest effects on 
overall life structure (Herman, 1992). This choice had implications for our control 
participants as it is very difficult to find survivors of such experiences with no or few 
significant symptoms of past or current posttraumatic stress to act as a ‘trauma-matched’ 
control sample. We therefore recruited control participants who had no such history of sexual 
assault/abuse trauma and no history of PTSD to any trauma. 
We predicted that our PTSD participants would utilize a greater proportion of 
negative descriptors across their life structure. Based on the extensive literature describing 
avoidant and dissociative psychological strategies to manage negative information about the 
past in PTSD, we also anticipated that there would be greater compartmentalization of 
positive and negative information in those with the disorder, relative to our control group. 
Our hypotheses concerning the redundancy metrics were less clear. There is evidence of 
reduced life satisfaction and wellbeing in those with PTSD (e.g. Karatzias et al., 2013; 
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Richardson et al., 2008) but it is unclear whether this would translate to impoverished 
positive themes across the life structure. Similarly, although chronic PTSD, as already noted, 
is characterized by the endorsement of dysfunctional higher-order meanings pertaining to the 
trauma (e.g. My life has been destroyed; Foa et al., 1999) (see Park, 2010, for a discussion), 
and evidence of increased centrality of traumatic events in the life narrative (Bernsten & 
Rubin, 2006, 2008), it is again unclear to what extent this would impact the development of 
negative themes more generally across the life structure. We therefore had no strong 
hypotheses concerning the redundancy metrics. 
In order to evaluate the putative specificity of the profile of performance across the 
life structure metrics associated with PTSD, we also planned to compare the current PTSD 
sample and controls to a chronically depressed sample with MDD sample and associated 
controls, pooled from prior studies (Dalgleish et al., 2011; Werner-Seidler et al., 2018), as the 
methodology and research setting were the same. 
2.2.2.2 Future Life Structure 
In the previous study using the Life Structure Task, Dalgleish et al. (2011) also asked 
depressed and control participants to generate anticipated future chapters of their life and 
allocate the same positive and negative descriptors to these future periods. Dalgleish et al. 
(2011) found no significant differences between the MDD and control groups regarding the 
organization of putative future life chapters. Thus, we also examined future life structure 
metrics in our participants with and without PTSD but we had no clear hypotheses, given the 
previous data. 
2.2.3 Method 
2.2.3.1 Participants  
We based our power calculations for minimal sample size estimations per group on 
the smallest effect size (Cohen’s d=.96) for the past life structure metrics between the MDD 
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and control groups in Dalgleish et al. (2011). With alpha set at .05, with 80% power, two-
tailed, this indicated sample sizes of 19 per group. 
Our initial analyses compared a group of women with chronic PTSD with a history of 
sexual assault and/or abuse with a group of healthy controls with no such trauma history and  
with no current or lifetime history of PTSD.  The PTSD Group comprised 27 participants 
who met diagnostic criteria for current PTSD according to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
Nineteen of these participants were recruited from The Haven: A Sexual Assault Referral 
Centre (SARC) in London, UK. They were invited to take part following attendance at The 
Haven follow-up clinic or during an assessment for counseling or psychological therapy. The 
remaining eight participants were recruited from the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 
Cambridge, Volunteer Mental Health Panel – a database of some 400 community volunteers 
with a history of mental health problems who have agreed to help with psychological 
research. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via advertisements online and in local 
newspapers.  
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PTSD diagnosis, trauma history and other Axis I and II psychiatric comorbidity were 
determined according to the DSM-IV using the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV 
Axis I Disorders – Clinician Version (SCID, Version 2.0; First, Spitzer, Williams & Gibbon, 
1996) and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis II Personality Disorders 
(Borderline, Avoidant and Dependant). Interviews were administered either by trained 
research staff under the supervision of a clinical psychologist, or by a clinical psychologist.  
Participants without PTSD (the No PTSD Control Group; n = 23), had no history of 
PTSD according to the SCID and no self-reported history of sexual trauma. They were 
recruited from the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, Volunteer Panel – a 
database of some 2000 community volunteers who have agreed to help with psychological 
research. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via advertisements online and in local 
newspapers. 
To be eligible for the study, participants had to be fluent in English and over 18 years 
of age. Exclusion criteria comprised a current diagnosis of substance dependence, a history of 
psychosis, or organic brain injury, all assessed via the SCID. No participants were excluded 
on these bases. 
2.2.3.2 Materials and Measures 
2.2.3.2.1 Life Structure Task 
The Life Structure Task was delivered as used by Dalgleish et al. (2011). Participants 
were first asked to imagine that they had to write their autobiography and in preparation they 
should divide their past life into chapters. Participants were told that they were free to create 
as many chapters as they felt were appropriate, that chapters did not need to have a clear 
beginning and end, and that chapters could run in parallel with other chapters. They were also 
informed that ongoing life chapters could be included. Participants were given a blank table 
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and asked to record their life chapters at the top of each column and to include their age at the 
beginning and end of each chapter.  
Participants were then given a deck of 48 cards, each containing an adjective or 
phrase that might be used to describe a period of one’s life. Some of these adjectives differed 
slightly from Dalgleish et al.’s (2011) study to allow us to reference affective states that 
trauma survivors endorse. For example, ‘feeling contaminated’, ‘feeling broken’ and ‘feeling 
dirty.’ The adjectives/phrases were either positive or negative in valence (24 of each; see 
Appendix A). Prior to the study, we had the adjectives/phrases rated (n = 15 unselected 
raters) for valence on 15-point Likert scales anchored at 1 (strongly positive), 7 (weakly 
positive), 8 (neutral), 9 (weakly negative), 15 (strongly negative). The positive set of 
adjectives had a mean rating of 2.59 (SD = 0.81), whereas the negative set of adjectives had a 
mean rating of 13.61 (SD = 1.09). An independent samples t test showed that the two sets of 
cards did not differ significantly in intensity (distance from the neutral score of 8; t <1).  
For the card sort, participants were asked to allocate cards (adjectives/phrases) that 
they felt were relevant to each of the life chapters identified (see Dalgleish et al, 2011 for 
further details on the card-sorting procedure). 
Participants were next asked to imagine their future life structure – the chapters of 
their life that were potentially still to come (e.g., ‘retirement’, ‘grandchildren’) and to repeat 
the card-sorting procedure for the future life chapters.  
2.2.3.2.2 Life Structure Task metrics 
Proportion of Negative Cards. This is the number of negative attributes, including 
repetitions, appearing in the card sort, divided by the total number of attributes used. It is a 
measure of the overall negativity of the card-sort (Showers, 1992). 
Compartmentalization (Showers, 1992). Compartmentalization is calculated as a phi 
(φ) coefficient based on a chi-squared (χ2) statistic (Everitt, 1977). It compares the 
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frequencies of negative and positive cards in each chapter to those that would be expected, 
based on the proportion of negative items for the card-sort as a whole. A frequency table is 
constructed that contains as many columns as there are chapters in the individual’s card sort 
and two rows for number of positive cards and number of negative cards. The observed 
frequencies for each cell are generated from the whole card sort. The expected frequencies 
are generated as follows: If the card sort contained, for example, 40% negative cards overall 
and the first chapter contained 20 cards, then the expected frequencies for that chapter would 
be 8 (40%) negative cards and 12 (60%) positive cards. A χ2 statistic is then computed using 
these expected and observed frequencies. This is then normalized by dividing by the number 
of cards in the sort (N) as follows:  
Ф = √χ2 / N 
where, φ can range from 0 to 1 (0 represents a perfectly random sort, and 1 represents a 
perfectly compartmentalized sort). 
Redundancy. Redundancy (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b) was computed 
separately for positive and negative attributes, with each redundancy score representing the 
degree of card repetitions across chapters, controlling for both the number of chapters in a 
given card sort and the number of cards used. The following formula generated the 
redundancy rates: 
Redundancy  = 𝑥 =
1
𝑛𝑑𝑤x 𝑛𝑑𝑔 
 x Ʃ nri 
where (using the example of negative redundancy) ndw equals the number of distinct negative 
words used in an individual’s card sort, ndg equals the number of chapters generated, and nri 
equals the sum of repetitions of each negative card up to the maximum of 23 cards. 
2.2.3.2.3 Procedure 
Ethics approval was obtained from the NHS National Research Ethics Service 
(reference 11/H0305/1). Participants completed the tasks and measures individually and face-
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to-face with the experimenter, in a quiet testing room. Following provision of informed 
consent, participants completed the SCID, a semi-structured interview on auditory pseudo-
hallucinations (not reported here) and several self-report questionnaire measures of mood and 
PTSD symptoms. In a separate session, approximately a week later, they completed the life 
structure task.  
2.2.3.2.4 Screening and Questionnaire Measures 
 The Complex Trauma Symptoms Questionnaire (CTSQ, Cloitre et al., 2014) is a 49-
item measure that indexes symptoms of complex PTSD. The measure has been previously used 
to index symptoms of complex PTSD in women with a history of interpersonal violence (Cloitre 
et al., 2014). Internal consistency was high in the current sample (α=.97). 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) is a widely used and well validated measure of depressive symptoms over 
the previous week.2 The BDI demonstrates high internal consistency, with α coefficients of 
.86 and .81, for psychiatric and non-psychiatric populations, respectively (Beck et al., 1988). 
Internal consistency was high in the current sample (α=.96). 
The Centrality of Events Scale (CES-Negative; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007) 
measures the extent to which a traumatic memory forms a central component of personal 
identity, a turning point in the life story and a reference point for everyday inferences. We 
used the full version, which consists of 20 items rated on 5-point scales (1=totally disagree; 
5=totally agree) in relation to the most stressful or traumatic event in the person’s life. The 
CES-negative is positively correlated with severity of PTSD symptoms, which remains 
significant when controlling for measures of anxiety, depression, dissociation and self-
consciousness (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007). Internal consistency was high in the current 
sample (α=.98).  
                                                        
2 The original BDI was preferred here over updated versions for legacy reasons involving comparability of scores across time for the 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Panel. 
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2.2.4 Results 
2.2.4.1 Descriptive Data 
As is typical for clinical groups with a history of sexual trauma, there was notable 
psychiatric comorbidity in the PTSD group. According to the SCID, in the PTSD Group, 
seven participants also met criteria for a current episode of Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD), 25 met the criteria for a past episode of MDD, eight for current panic disorder 
(secondary to PTSD), three for current Agoraphobia, five for current Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD), and three for current Avoidant Personality Disorder.  In the No PTSD 
Control Group, three participants met the criteria for a past Major Depressive Episode, and 
one for current panic disorder. 
The remaining descriptive group data are presented in Table 2.1. The groups did not 
differ in age, t(48) = 0.64, p = 0.52, d = 0.18; 95% CIs [-0.40, -0.76] but did differ 
significantly in education level, t(47.53) = 2.89, p = .006, d = 0.82; 95% CIs [0.22, 1.42]. 
There were the expected differences in BDI and CES scores between the PTSD and Control 
Groups (BDI: t(27.16) = 9.19, p <.001, d = 2.61; 95% CIs [1.82, 3.40]; CES: t(43.61) = 9.83, 
p < .001, d =2.79; 95% CIs [1.97, 3.61]). Because our PTSD and No PTSD Control samples 
were not matched on education level, we repeated all analyses with education levels covaried. 
Results remained the same. We therefore present the uncontrolled analyses but have included 
the key results with education covaried in the footnotes. 
Table 2.1. Mean (SD) descriptive data for the PTSD and No PTSD Control groups.  
 PTSD Group  
(n=27) 
No PTSD 
Control Group 
(n=23) 
Years in Education 14.15 (2.87) 16.48 (2.27) 
Age (in years) 37.63 (13.17) 35.09 (14.87) 
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Complex Trauma Symptoms Questionnaire (CTSQ)  105.93 (48.93) 4.74 (5.00) 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I)  26.07 (12.70) 1.52 (1.76) 
Centrality of Event Scale (CES)  82.19 (15.27) 36.13 (17.87) 
 
2.2.4.2 Past Life Structure in PTSD 
All participants were able to come up with multiple chapters to describe their past 
lives (minimum=3). Examples of chapter titles were ‘ learning first steps ’, ‘school years’, 
‘marriage’, ‘the grand challenge, ‘a new beginning’ and ‘what it all means’.  
Data concerning numbers of chapters generated and numbers of cards used are 
presented in Table 2.2. The groups did not significantly differ in the number of past chapters 
they generated, t(48) = 0.57, p = .57, d = 0.16; 95% CIs [-0.42, 0.74], nor in the total number 
of cards used in the past card sort, t(48) = 1.13, p = .26, d = 0.32; 95% CIs [-0.26, 0.90]. This 
suggests broadly comparable engagement in the task across groups and indicates that any 
group differences on the structure metrics considered below were not a simple function of 
numbers of chapters and/or cards employed.  
 The past life structure metrics for the PTSD and No PTSD Control groups are 
presented in Figure 2.1. There were broad ranges of scores across both groups on the four 
past life structure metrics (maximum possible range 0 to 1) suggesting that across-group floor 
and ceiling effects were not evident; Proportion of Negative Cards 0.02 – 0.93; Negative 
Redundancy 0.12 – 0.45; Positive Redundancy 0.09 – 0.72; and Compartmentalization 0.22 
to 1. To illustrate the raw data, Appendix B shows two examples of actual past card sorts 
demonstrating lower and higher levels of Compartmentalization. Of particular note, in the 
more integrated card sort example (low Compartmentalization) in Table B1, several of the 
life chapters contain positive and negative descriptors that are diametrically opposite in 
meaning.  
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Figure 2.1. Mean (+1 SE) performance (y-axis) for the PTSD and No PTSD Control groups 
for proportion of negative cards used, positive and negative redundancy, and 
compartmentalization, for the past life chapters. 
 
To test our hypotheses and assess whether past life structure differed across the two 
groups we first conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) (cf., Dalgleish et 
al., 2011) across groups with the four life structure metrics as the dependent variables. There 
was a statistically significant multivariate difference for the past life structure components 
across groups, Wilk’s Λ = 0.49, F(4, 45) = 11.80, p < .001, d= 0.97; 95% CIs [0.36, 1.58] 3 
 Follow-up univariate ANOVAs indicated a significantly greater Proportion of 
Negative Cards were used, F(1, 48) = 39.19, p < .001, d = 1.78; 95% CIs [1.09, 2.47], 
significantly greater Compartmentalization, F(1, 48) = 18.88, p < .001, d = 1.23; 95% CIs 
[0.60, 1.86], and significantly reduced Positive Redundancy, F(1, 48) = 7.59, p = .02, d = 
0.78; 95% CIs [0.18, 1.38], for the PTSD group relative to the No PTSD Controls. There was 
                                                        
3 MANOVA across groups with years in education covaried: Λ = 0.71, F (4, 44) = 4.55, p = .004, d = 0.61; 95% 
CIs [0.02, 1.20]. 
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no significant difference between groups on Negative Redundancy F (1, 48) = 2.18, p = .15, 
d = 0.42; 95% CIs [-0.17, 1.01] 4. 
2.2.4.3 Future Life Structure in PTSD 
We next examined performance on the future Life Structure Task for the PTSD group 
and No PTSD Control group. All participants generated multiple future life chapters. Some 
examples of chapter headings were ‘hard times’, ‘new career’, ‘grannies and chickens’, 
‘children married’, ‘parent death’, ‘death of spouse’, ‘holidays abroad’, and 
‘grandchildren’.  The future life structure data are presented in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2. The 
across-group ranges of scores on the future life structure metrics were broad, as for the past 
metrics. Proportion of Negative Cards ranged from 0 – 0.94; Negative Redundancy 0 – 1; 
Positive Redundancy 0.18 – 1; and Compartmentalization 0 - 1. Also, in line with the past 
metrics, the groups were not significantly different on the number of future chapters, t(48) = 
1.17, p = .25,  d = 0.33; 95% CIs [-0.25, 0.91], nor on total number of cards used in the future 
sort, t(48) = 1.69, p = .10, d = 0.48; 95% CIs [-0.11, 1.07]. A MANOVA on the future 
metrics revealed no statistically significant differences in the future life structure components 
between groups, Wilk’s Λ = 0.89, F(4, 45) = 1.45, p = .23, d = 0.345; 95% CIs [-0.24, 0.92]. 
 
Table 2.2 Mean (Standard Deviation) numbers of past and future chapters and cards used in 
the past and future card sorts by group 
 PTSD Group  
(n = 27) 
No PTSD Control 
Group (n = 23) 
                                                        
4 Proportion of Negative Cards with years in education covaried: F(1, 47) = 27.60 p <.001, d = 1.49; 95% CIs 
[0.83, 2.15] 
Compartmentalization with years in education covaried: F(1, 47) = 10.86 p = .002, d = 0.94; 95% CIs [0.33, 
1.55] 
Positive Redundancy with years in education covaried: F(1, 47) = 6.47 p = .01, d = 0.72; 95% CIs [0.12, 1.32] 
Negative Redundancy with years in education covaried: F(1, 47) = 2.38 p = .13, d = 0.44; 95% CIs [-0.15, 1.03] 
5 MANOVA with years in education covaried: Λ = 0.91, F(4, 44) = 1.08, p = .38, d = 0.29; 95% CIs [-0.29, 
0.87]. 
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Past chapters (range 3 – 16) 8.74 (3.18) 9.26 (3.22) 
Cards used in past sort (range 11 – 266) 81.67 (51.95) 98.70 (54.42) 
Future chapters (range 1 – 9) 4.26 (2.30) 5.04 (2.44) 
Cards used in future sort (range 2 – 173) 40.30 (30.19) 57.39 (41.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Mean (+1 SE) performance (y-axis) for the PTSD and No PTSD Control groups 
for proportion of negative cards used, positive and negative redundancy, and 
compartmentalization for the future life chapters. 
 
Although the multivariate effect was non-significant, we conducted follow-up 
univariate ANOVAs to further explore the separate life structure metrics. These revealed no 
significant difference between groups for Proportion of Negative Cards used, Positive 
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Redundancy, and Negative Redundancy, all Fs<1.   There was however significantly greater 
Compartmentalization for the No PTSD Control Group than the PTSD group, F(1, 48) = 
4.29, p = .04, d = 0.59; 95% CIs [-0.002, 1.18] – the opposite pattern to what one might 
predict based on the past life structure results – but this effect became non-significant once 
education was included as a covariate, F(1, 47) = 2.85, p = .10, d = 0.48; 95% CIs [-0.11, 
1.07]. 
2.2.4.4 Correlations between PTSD symptomatology and past life structure metrics 
 Because our PTSD group differed from our No PTSD Controls in both the experience 
of sexual trauma and the presence of PTSD, we explored which of the past life structure 
metrics that were significantly different in the PTSD sample (reduced Positive Redundancy, 
increased Proportion of Negative Cards, increased Compartmentalization; Figure 2.1) related 
to severity of PTSD symptoms on the CTSQ in the clinical group. We found significant 
correlations between increased PTSD symptoms and both higher Proportion of Negative 
Cards, r(25)=.50, p =.008, and lower Positive Redundancy, r(25)=-.41, p =.04, but no 
evidence of a correlation between symptom severity and Compartmentalization, r(25)=-.09, p 
=.64.  
2.2.4.5 Comparing individuals with a primary diagnosis of PTSD and a primary 
diagnosis of chronic Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), relative to controls for past life 
structure  
The present findings exploring past life structure in individuals with a diagnosis of 
chronic PTSD show a different profile to earlier research using the same task with individuals 
with a long-term diagnosis of chronic MDD (see Dalgleish et al., 2011, for details). 
Specifically, both clinical groups show similar patterns relative to healthy controls in terms of 
Proportion of Negative Cards used, Compartmentalization of the card sort, and Positive 
Redundancy across life chapters. The MDD participants however also showed enhanced 
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Negative Redundancy – the tendency to endorse the same trait constructs across multiple life 
chapters – relative to controls. This effect was not observed in the current PTSD data (see 
Figure 2.1). 
Because the procedure for the MDD study (see Dalgleish et al., 2011) was almost 
identical to the current PTSD study, and the two studies were conducted in the same research 
setting by the same research team, we next sought to statistically compare the MDD and 
PTSD groups, against controls, to further evaluate these apparent differences in life-structure 
across the two clinical groups.  
To do this we set aside those participants (n=7) from the current PTSD Group who 
also met criteria for a diagnosis of current MDD, to create a PTSD/No-MDD Group (n=20). 
We also excluded data from the three participants in our current No PTSD Control group who 
met criteria for a past Major Depressive Episode (MDE; APA, 2013) to create a a No 
PTSD/No MDE Control Sample (n=20). We next pooled participants with chronic MDD 
from two datasets where we had used the past life structure task (Dalgleish et al., 2011; 
Werner-Seidler et al., 2018) but removed any participants who also met criteria for present or 
past PTSD, to create a chronic, recurrent MDD /No PTSD Group (n=30). Finally, we also 
removed participants from the MDD study control samples with current or past PTSD to 
create a No MDD/No PTSD Control group (n=36). We therefore analyzed data for four 
groups; PTSD/No-MDD, MDD/No-PTSD, a healthy control group from the PTSD study and 
a healthy control group from the MDD study.  
As a validity check of the original life structure profiles6 presented above and in 
Dalgleish et al. (2011) and Werner-Seidler (2018) we reanalyzed the data with comorbid 
participants set aside for the current PTSD/No MDD group (n=20) against the current No 
PTSD/No MDE Control group (n=20), and also reanalyzed the MDD/No PTSD group (n=30) 
                                                        
6 prior to the removal of comorbid participants 
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against the No MDD/No PTSD controls from the prior studies (n=36). The past life structure 
profiles mirrored those in the original studies prior to the removal of comorbid participants. 
There was a significant relative decrease in Negative Redundancy in the MDD/No PTSD 
Group, compared to the No MDD/No PTSD controls, F(1, 64) = 18.85, p< .001, d = 1.07; 
95% CIs [0.53, 1.61], that was not present in the PTSD/No MDD group compared to the No 
PTSD/No MDD controls, F(1, 41) = 2.00, p = .17, d = 0.44; 95% CIs [-0.22, 1.10]. The two 
clinical groups performed similarly, relative to their respective control groups, on the 
remaining past life-structure metrics (see Supplementary Materials for full analyses). This 
confirmed the decision to examine these putatively different profiles statistically within a 
combined analysis. 
To this end, as the next step in integrating the current dataset with the previous MDD 
dataset, we compared the current No PTSD/No MDD Control group (n=20) against the 
previous No MDD/No PTSD Control group (n=36) to check that the two control groups did 
not differ significantly in terms of their past life structure profiles. Because the study samples 
differed overall on age, F(3,102) =7.46, p<.001, d = 0.51; 95% CIs [0.13, 0.89], and gender 
ratio, Freeman-Halton Fisher exact probability, p<.001 (see Supplementary Table 2.S3 in 
Appendix C),  we covaried age and gender for these and subsequent analyses comparing 
across the two datasets. As anticipated, there were no significant differences between the two 
control groups on any of the past life structure metrics, Fs(1, 53) < 2.49, ps>.12, ds < 0.44. 
We therefore combined the two control groups into a single Combined Control group (n=56) 
for our main analysis. 
We thus proceeded with three groups for our key analyses, each with sample sizes 
that remained in line with our a priori power calculations; a PTSD/No MDD group (n=20), 
an MDD/No PTSD Group (n=30) and a Combined Control Group (n=56).  The past life 
structure metrics for the three groups are presented in Figure 2.3. We conducted a 
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MANCOVA, across the three groups, with the four life structure metrics as the dependent 
variables, with age and gender covaried. There was a statistically significant difference for 
past life structure components across groups, Wilk’s Λ = 0.42, F(8, 196) = 13.25, p< .001. 
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs demonstrated significant effects of group for all four of the 
life structure metrics, Fs (2,101) > 12.65, ps<.001.  
  
Figure 2.3 Mean (+1 SE) performance (y-axis) for the PTSD/No MDD, MDD/No PTSD and 
Combined Control groups for proportion of negative cards used, positive and negative 
redundancy, and compartmentalization for past life chapters. 
 
Breaking down these effects revealed, as expected, that the MDD/No PTSD group 
differed from the Combined Control group on the multivariate analysis, Wilk’s Λ = 0.45, F(4, 
79) = 24.51, p< .001, d = 1.12; 95% CIs [0.63, 1.61], and on all four univariate metrics, Fs 
(1,82) > 14.52, ps<.001, ds >.80, mirroring the previous MDD findings (Dalgleish et al., 
2011). Also, as expected, the PTSD/No MDD group differed from the Combined Control 
group on the multivariate analysis, Wilk’s Λ = 0.61, F(4, 69) = 10.95, p < .001, d = 0.86; 95% 
CIs [0.31, 1.41]. As with the initial PTSD sample analyses reported earlier, the univariate 
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analyses demosntarted no significant differences between the PTSD/No MDD and Combined 
Control groups for Negative Redundancy, F<1, but significant group differences for Positive 
Redundancy, Proportion of Negative Cards and Compartmentalization, Fs (1,72) > 8.53, 
ps<.005, ds>.70.  
Finally, the critical comparison between the two clinical groups – the PTSD/No MDD 
and MDD/No PTSD groups – revealed a significant multivariate effect, Wilk’s Λ = 0.45, F(4, 
43) = 2.85, p = .04, d = 0.49; 95% CIs [-0.11, 1.09]. The univariate analyses revealed that the 
two clinical groups did not differ significantly on either Positive Redundancy, F(1, 46) = 
1.24, p = .27, d = 0.32; 95% CIs [-0.27, 0.91], or Compartmentalization, F<1. There was a 
non-significant trend for the MDD/No PTSD Group to select a higher Proportion of Negative 
Cards,  F(1, 46) = 3.66, p= .06, d = 0.55; 95% CIs [-0.05, 1.15]. Importantly, there was a 
significant difference indicative of greater Negative Redundancy in the MDD/No PTSD 
Group relative to the PTSD/No MDD Group, F(1, 46) = 8.42 p < .01, d = 0.84; 95% CIs 
[0.22, 1.45]. Taken together, these findings indicate that the life structure profiles of those 
with chronic MDD and those with chronic PTSD, although broadly similar, also critically 
differ in specific ways. 
2.2.5 Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to examine the organization of past 
autobiographical knowledge in a sample of sexual trauma survivors with PTSD compared to 
a sample of healthy controls with no history of sexual trauma or of PTSD, using a self-
descriptive card-sorting task (Showers, 1992). The secondary aim was to compare our 
findings in this PTSD sample to previously collected data on the same task from individuals 
with chronic, recurrent Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).  
In terms of our primary analyses, consistent with our predictions we found that those 
with PTSD utilized a greater proportion of negative descriptors across their past life structure, 
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and showed greater compartmentalization of positive and negative information across 
chapters. We had no strong hypotheses concerning the past life structure redundancy metrics 
and found no significant differences for negative redundancy between the PTSD and No 
PTSD Control groups, but significantly greater positive redundancy for the Control group 
relative to the PTSD group. For the future card-sort, we found no significant differences on 
any life structure metrics between the PTSD and Control groups that survived statistically 
adjusting for group differences in years-in-education. 
These primary findings for past life structure for the PTSD group, relative to controls, 
were ostensibly different to earlier research using the same card-sorting task with individuals 
with a long-term diagnosis of MDD (Dalgleish et al., 2011). The key difference is that we 
found no support in our PTSD sample for the enhanced negative redundancy that 
characterizes MDD participants relative to controls. We therefore statistically compared the 
PTSD participant data against the prior MDD participant data, relative to controls, and indeed 
found a significant difference indicative of greater negative redundancy in the MDD-only 
group relative to the PTSD-only group, with no significant differences in other aspects of the 
life structure. 
The current findings are notable in three important ways. First, they indicate that 
sexual trauma survivors with PTSD structure their autobiographical narrative fundamentally 
differently to healthy control participants. This is consistent with the notion that profound 
trauma markedly alters the sense of personal identity (e.g., Bernsten & Rubin, 2006, 2008). 
Second, the narrative structure is not simply rendered more negative following the impact of 
trauma and PTSD, but is also more compartmentalized, with positive and negative life epochs 
relatively more isolated from one another, compared to the life structure in healthy controls. 
Finally, there appears to be some specificity with respect to clinical presentation, with the 
elevated negative redundancy that is characteristic of chronic depression not emerging as a 
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feature of the life-structure in those with PTSD, suggesting that alterations in life-structure 
are not simply a broad feature of mental health problems per se. 
The greater overall negativity of the life-structure in PTSD is perhaps the least 
surprising of the current results, given our participants’ experience of a chronic life-changing 
mental health problem rooted in profoundly traumatic experiences, the sequelae of which we 
know are characterized by pervasive negative affect and cognitions. As suggested in the 
Introduction, the higher levels of affective compartmentalization observed in the PTSD 
sample are consistent with other aspects of the clinical presentation of PTSD, and may have 
generalized from an initial segregation of traumatic experiences as a way of ‘ring fencing’ off 
traumatic information (Holmes et al., 2005), to a broader disaggregation of positive and 
negative evaluative information more generally. This is consistent with the data and theory in 
other cognitive domains such as overgeneral autobiographical memory (see Moore & 
Zoellner, 2007). 
The reduced positive redundancy effect in the PTSD group indicates that there are 
fewer consolidated positive themes running through the life narrative for those with PTSD, 
relative to controls. We have proposed that higher positive redundancy is reflective of 
augmented well-being and positive mental health, as opposed to merely the absence of 
negative mental-health (Dalgleish et al., 2011; Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2015). In this 
light, the lack of positive redundancy in the present findings concords with other evidence of 
reduced wellbeing in those with PTSD (e.g. Karatzia et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2008) 
and is perhaps unsurprising given the chronically disrupted lifestyles associated with chronic 
PTSD following sexual trauma. 
Why did we find no support for a difference in negative redundancy between our 
PTSD and control groups, but a significant difference between our PTSD group and a chronic 
MDD group with the latter showing elevated negative redundancy? This profile suggests that, 
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in our PTSD sample, distressing or toxic information relating to past negative experiences is 
more effectively segregated across the past life-structure than for individuals with chronic 
MDD, such that instead of pervading the individual’s entire history of personal experiences, 
the negative information is prevented from contaminating the other, more positive life 
epochs. This fits with the clinical presentation of PTSD, where pervasive and chronic 
avoidance of trauma-related information and its consequences, via behavioral and lifestyle 
changes through to more profound dissociative phenomena, can give rise to oases of healthy 
functioning (Dalgleish, 2004; Holmes et al., 2005). In contrast, for those with MDD, negative 
affect and information are characteristically less contained, pervading all aspects of the self, 
world and future (Beck et al., 1979). 
The present results have no immediate clinical implications but indicate a clear 
empirical pathway to translation. The first question is the extent to which these changes in 
life structure drive and maintain PTSD symptoms over time within longitudinal cohorts. If 
future studies suggest a causal role for autobiographical structure in driving symptoms, one 
could then work directly with the life structure task, modifying generated life structures to 
integrate positive and negative material within each chapter and to enhance positive 
redundancy across chapters with a view to ameliorating outcomes (Dalgleish & Werner-
Seidler, 2014).  
 The study has some potential limitations. Although we did ask participants to describe 
their own life chapters, we did not ask them to produce their own descriptive words for the 
cards used in the sorting task. This decision was made because we wanted to ensure that there 
were comparable numbers of positive and negative cards to select from and also that the 
intensity of descriptors was comparable across participants so that we could draw conclusions 
about the life structure as opposed to the language used to describe it. Future studies could 
ask participants to provide their own adjectives to allocate to each of the cards used in the 
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card-sort, that could then be rated in terms of valence and coded using metrics similar to 
those employed here (Rubin & Bernstein, 2003). 
As discussed previously, our choice to work with participants with PTSD with a 
chronic history of interpersonal trauma had implications for our selection of control 
participants as it is very difficult to find survivors of such experiences with no significant 
symptoms of past or current posttraumatic stress to act as a trauma-matched control sample. 
We therefore recruited control participants who had no such history of sexual assault/abuse 
trauma and no history of PTSD to any trauma. This means that it is difficult to disentangle 
whether it is the development of PTSD rather than the trauma history per se that accounts for 
our primary findings. We did explore this question using correlational analyses within the 
PTSD group. While the proportion of negative cards endorsed and the reduced positive 
redundancy across the life structure were significantly correlated with PTSD severity this was 
not the case for the degree of compartmentalization, suggesting that PTSD severity may not 
be the only driving force behind the current profile of findings. Future studies could examine 
the replicability of the effects with survivors of more discrete or less severe trauma, which 
would also enable greater generalization of the effects from severe interpersonal trauma to 
other trauma categories. 
 A further limitation of the life structure task is that, although it focuses on the whole 
life narrative, it remains retrospective. The life reconstruction approach with its mandate to 
generate individual chapters and consider them separately is an advance over less structured 
methodologies but the possibility remains that contemporaneous consideration of past life 
chapters may have generated a different profile of findings. However, to the extent to which 
we are seeking to understand how those with chronic PTSD organize their current narrative 
of their past life, the chosen methodology is actually valid. PTSD as a disorder is often less 
about what actually happened in the past but more so about what is perceived to have 
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happened and what the perceived implications are for the present (Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). 
Another limitation relates to the samples used in the current analyses. The sample 
sizes for the two clinical groups were modest, as is often the case for hard-to-recruit clinical 
samples. However, there is nothing to indicate that the pattern and magnitude of the results 
relates to a lack of statistical power and the sample sizes exceeded our a priori power 
estimates. The PTSD sample was also all female. Finally, the PTSD/No MDD sample 
contained some individuals with past experience of depression, although if anything this 
would have been more likely to reduce between-group effects when comparing with the 
MDD/No PTSD sample. Nevertheless, it would be important to replicate the current findings 
with both clinical groups in larger samples including individuals with PTSD who have 
experienced different traumas, who are male, and with no lifetime history of depression.  
In summary, the present study used an established card-sorting task to examine the 
organization of autobiographical knowledge in a sample of sexual trauma survivors with 
PTSD compared to a sample of individuals with chronic depression, and to healthy controls. 
The PTSD group presented with a life structure significantly different to controls and to those 
with chronic depression, supporting proposals that the life narrative is organized differently 
in those with PTSD.  
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2.2.7 Appendices 
2.2.7.1 Appendix A 
Positive and Negative Words/Phrases Used in the Card Sorts  
Positive                                Negative 
Happy 
Satisfying 
Overjoyed 
Fulfilling 
Successful 
Feeling Loved 
Confident 
Creative 
Feeling Needed  
Passionate 
Feeling Nurtured 
Joyful 
Wisdom 
Accomplished 
Important 
Feeling Together 
Exciting 
Complete 
Relaxed 
Feeling Courageous 
In Control 
Organised  
Stable 
Feeling Pure  
Naïve 
Incomplete 
Confused 
Boring 
Apathetic 
Moody  
Regretful 
Feeling Contaminated  
Stressful 
Out of Control 
Unsuccessful 
Feeling Broken 
Insignificant 
Insecure 
Ashamed 
Feeling Rejected 
Unfulfilling 
Gloomy 
Feeling Unwanted 
Lonely  
Depressing 
Feeling Unloved 
Hopeless 
Failure  
  
 
(Appendices continue) 
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2.2.7.2 Appendix B 
Sample Past Life Card Sorts for Two Participants 
Chapter titles have been adapted slightly for the purpose of anonymity, though they remain faithful to 
the chapter content. Negative words are in bold, and positive words are in italics. 
 
Table B1 
Card Sort for a participant with a more integrated card sort  (Φ= 0.53) 
 
Mother & 
Father 
Grandmother England University Sedentary Life First Job Second Job 
Exciting 
Fulfilling 
Happy 
Joyful 
Loved 
Satisfying 
Important 
Relaxed 
 
Depressing 
Unsuccessful 
Sad 
Lonely 
Confused 
Insecure 
Naive 
Stressful  
Rejected 
Failure 
Unwanted 
Unfulfilling 
Contaminated 
Hopeless 
Incomplete 
 
Incomplete 
Sad 
Failure 
Confused 
Insecure 
Successful 
Broken 
Passionate 
Wisdom 
Moody 
Nurtured 
Creative 
Depressing 
Unsuccessful 
Contaminated 
Stressful  
Naive 
Loved 
Out of control 
Moody 
Creative 
Broken 
Wisdom 
Passionate 
Sad 
Failure 
Confused 
 
Loved 
Wisdom 
Failure 
Sad 
Passionate 
Successful 
Insecure 
Incomplete 
Together 
In control 
Accomplished 
Stable 
Fulfilling 
Needed 
Satisfying 
Exciting 
Important 
Happy 
Relaxed 
Stressful  
Creative 
 
Relaxed 
Fulfilling 
Incomplete 
Insecure 
Sad 
Moody 
Ashamed 
Accomplished 
Unfulfilling 
In control 
Stable 
Stressful  
Creative 
Loved 
Wisdom 
Needed 
Together 
Happy 
Courageous 
Satisfying 
Important 
Failure 
Passionate 
Depressing 
Successful 
Confident 
Unsuccessful 
Exciting 
 
Happy 
Moody 
Ashamed 
Incomplete 
Unfulfilling 
In control 
Confused 
Joyful 
Complete 
Successful 
Hopeless 
Relaxed 
Rejected 
Unsuccessful 
Out of 
control 
Failure 
Exciting 
Passionate 
Depressing 
Wisdom 
Insecure 
Sad 
Confident 
Needed 
Satisfying 
Loved 
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Table B2 
Card Sort participant with a more compartmentalized sort  (Φ= 0.90) 
 
Infant 
school 
Junior 
School 
Senior 
School 
University Qualified The break 
up 
Sisterhood  
Important  
Fulfilling 
Joyful 
Happy 
Exciting 
Overjoyed 
 
Exciting 
Stable 
Satisfying 
In control 
Together 
Important 
Passionate 
Confident 
Pure 
Successful 
Happy 
Creative 
 
In control 
Together 
Important 
Loved 
Passionate 
Confident 
Pure 
Successful 
Fulfilling 
Happy 
 
Exciting 
Nurtured 
Stressful 
Confused 
Wisdom 
Organised 
Important 
Loved 
Passionate 
Successful 
Happy 
Creative 
Fulfilling  
 
Overjoyed 
Exciting 
Courageous 
Accomplished 
Out of control 
Important 
Loved 
Passionate  
Successful 
Joyful 
Happy 
Creative 
Fulfilling 
 
Regretful 
Failure 
Broken 
Rejected 
Stressful 
Incomplete 
Confused 
Insecure 
Apathetic 
Unloved 
Unwanted 
Lonely 
Sad 
Exciting 
Overjoyed 
Accomplished 
Stable 
Complete 
Satisfying 
Confused 
In control 
Organised 
Important 
Loved 
Passionate  
Confident 
Pure 
Successful 
Joyful 
Happy 
Creative 
Fulfilling 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.7.3 Appendix C 
Supplementary Results 
Sensitivity analysis comparing the PTSD/No MDD Group versus the No PTSD/No MDE 
Control Group on past life structure metrics 
In these analyses we set aside the seven participants with a comorbid diagnosis of 
MDD from the original PTSD group and the three controls with a past Major Depressive 
Episode (MDE) from the original No PTSD Control Group and conducted sensitivity 
analyses on the remaining sample (n=20 per group; see Table 2.S1 for past life structure 
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metrics) in order to verify that these smaller groups still showed the same pattern of 
differences on our past life structure metrics. These sample sizes still fell within the 
acceptable estimations based on our a priori power calculations (see Participants section of 
the main manuscript). 
 
Table 2.S1: Means (standard deviation) of scores on the past life structure metrics for the 
PTSD/No MDD Group and the No PTSD/No MDD Control Group  
 PTSD/No MDD Group  
(n=20)  
Mean (SD) 
No PTSD/No MDE Control Group  
(n = 20)  
Mean (SD) 
Prop. of Negative Cards 0.50 (0.16) 0.24 (0.14) 
Negative Redundancy 0.27 (0.09) 0.24 (0.07) 
Positive Redundancy 0.31 (0.12) 0.40 (0.15) 
Compartmentalisation 0.76 (0.16) 0.54 (0.22) 
 
Mirroring the data with the full sample (see main manuscript), these sensitivity 
analyses revealed a statistically significant multivariate difference in the past life structure 
components across groups, Wilk’s Λ = 0.52, F (4, 35) = 8.13, P < .001; d = 0.90; 95% CIs 
[0.22, 1.58]. The follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed a significantly greater proportion of 
negative cards, F (1, 38) = 30.85, P < .001, d = 1.76; 95% CIs [0.99, 2.53], significantly 
greater compartmentalization, F (1, 38) = 12.67, P = .001, d = 1.13; 95% CIs [0.43, 1.83], 
and significantly reduced positive redundancy, F (1, 38) = 4.49, P = .04, d = 0.67; 95% CIs 
[0.002, 1.34], in the PTSD/No MDD group. There was no significant difference between 
groups for negative redundancy, F (1, 41) = 2.00, P = .17, d = 0.45; 95% CIs [-0.21, 1.11]. 
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Sensitivity analysis comparing the MDD/No PTSD group against the No MDD/No 
PTSD Control group on past life structure metrics 
Table 2.S2: Means (standard deviation) of scores on the past life structure metrics for the 
MDD/No PTSD Group and the No MDD/No PTSD Control Group  
 MDD/No PTSD) Group  
(n=30) Mean (SD) 
No MDD/No PTSD Control Group  
(n = 36) Mean (SD) 
Prop. of Negative Cards 0.61 (0.19) 0.28 (0.12) 
Negative Redundancy 0.38 (0.19) 0.24 (0.12) 
Positive Redundancy 0.26 (0.11) 0.46 (0.19) 
Compartmentalisation 0.74 (0.18) 0.56 (0.23) 
 
 
In these analyses we set aside participants with a diagnosis of current or past PTSD. 
Mirroring the original depression study findings (Dalgleish et al., 2011), there was a 
statistically significant multivariate difference in the past life structure components across 
groups, Wilk’s Λ = 0.43, F (4, 61) = 20.23, P < .0001; d = 1.11; 95% CIs [0.57, 1.65]. The 
follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed a significantly greater proportion of negative cards, 
F (1, 64) = 76.29, p <.0001, d = 2.16; 95% CIs [1.53, 2.79], significantly greater 
compartmentalization, F (1, 64) = 18.85, p < .0001, d = 1.07; 95% CIs [0.53, 1.61], 
significantly greater negative redundancy, F (1, 64) = 18.85, P< .0001, d = 1.07; 95% CIs 
[0.53, 1.61], and significantly reduced positive redundancy, F (1, 64) = 28.19, p < .0001, d = 
1.31; 95% CIs [0.76, 1.86], in the MDD (No PTSD) relative to the MDD study controls.  
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Table 2.S3: Frequencies for gender and means (standard deviations) for age and depression 
symptom scores for the PTSD/No MDD group, the MDD/No PTSD Group, the No PTSD/No 
MDE control group and the No MDD/No PTSD control group 
 PTSD/No 
MDD Group  
(n=20)  
MDD/No 
PTSD Group 
(n = 30)  
No PTSD/No 
MDE Control 
Group 
(n = 20)  
No MDD/No 
PTSD Control 
Group 
(n = 36)  
Gender 
(female/male) 
20/0 20/10 20/0 28/8 
Age in years  37.70 (13.65) 47.00 (11.80) 34.65 (15.91) 48.58 (10.33) 
BDI Total Score  21.20ab (9.36) 26.00cd (11.68) 1.55ac (1.84) 3.14bd (4.02) 
 
Note 
 
abcd Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores sharing the same superscript differ significantly 
from each other, Ps<.001. 
 
END OF RESEARCH PAPER 
 
2.3 Discussion and Integration  
There has been increasing interest in the observed impact of traumatic experiences on 
autobiographical memory. Literature in this area has included research into the impact of 
trauma on memory fragmentation or disorganisation (e.g., van der Kolk, 1994) and the 
dissociation of trauma memories from other autobiographical memories (e.g., Brewin, 2001; 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; van der Kolk, 1994), as a way of protecting individuals from the 
emotional distress associated with their traumatic re-experiencing. In study 1 reported in the 
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current chapter we examined the structure of the autobiographical life story in those with 
PTSD in order to establish the ways in which the disorder impacts on how individuals 
represent and organise personal memories of their life history. Consistent with our 
predictions, the PTSD group utlilised a greater proportion of negative descriptors across their 
past life structure. They also demonstrated greater compartmentalization of positive and 
negative information than the non-PTSD control group. 
Although there is evidence in the literature of reduced wellbeing in those with PTSD 
(e.g. Karatzias et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2008) and the endorsement of dysfunctional 
higher-order meanings pertaining to past traumatic experiences, we found a greater use of 
negative descriptors across the past life story in the PTSD only group but no evidence of the 
same descriptors repeatedly applied across the life chapters identified. The finding for our 
PTSD only group contrasts with previous research in individuals with clinical depression 
who have been found to demonstrate greater overall negativity, but also greater redundancy 
of negative attributes across the life story, reduced positive redundancy, and stronger 
affective compartmentalization than those who had never suffered from depression. (e.g. 
Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Dalgleish et al., 2011). Our PTSD group more effectively 
segregated distressing or toxic information relating to past negative experiences across the 
past life-structure than individuals with chronic MDD. 
Our results suggest that, individuals with PTSD use strategies to compartmentalise or 
“ring-fence” the distressing or toxic information related to their past traumatic experiences, 
rather than allowing it to pervade or contaminate other, more positive aspects of their life 
story. This is consistent with our understanding of PTSD (and the symptoms in the DSM-V 
criteria for the disorder) – that PTSD typically includes persistent avoidance of stimuli 
associated with the trauma, such as attempts to avoid talking or thinking about what 
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happened, avoiding contact with specific reminders or anything that might trigger re-
experiencing symptoms and the associated unpleasant emotions.  
It has been argued that trauma memories form a central reference point for an 
individual’s whole life but also their personal identity - infusing other, non-traumatic, 
experiences with trauma-related meaning (Bernsten & Rubin, 2006, 2008). Therefore, we 
decided it would also be interesting to explore whether there were similar patterns in the 
ways in which those with PTSD represent and organise personal beliefs and memories in 
relation to their individual self-concept. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Research paper: Compartmentalization of self-representations in female survivors of 
sexual abuse and assault, with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  
Authors: Clifford, G., Hitchcock, C. & Dalgleish, T. 
Submitted for publication at Psychological Medicine on 16/01/2019 
Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/xms5f/ 
Citation: Clifford, G., Hitchcock, C., & Dalgleish, T. (2019) Compartmentalization of self- 
representations in female survivors of sexual abuse and assault, with posttraumatic stress  
disorder (PTSD). Preprint: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/xms5f 
For this paper, the candidate planned the study, collected all of the data, analysed the 
results and wrote the paper. The co-authors supervised the research process and made 
comments on iterative drafts of the manuscript. 
3.1 Background to the Study 
As discussed in Chapter 1, we have a tendency to adapt to changes and difficulties in 
the environment by organising personally experienced events in terms of self-reference (e.g. 
Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). More specifically in relation to PTSD, it has been argued 
that intrusive memories of past traumatic experiences are believed to structure our 
autobiographical narratives, inform our sense of self, and act as a reference point for our 
expectations and attributions in daily life (e.g. Robinaugh & McNally, 2011). 
There has been increasing interest in the relationship between the structure of the self-
concept and mental health, with a particular focus on how affective self-related information is 
organised across different aspects of our individual self-concept. One area of interest has 
been the degree to which positive and negative affective material is segregated into separate 
aspects of the self-concept (Showers, 2002).  It has been proposed that high levels of 
affective compartmentalization may arise out of stressful or traumatic life experiences as a 
 70 
means of ‘ring fencing’ off toxic self-related material from more positive self-aspects 
(Linville, 1987; Morgan & Janoff–Bulman, 1994; Showers, Zeigler-Hill & Limke, 2006; cf. 
also Steinberg, Pineles, Gardner, & Mineka, 2003), due to the use of avoidance and 
dissociative strategies, as discussed previously in relation to the life structure.  
Another organisational strategy that has been identified in relation to the structure of 
the self-concept to mental health is the extent to which affective self-related knowledge 
shows overlap or redundancy across (Linville, 1987) different self-concepts. The implication 
is that potentially toxic negative information is not effectively confined or compartmentalised 
into discrete self-aspects but pervades the individual’s entire sense of self, potentially 
contaminating even the most positive self-aspects. 
The principal focus of study 2 was to examine degree of negativity, positive- and 
negative-redundancy, and the compartmentalisation of valenced information across self-
generated self-aspects of an individual’s self-concept in a sample of participants with current 
PTSD following significant interpersonal trauma, relative to healthy controls who had not 
experienced such trauma. Using the same card-sorting task and methodology described in 
study 1, the aim of this study was to establish whether an individual’s self-concept had been 
chronically shaped by the experience of trauma. In study 2, again we focused on PTSD 
following sexual assault or abuse as we anticipated that such significant interpersonal trauma 
might have the clearest effects on self-concept.  
3.2 Research paper: Compartmentalization of self-representations in female survivors 
of sexual abuse and assault, with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)  
3.2.1 Abstract 
This study examined the structure of the self-concept in a sample of sexual trauma 
survivors with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) compared to healthy controls using a 
self-descriptive card-sorting task. We explored whether individuals with PTSD possess a 
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highly affectively-compartmentalized self-structure, whereby positive and negative self-
attributes are sectioned off into separate components of self-concept (e.g., self as an 
employee, lover, mother). We also examined redundancy (i.e., overlap) of positive and 
negative self-attributes across the different components of self-concept. Participants 
generated a set of self-aspects that reflected their own life (e.g., ‘self at work’,). They were 
then asked to describe their self-aspects using list of positive or negative attributes. Results 
revealed that, relative to the control group, the PTSD group used a greater proportion of 
negative attributes and had a more compartmentalized self-structure. However, there were no 
significant differences between the PTSD and control groups in positive or negative 
redundancy. Sensitivity analyses demonstrated that the key findings were not accounted for 
by comorbid diagnosis of depression. Findings indicated that the self-structure is organized 
differently in those with PTSD, relative to those with depression or good mental health.  
3.2.2 Introduction 
There are profound individual differences in the way we process and organize 
information related to our self-concept – our experienced sense of self. Theoretical accounts 
of how the self-concept is structured propose that it comprises multiple ‘self-aspects’– 
distinct identities that are represented by organised bodies of both declarative and episodic 
knowledge (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; McConnell, 2011). Self-aspects can include 
roles (e.g. mother, teacher) (e.g., Roberts & Donahue, 1994), social identities (e.g. being a 
Muslim, a member of the UK Labour party), social relationships (e.g. friend, wife), affective 
states (e.g. ‘when I’m depressed’), behavioral situations (e.g. ‘when I’m meeting new 
people’), private and public selves (e.g., Triandis, 1989), and relational and collective 
identities (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Self-aspects are conceptualized as cognitive 
structures containing sets of specific attributes or beliefs (Showers, Zeigler-Hill & Limke, 
2006) that prototypically include significant amounts of affect-laden information (Cantor, 
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Markus, Nedenthal & Nurius, 1986). It is proposed that different self-aspects will preside 
over mental experiences in different contexts – what we have previously called the ‘self-in-
place’ (Dalgleish & Power, 2004). So, the ‘self with family’ self-concept would preside when 
an individual is with their family, whereas the ‘depressed self’ would drive self-related 
experiences when the individual is under the yoke of depressed mood. Under such 
circumstances, the attributes, beliefs and affect associated with the presiding self-aspect will 
be more accessible relative to information pertaining to self-aspects that are subordinate in 
that context. 
3.2.2.1 Affective compartmentalization 
It is proposed that self-concepts can vary in complexity across individuals. Linville 
(1987) argued that a more complex self-concept is characterized by a greater number of self-
aspects and stronger distinctions or boundaries between different self-aspects, in other words, 
the degree to which the self-concept is compartmentalized. There has been increasing interest 
in the relationship between the structure of the self-concept and mental health, with a 
particular focus on how affective self-related information is organized across different self-
aspects and how this relates to different degrees of self-concept complexity.   
Two aspects of how affective information is organized seem particularly important for 
mental health. The first is the degree to which affective material is compartmentalized such 
that positive and negative self-attributes are segregated into separate self-aspects (Showers, 
2002). For an individual with a high degree of affective compartmentalization, any given 
self-aspect (e.g., ‘self at work’, ‘self with friends’) will be dominated by either positive (e.g., 
happy, confident) or negative (e.g., worried, hopeless) self-attributes, as opposed to a self-
aspect being represented by a balance of positive and negative attributes (e.g., happy, 
worried). For example, an affectively compartmentalized person may have a positive self-
aspect category (e.g., ‘self with close friends’), which contains predominantly positive 
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conceptualizations about that instantiation of the self (e.g., confident, optimistic, happy and 
organized). As long as such positively valenced self-aspects are salient, these primarily 
positive self-beliefs will populate conscious awareness with consequent implications for 
affect and well-being. Conversely, when negatively valenced self-aspects are salient, the 
phenomenology of highly compartmentalized individuals would be dominated by negative 
self-beliefs. For example, for a highly compartmentalized person with a negative self-aspect 
category (e.g. ‘self at work’), it is proposed that highly accessible negative self-related beliefs 
(e.g., worried, hopeless, uncomfortable and insecure) will dominate mental life when at work.  
Several authors have discussed how high levels of affective compartmentalization 
may arise out of stressful or traumatic formative experiences as a means of ‘ring fencing’ off 
toxic self-related material from more positive self-aspects (Linville, 1987; Morgan & Janoff–
Bulman, 1994; Showers, Zeigler-Hill & Limke, 2006; cf. also Steinberg, Pineles, Gardner, & 
Mineka, 2003). Such affective compartmentalization can be viewed as both a protective 
strategy and as a vulnerability factor. When positively-valenced compartmentalized self-
aspects preside over mental life, difficult or toxic self-related information is kept 
psychologically at bay, promoting experiential well-being (Linville, 1987). However, to the 
extent that the individual is vulnerable to the self-in-place (Dalgleish & Power, 2004) being 
occupied by a predominantly negative self-aspect, characterized by self-attributes grounded 
in experiences of significant unresolved stress or trauma, then such compartmentalization 
represents a risk factor for mental distress or ill health.  
 The counterpart to this compartmentalized structure is the notion of an integrated self-
concept characterized by a mixture of positive and negative self-attributes within most or all 
self-aspects (Showers, 2002). An individual with a highly-integrated self-concept may also 
endorse the self-aspect – ‘self at work,’ – but in this case, this self-aspect would contain a 
balance of both positive and negative self-content. Although such individuals may not inhabit 
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self-aspects with unremittingly positive content they are also less susceptible to the toxic 
override potential of highly negative self-aspects and consequently have reduced mental 
health vulnerability. This has been corroborated across numerous studies linking self-concept 
integration with mental health and well-being (e.g., Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; 
Showers, 1992; Showers & Kling, 1996; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998).  
 The first aim of the present study was to extend this work on self-structure and mental 
health to look at individuals who had experienced significant trauma – in this case 
sexual/physical abuse and/or assault – and who are suffering as a consequence from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD is characterized by negative beliefs about the self 
being broken or damaged in some way by the trauma. For example, one criterion in the 
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) diagnosis for PTSD is ‘Persistent 
and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations about oneself, others, or the world (e.g., “I 
am bad,” “No one can be trusted,”)’. Sufferers of PTSD also invariably possess a rich 
repertoire of psychological and behavioral strategies to protect against potentially toxic 
information about their trauma and its implication or consequences for the self.  Many of 
these comprise the DSM-5 avoidance symptoms of PTSD (avoiding trauma reminders, 
attempts to never think about or talk about the trauma, social withdrawal, loss of interest in 
activities, emotional numbing and psychogenic amnesia) (APA, 2013). Others involve 
associated phenomena such as dissociation (including depersonalization and derealization), 
suppression and repression, which sufferers of PTSD often use to inhibit the reliving 
symptoms and overwhelming emotions associated with the trauma (Holmes et al., 2005)  
Based on these aspects of the PTSD phenotype and on the theoretical literature 
outlined above, our first hypothesis was that individuals with PTSD following an experience 
or experiences of interpersonal trauma such as sexual or physical abuse or assault would 
possess a highly affectively-compartmentalized self-structure relative to individuals who 
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have not experienced sexual trauma and do not suffer PTSD. 
3.2.2.2 Affective redundancy 
The second organizational principle relating the structure of the self-concept to mental 
health is the extent to which affective self-related knowledge shows overlap or redundancy 
across (Linville, 1987) different self-concepts. For example, the self may be represented as 
“worthless” across multiple self-aspects such as ‘self as a friend’, ‘self at work’, ‘self as a 
spouse’ (e.g. Dalgleish & Power, 2004; Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Linville, 
1985).  In such circumstances, potentially toxic negative information is not effectively 
confined or compartmentalized into discrete self-aspects but pervades the individual’s entire 
sense of self, potentially contaminating even the most positive self-aspects. In contrast, high 
redundancy of positive information would reflect a stable positive sense of self, with 
beneficial consequences for mental health and well-being. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, research 
on the structure of the self-concept in those with clinical depression reveals greater overall 
negativity, greater redundancy of negative attributes across self-aspects, reduced positive 
redundancy, and stronger affective compartmentalization than is the case for those who have 
never suffered from depression. (e.g. Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Dalgleish et al., 2011). 
The second aim of the present study was to examine redundancy of positive and 
negative self-attributes across the self-concept in trauma-exposed individuals with PTSD and 
the healthy control participants. We had a clear hypothesis regarding positive redundancy, 
predicting that it would be reduced in the individuals with PTSD, reflecting the absence of a 
stable positive sense of self. We had no clear hypothesis regarding negative redundancy. It is 
plausible that the repertoire of inhibitory strategies that characterizes PTSD would serve to 
corral negative self-related information into a small number of negatively-laden self-aspects 
with little ‘spillover’ or redundancy with the rest of the self-concept. In contrast, it is also 
plausible that the content of any negative self-attributes that had their origins in the person’s 
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experience of trauma would generalize to pervasive negative self-representations that 
populated the entire self-concept, akin to the pervasive negativity observed in depression 
(Dalgleish et al., 2011). 
3.2.2.3 Self-Descriptive Card Sort 
To examine the structure of self-concept we used the self-descriptive card-sorting task 
that was adapted by Showers (1992) from Linville (1985, 1987). In this card sorting 
procedure, participants are first asked to generate a set of self-aspects that reflect their own 
life (e.g., ‘self at work’, ‘self when angry’). There can be as many, or as few, self-aspects as 
seem relevant to a given individual. Participants are then presented with a set of 48 cards, 
each containing a trait word or phrase which is either positive or negative in valence and that 
potentially describes them in one or more of their self-aspects.  
The participants are asked to sort the cards into one, many or none of the self-
generated self-aspects (Linville, 1985, 1987). So, for example, a card may contain the 
adjective ‘confident’ and, during the card sort, the participant would decide how many, if 
any, of his/her self-aspects could be described in this way and allocate that card accordingly.  
Any card can be used repeatedly if it is relevant to more than one self-aspect, or not at all if it 
is deemed irrelevant to the self. Within this procedure the degree of negativity (Showers, 
1992) is the overall proportion of cards selected that are negative in valence across all self-
aspects, including repetitions. Redundancy or overlap is the extent to which the same cards 
are used across multiple self-aspects (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b). Finally, affective 
compartmentalization is the extent to which positive and negative cards are allocated to 
distinct self-aspects such that some self-aspects are predominantly positive, while others are 
predominantly negative (Showers, 1992).  
3.2.2.4 The Current Study 
The principal focus of the present study was to examine degree of negativity, 
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positive- and negative-redundancy, and compartmentalization of valenced information across 
the self-generated self-aspects of an individual’s self-concept, as revealed by the card sort 
procedure, in a sample of participants with current PTSD following significant interpersonal 
trauma, relative to healthy controls who had not experienced such trauma. 
In sum, we predicted that the PTSD group would identify the most stressful or 
traumatic event in their lives as more centrally defining in terms of how they see themselves, 
relative to the controls, as measured by the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006, 2007) – a self-report inventory assessing how identified events have come to define 
your personal identity. In terms of the card-sorting task, we hypothesized that all participants 
would generate multiple self-aspects but that the PTSD sample would display greater 
negativity across the self-concept as well as greater compartmentalization between positive 
and negative components of the self-concept, across their different self-aspects. We also 
predicted that redundancy of positive information across the different self-aspects would be 
reduced in those with PTSD relative to the controls, but we had no clear directional 
hypotheses regarding negative redundancy. 
3.2.3 Method 
3.2.3.1 Participants  
A power calculation estimating the effect size (d = 1.02) for the difference between 
healthy and depressed samples in card-sort metrics observed by Dalgleish et al. (2011) 
indicated that 22 participants per group would provide 90% power (two-tailed, α = .05).  
Two groups of female participants were included in the study. Participants who had 
developed PTSD following sexual trauma were allocated to a PTSD group. Current diagnosis 
of PTSD was determined according to the DSM-IV (n = 23). Fifteen of these participants 
were recruited from the Haven; A Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC) in Paddington. 
They were invited to take part following attendance at the Haven or during an assessment for 
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counseling or psychological therapy. Eight participants were recruited from the MRC 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Clinical Volunteer Panel – a database of some 400 
community volunteers with a history of significant mental health problems who have agreed 
to help with psychological research. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via advertisements 
in local newspapers and through local clinics.  
PTSD diagnosis and history and other Axis I and II psychiatric comorbidity according 
to the DSM-IV were determined using the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis 
I Disorders – Clinician Version (SCID, Version 2.0; First, Spitzer, Williams & Gibbon, 1996) 
and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis II Personality Disorders 
(Borderline, Avoidant and Dependant), administered by trained interviewers, under the 
supervision of a Clinical Psychologist.  
The female participants with no experience of sexual abuse/assault and without PTSD 
(which may have occurred from other events such as motor vehicle accidents) as determined 
by the SCID (the control group; n = 22), were recruited from the MRC Cognition and Brain 
Sciences Unit Non-Clinical Volunteer Panel – a database of some 2000 community 
volunteers who have agreed to help with psychological research. Volunteers are recruited to 
the panel via advertisements in local newspapers. 
To be eligible for the study, participants had to be fluent in English and over 18 years 
of age. Exclusion criteria comprised a diagnosis of substance dependence, organic brain 
injury and a history of psychosis. No participants were excluded based on this criteria. 
3.2.3.2 Materials and Measures  
3.2.3.2.1 Self-structure card-sorting task.  
The card-sorting task was adapted from Showers (1992; Showers & Kevlyn, 1999; 
Showers & Kling, 1996), although the original task was proposed by Zajonc (1960) and 
subsequently adapted by Linville (1985, 1987). First, participants were given a description of 
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how we define “self-aspects.” Participants were then asked to identify and describe each of 
their different “self-aspects”. They were told that they were free to come up with as many 
different self-aspects as they felt were appropriate. Participants were given a blank table and 
asked to record their self-aspects at the top of a column.  
Participants were given a deck of 48 cards (listed in Appendix A), shuffled anew for 
each participant. Each card contained an adjective or phrase that might be used to describe a 
self-aspect. Participants were asked to record which of the cards fell under each self-aspect. 
The adjectives chosen were modified from Dalgleish et al.’s (2011) study to be more 
specifically trauma-related. For example, ‘feeling contaminated’, ‘feeling broken’ and 
‘feeling dirty.’ The adjectives/phrases were either positive or negative in valence (24 of each; 
see Appendix A). Prior to the study, we had the adjectives/phrases rated (n = 15 raters) for 
valence on 15-point Likert scales anchored at 1 (strongly positive), 7 (weakly positive), 8 
(neutral), 9 (weakly negative), 15 (strongly negative). The positive set of adjectives had a 
mean rating of 2.59 (SD = 0.81), whereas the negative set of adjectives had a mean rating of 
13.61 (SD = 1.09). A paired samples t test showed that the two sets of cards did not differ 
significantly in intensity (distance from the neutral score of 8; t <1).  
We also asked participants to think about their “core self” – the parts of their self 
concept that they felt were always almost experientially present and that underlay their 
experience of their different self-concepts. Participants were provided with a definition and 
then asked to take the 48 cards and then select those which they felt described their ‘core-
self.’. We hypothesized that the core self in our sample with PTSD would be more negatively 
laden than in our control group. 
3.2.3.2.2 Self-structure metrics 
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Proportion of negative items. This is the number of negative words or phrases, 
including repetitions, appearing in the card sort, divided by the total number of words or 
phrases used. It is a measure of the overall negativity of the sort (Showers, 1992).  
Compartmentalization (Showers, 1992). The measure of compartmentalization is a 
phi (φ) coefficient based on a chi-square statistic (Everitt, 1977). It compares the frequencies 
of positive and negative cards in each self-aspect of the card sort to those that would be 
expected, given the proportion of negative items for the sort as a whole. A frequency table is 
constructed that contains as many columns as there are self-aspects in the individual’s card 
sort and one row each for number of positive cards and number of negative cards. The 
observed frequencies for each cell are generated from the whole card sort. The expected 
frequencies are generated as follows: If the card sort contained, for example, 40% negative 
cards overall and the first self-aspect contained 20 cards, then the expected frequencies for 
that aspect would be 8 (40%) negative cards and 12 (60%) positive cards. A chi-square 
statistic is then computed using these expected and observed frequencies. This is then 
normalized by dividing by the number of cards in the sort (N) as follows:  
Ф = √χ2 / N 
where, φ can range from 0 to 1 (0 represents a perfectly random sort, and 1 represents a 
perfectly compartmentalized sort). 
Redundancy. Redundancy (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b) was computed 
separately for positive and negative attributes, with each redundancy score representing the 
degree of card repetitions across self-aspects, controlling for both the number of self-aspects 
in a given card sort and the number of cards used. The following formula generated the 
redundancy rates: 
Redundancy  = 𝑥 =
1
𝑛𝑑𝑤x 𝑛𝑑𝑔 
 x Ʃ nri 
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where (using the example of negative redundancy) ndw equals the number of distinct negative 
words used in an individual’s card sort, ndg equals the number of self-aspects generated, and 
Ʃnri equals the sum of repetitions of each negative card up to the maximum of 23 cards.7 
3.2.3.2.3 Screening and Questionnaire Measures 
SCID-I for Mood Disorders; Anxiety and Other Disorders. Axis I diagnoses 
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) were determined by having participants complete 
the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders – Clinician Version 
(SCID, Version 2.0; First, Spitzer, Williams & Gibbon, 1996) under the supervision of a 
Clinical Psychologist. The reliability and validity of the SCID-I for DSM-IV has been 
reported in several published studies (e.g. Lobbestael, et al., 2011; Zanarini et al., 2000). 
SCID-II (Borderline, Avoidant and Dependent Personality Disorder sub-sections). 
Diagnoses of Borderline, Avoidant and Dependent Personality Disorder were determined by 
having participants complete the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders 
(SCID-II; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1997). Excellent inter‐rater 
reliability has been found on the SCID-II (range 0.77 to 0.94).  The intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) trait scores of all personality disorders were excellent, with the exception of 
the schizotypal, histrionic, narcissistic and the A criteria of antisocial personality disorders 
which displayed fair inter‐rater agreement (e.g. Lobbestael, et al., 2011).  
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961). The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961) is a widely-used and well validated measure of depressive symptoms over the previous 
                                                        
7 The prototypical work on self-structure by Linville (1985, 1987) used a metric of “self-complexity,” which is a combination of overlap or 
redundancy across self-aspects and the overall numbers of self-aspects generated. However, self-complexity is highly correlated with 
numbers of different cards used in each card sort (Woolfolk et al., 1995), which militates against its use. We did not anticipate group 
differences in numbers of self-aspects generated in the present study and we were careful to match our groups on mean age. For these 
reasons among others (Dozois & Dobson, 2001a, 2001b; Rafaeli-Mor et al., 1999), we did not use the self-complexity metric in the present 
study. 
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week.8 The BDI demonstrates high internal consistency, with alpha coefficients of .86 and 
.81 for psychiatric and non-psychiatric populations respectively (Beck et al., 1988). Internal 
consistency was high in the current sample (α =. 96). 
Centrality of Events Scale (CES -Negative; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007). The 
CES-Negative (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007) measures the extent to which a negative or 
traumatic memory forms a central component of personal identity, a turning point in the life 
story, and a reference point for everyday inferences. We used the full version, which consists 
of 20 items rated on 5-point scales (1=totally disagree to 5=totally agree) in relation to the 
most stressful or traumatic event in the person’s life. The CES-negative is positively 
correlated with severity of PTSD symptoms, and this relationship remains significant when 
controlling for measures of anxiety, depression, dissociation, and self-consciousness 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007). Internal consistency for the CES was high in the current 
sample (α = .98). 
3.2.3.2.4 Procedure 
Ethics approval was obtained from the NHS National Research Ethics Service 
(reference 11/H0305/1). Participants completed the experimental session individually and 
face-to-face with the experimenter, in a quiet testing room. Following provision of informed 
consent, participants completed the SCID and several self-report questionnaire measures of 
mood and PTSD symptoms.. In a separate session, approximately a week later, they 
completed the self-structure card sort.  
3.2.4 Results 
3.2.4.1 Participant characteristics 
According to the SCID, of the 23 participants in the PTSD group, nine also met the 
criteria for a current episode of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), 19 met the criteria for a 
                                                        
8 The original BDI was preferred here over updated versions for legacy reasons because the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer 
Panel has an extensive historical database of original BDI scores that can be used when recruiting for studies. 
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past episode of MDD, one for current panic disorder (secondary to PTSD), four for current 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and two for current Avoidant Personality 
Disorder.  In the control group, one participant met the criteria for a current episode of MDD 
and five met the criteria for a past episode of MDD. The participant in the control group who 
met criteria for a current episode of MDD was excluded from the analyses.  
Descriptive group data are presented in Table 3.1. The groups did not differ 
significantly in age, t (42) = 1.41, p = .17, d = 0.44; 95% CIs [-0.03, 2.63],  nor in education 
level, t (42) = 1.75, p = .09, d = 0.54; 95% CIs [-0.17, 2.77], although there was tendency for 
the PTSD group to report fewer years in education. There were the expected differences in 
BDI scores between the PTSD and Control groups (BDI: t (24.01) = 7.35, p < .001, d= 3.0; 
95% CIs [-2.16, 4.76];  and support for our first hypothesis that the PTSD group would 
identify the negative events they had experienced as more self-defining on the CES: t (37.63) 
= 6.79, p < .001), d = 2.21; 95% CIs [-1.67, 4.27]. 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Data for Study Participants.  
Category PTSD Group  
(n=23) 
Control Group 
(n= 21) 
Years in Education 14.87 (2.32) 16.05 (2.13) 
Age (in years) 35.87 (14.03) 30.19 (12.54) 
Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-I) Total Score 
24.77 (12.83) 3.95 (3.37) 
Centrality of Events (CES) 
Total Score 
80.00 (15.49) 42.76 (20/07) 
 
3.2.4.2 Self-Structure  
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All participants were able to come up with multiple self-aspects (range 2-15). 
Examples of self-aspects were ‘self at work’, ‘self with close friends’, self with men’, and 
‘self at home.’  
The self-structure data are presented in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1. The groups were not 
significantly different on the total number of self-aspects generated, t (42) = 1.02, p = .31, d =  
0.31; 95% CIs [0.19, 2.41],  nor the total number of cards used, t (42) = 1.54, p = .13, d = 
0.48; 95% CIs [-0.09, 2.69],  although participants in the PTSD group used numerically more 
cards on average. This suggests comparable engagement in the task across groups and 
indicates that any group differences on the structure metrics considered below, which 
nevertheless control for overall numbers of self-aspects and cards used, were not likely to be 
a function of the number of self-aspects generated.  
 
Table 3.2: Mean (and Standard Deviation) Numbers of Self-Aspects and Cards Used Sorts 
Across Groups 
Variable PTSD Group (n = 23) Control Group (n = 21) 
Number of Self-Aspects (range 2-15) 6.70 (2.98) 5.90 (2.02) 
Cards used in sort (range 10 –229) 75.04 (56.69) 53.90 (28.19) 
Cards per Self Aspect (range 1-36) 10.59 (6.11) 9.27 (4.01) 
 
There were broad ranges of scores across both groups on the four self-structure 
metrics (maximum possible range 0 to 1) suggesting that across-group floor and ceiling 
effects were not at work in the data: Proportion of Negative Cards: 0.02 – 0.92; Negative 
Redundancy: 0 – 0.67; Positive Redundancy: 0.18 – 0.74; and Compartmentalization: 0 to 1. 
In illustration of the raw data, Appendix B shows two examples of actual past card sorts from 
participants in the control group illustrating relatively high and low levels of Affective 
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Compartmentalization. Of particular note is how, in the integrated card sort example 
illustrating relatively low Compartmentalization (Appendix B1), several of the self-aspects 
contain positive and negative descriptors that are diametrically opposite in meaning. 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean (+1 SE) performance (y-axis) for the PTSD and control groups for 
Proportion of Negative cards used, Positive and Negative Redundancy, and 
Compartmentalization across their multiple self-aspects. 
 
The first analysis assessed whether, overall, self-structure differed across the two 
groups. To that end we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with the 
four self-structure metrics as the dependent variables. 
 There was a statistically significant difference in the self-structure components based 
on group, Wilk’s Λ = 0.41, F (4, 39) = 13.85, p = .00, ηp2 =0.59. 
 Follow-up Univariate ANOVAs showed a significantly greater Proportion of 
Negative cards (F (1, 42) = 36.14, p = .00, ηp2 = 0.46; 95% CIs [0.41, 0.54], [0.12, 0.26]) and 
significantly greater Compartmentalization (F (1, 42) = 12.50, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.23; 95% CIs 
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[0.65, 0.83], [0.42, 0.61]) for the PTSD group. There were no significant differences between 
groups for Positive or Negative Redundancy, Fs < 1 
 
3.2.4.3 Sensitivity analysis examining the effects of comorbid depression 
To assess the likely effects of clinical depression comorbidity on self-structure, we set 
aside the nine participants with a comorbid diagnosis of MDD from the PTSD group and 
conducted sensitivity analyses using the remaining PTSD sample, for whom the self-structure 
metrics were similar to the whole sample (n = 14; see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Means and Standard Deviations of Scores on the Self-Structure metrics for the 
Participants without co-morbid MDD in the PTSD Group and the Control Group  
Self-structure metric PTSD Group 
without MDD 
(n=14) 
Mean (SD) 
Control Group 
(n = 21) 
 
Mean (SD) 
Effect 
Size (ηp2) 
Proportion of Negative 
Cards 
0.42 (0.13) 0.19 (0.13) 0.44 
Negative Redundancy 0.31 (0.11)      0.27 (0.16) 0.02 
Positive Redundancy 0.39 (0.15) 0.40 (0.13) 0.003 
Compartmentalization 0.79 (0.22) 0.51 (0.22) 0.30 
 
The MANOVA with the four self-structure metrics for this sensitivity analysis 
again revealed a statistically significant difference in the self-structure components based on 
group, Wilk’s Λ = 0.46, F (4, 30) = 8.99, p = .00, ηp2 =0.55.  Univariate ANOVAs again 
showed a significantly greater proportion of negative cards used, F (1, 33) = 26.28, p = .00, 
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ηp2 = 0.44; 95% CIs [0.35, 0.49], [0.14, 0.25] and significantly greater compartmentalization 
(F (1, 33) = 14.42, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.30; 95% CIs [0.68, 0.91], [0.42, 0.61], for the PTSD 
group. There was again no significant difference between groups on positive or negative 
redundancy, Fs < 1. 
3.2.4.4 Core Self Data 
The core-self data are presented in Table 3.4. The groups were not significantly 
different on the total number of cards used, t (42) = 1.05, p = .30, d = 0.32; 95% CIs [0.17, 
2.43],. As anticipated, the PTSD group used a significantly greater proportion of negative 
cards to describe their core self, t (34.38) = 3.32, p = .002, d = 1.13; 95% CIs [-0.83, 3.43]. 
3.2.5 Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to examine the structure of self-concept in a sample 
of sexual trauma survivors with PTSD compared to healthy controls using a self-descriptive 
card-sorting task (Showers, 1992). Consistent with our predictions, across self-aspects, the 
PTSD group used a greater proportion of negative cards and had a more compartmentalized 
self-structure than the control group. However, in contrast to our predictions, there were no 
significant differences between the PTSD and control group in positive redundancy. We also 
found no group differences for negative redundancy, where we had no clear predictions. We 
also demonstrated, unsurprisingly, that those with PTSD characterized their ‘core self’ as 
more negative relative to the healthy control group. The pattern of findings on the card-
sorting task was not simply a function of different numbers of self-aspects or number of cards 
used across the group, because there were no significant differences on these variables. To 
account for the previously established effects of depression (Dalgleish et al., 2011) on self-
structure, we set aside the participants with a comorbid diagnosis of MDD from the PTSD 
group and the resultant sensitivity analyses showed that the key findings were unchanged, 
indicating that the results are not accounted for by depression comorbidity.  
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  As noted in the Introduction, a number of authors have suggested that the higher 
levels of affective compartmentalization observed our PTSD sample may arise out of 
stressful or traumatic experiences as a way of ‘ring fencing’ off what tends to be highly 
distressing negative self-related material from more positive self-aspects (Linville, 1987; 
Morgan & Janoff–Bulman, 1994; Showers, Zeigler-Hill & Limke, 2006; cf. also Steinberg, 
Pineles, Gardner, & Mineka, 2003). So, for an individual with PTSD following a sexual 
trauma, a particular self-aspect, such as ‘self with men’, which encompassed feelings of 
shame, hopelessness and insecurity might be compartmentalized or split off from other self-
aspects, such as ‘self with close friends,’ which were associated with more positive affect. 
The fact that we found no support for a difference in negative redundancy between 
our groups suggests that in our sample with PTSD, distressing or toxic information relating to 
past traumatic experiences is compartmentalized across the self-structure, rather than 
pervading the individual’s entire sense of self. In this way, negative material is prevented 
from contaminating the other, more positive self-aspects. This finding contrasts with previous 
research in individuals with clinical depression who were found to demonstrate greater 
overall negativity, greater redundancy of negative attributes across self-aspects, reduced 
positive redundancy, and stronger affective compartmentalization than those who had never 
suffered from depression. (e.g. Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Dalgleish et al., 2011). This 
suggests that the self-structure is organized differently in those with PTSD, relative to 
depression.  
Similarly, based on these earlier depression findings, we had predicted that positive 
redundancy would be reduced in those with PTSD relative to controls, reflecting a reduced 
stable positive sense of self. However, this was not the case. Our results suggest that, 
although the overall positivity across the self-structure is lower in those with PTSD, as one 
would expect given the severe and distressing nature of the disorder, and the positive 
information is more compartmentalized, the positive content that is represented is as 
consistent across the self-structure as it is healthy participants. Again, this suggests clear 
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differences between the self-structure of those with PTSD compared to those with depression. 
 The study has some potential limitations. Although we did ask participants to generate 
their own self-aspects, we did not ask them to generate their own descriptive words to assign 
to the cards used in the sorting task. This was because we wanted to ensure that there were 
comparable numbers of positive and negative cards to select from and also to ensure that the 
intensity of descriptors was comparable across participants so that we could draw conclusions 
about the structure of the self-concept as opposed to the language used to describe it. Future 
studies could ask participants to provide their own adjectives to describe each self-aspect, 
that could then be rated in terms of valence and coded using metrics similar to those 
employed here (Rubin & Bernstein, 2003). 
 The second issue is that our clinical group and control group differed in two key 
ways. The clinical group consisted of a sample of individuals who experienced 
sexual/physical abuse and/or assault and who, as a consequence, had developed PTSD. Our 
controls comprised individuals who did not report traumas of this nature and who did not 
meet criteria for PTSD. This means that it is not possible to disentangle whether it is the 
development of PTSD rather than the trauma history, per se, that can account for differences 
in negative material and compartmentalization. The reason for this is that it is very difficult to 
find individuals with this kind of trauma history, at the level of severity of our sample, who 
are without mental health problems and so any trauma-matched control group would likely 
present with significant symptoms of PTSD (alongside diagnoses of other disorders) even 
though they might not meet criteria for a full diagnosis. Future studies could examine the 
replicability of the effects with survivors of more discrete or less severe trauma to seek to 
disentangle the experience of trauma from the presence of PTSD. Such studies would also 
speak to the generalizability of the effects from severe interpersonal trauma to other trauma 
categories. 
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 A third issue is that the sample sizes for the two groups were modest as is often the 
case for hard-to-recruit clinical samples. However, there is no suggestion in the pattern and 
magnitude of the results that lack of statistical power is responsible for any of the findings. 
The samples were also all female. It is now important to replicate the findings with larger 
samples including individuals with PTSD who have experienced different traumas and who 
are male. And finally, although we draw conclusions about the self-structure in PTSD relative 
to depression based on comparisons with the previous literature, we have not directly 
compared a PTSD (with no comorbid depression) group to a clinically depressed (with no 
comorbid PTSD) group. 
 In summary, the present study used an established card-sorting task to examine degree 
of negativity, positive and negative redundancy, and compartmentalization of valenced 
information across the self-generated self-aspects of an individual’s self-concept in a female 
sample of individuals with PTSD relative to healthy controls. The data revealed a greater 
proportion of negative cards and a more compartmentalized self-structure in individuals with 
PTSD, compared to a non-clinical control group, but provided no support for differences in 
positive or negative redundancy. This is consistent with literature proposing that high levels 
of affective compartmentalization may arise out of stressful or traumatic experiences as a 
way of ‘ring fencing’ off negative self-related material from the more positive self-aspects. 
These data fit with our understanding of PTSD and the mechanisms involved, such as 
avoidance and dissociation, that are used to inhibit the negative impact of past traumatic 
experiences. 
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3.2.7 Appendices 
3.2.7.1 Appendix A 
Positive and negative words/phrases used in the Card Sorts  
Positive                                Negative 
Happy 
Satisfying 
Overjoyed 
Fulfilling 
Successful 
Feeling Loved 
Confident 
Creative 
Feeling Needed  
Passionate 
Feeling Nurtured 
Joyful 
Wisdom 
Accomplished 
Important 
Feeling Together 
Exciting 
Complete 
Relaxed 
Feeling Courageous 
In Control 
Organised  
Stable 
Feeling Pure  
Naïve 
Incomplete 
Confused 
Boring 
Apathetic 
Moody  
Regretful 
Feeling Contaminated  
Stressful 
Out of Control 
Unsuccessful 
Feeling Broken 
Insignificant 
Insecure 
Ashamed 
Feeling Rejected 
Unfulfilling 
Gloomy 
Feeling Unwanted 
Lonely  
Depressing 
Feeling Unloved 
Hopeless 
Failure  
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3.2.7.2 Appendix B 
Sample self-structure card sorts for two Control group participants 
Table B1 
Card Sort for a control group participant with a predominantly positive self-structure and a relatively integrated mix of 
positive and negative words (Φ= 0.28) 
 
Friends Relationship Colleagues Alone Travelling Home 
Creative 
Happy 
Confident 
Important 
Loved 
Fulfilling 
Joyful 
Needed 
Together 
Complete 
In control 
Stable 
Relaxed 
 
Exciting 
Nurtured 
Relaxed  
Confused 
Stable 
Satisfying 
Together  
Passionate 
Needed 
Stressful 
Joyful  
Fulfilling  
Loved 
Important 
Happy  
 
Organised 
Wisdom 
Satisfying 
In control 
Out of control 
Courageous 
Naive 
Exciting 
Courageous 
Naive 
Relaxed  
Stable 
Insecure 
Accomplished 
In control 
Out of control 
Together  
Needed 
Lonely 
Wisdom 
Stressful 
Loved 
Important 
Creative  
Moody 
 
Stable 
Confident  
Importan 
Loved 
Fulfilling  
Joyful  
Confused 
Wisdom 
Stressful 
Together  
Lonely 
Complete 
Satisfying 
Out of control  
In control 
Relaxed  
Naive 
Accomplished 
Courageous 
Exciting 
 
Couraegous 
Nurtured 
Relaxed  
Stable 
In control 
Satisfying 
Together  
Needed 
Pure 
Joyful  
Moody 
Loved 
Important 
Boring 
Happy  
 
 
Note: Self-aspect titles have been adapted slightly for the purpose of anonymity, though they remain faithful to the 
content. Negative words are in bold, and positive words are in italics. 
 
Table B2 
Card Sort for a control participant with a more compartmentalized structure (Φ= 0.90) 
 
With parents With my 
brother 
With friends At school With boyfriend When 
unwell 
When alone 
Organised  
Accomplished 
Feeling Loved  
Nurtured 
Stressful  
Boring 
Joyful 
Stable 
Out of 
Control  
Confident  
Important  
In control  
 
 
Organised 
Stressful  
Insecure 
Boring 
Regretful 
Out of 
Control  
 
 
Organised 
Happy 
Feeling Loved  
Joyful 
Courageous 
Relaxed 
Exciting 
Creative 
Important  
Feeling 
needed  
Confident 
Satisfying 
Passionate  
Feeling 
Together  
In control  
 
Organised 
Accomplished  
Insignificant 
Stressful 
Confused 
Insecure 
Lonely  
Unsuccessful  
Out of 
Control  
Apathetic  
Failure 
Happy 
Feeling Loved  
Nurtured 
Feeling Together  
Stable 
Feeling Needed  
Joyful 
Ashamed 
Relaxed 
Creative 
Satisfying 
Important  
Confident  
Passionate  
Exciting 
Stressful 
Confused 
Moody 
Lonely 
Boring 
Sad 
Depressing 
Out of 
Control  
 
Happy 
Courageous 
Feeling Loved  
Moody 
Stable 
Creative 
Joyful 
Relaxed 
Confident  
In control  
Satisfying 
Exciting 
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Note: Self-aspect titles have been adapted slightly for the purpose of anonymity, though they remain faithful to the 
content. Negative words are in bold, and positive words are in italics. 
 
 
3.2.7.3 Appendix C 
Supplementary Material 
Selection of the Trauma-related Adjectives for the Card-Sorting Task 
The adjectives chosen were modified from Dalgleish et al.’s (2011) study to be more 
specifically trauma-related. For example, ‘feeling contaminated’, ‘feeling broken’ and 
‘feeling dirty.’ The adjectives/phrases were either positive or negative in valence (24 of each; 
see Appendix A). Prior to the study, we had the adjectives/phrases rated (n = 15 raters) for 
valence on 15-point Likert scales anchored at 1 (strongly positive), 7 (weakly positive), 8 
(neutral), 9 (weakly negative), 15 (strongly negative). The positive set of adjectives had a 
mean rating of 2.59 (SD = 0.81), whereas the negative set of adjectives had a mean rating of 
13.61 (SD = 1.09). A paired samples t test showed that the two sets of cards did not differ 
significantly in intensity (distance from the neutral score of 8; t <1).  
END OF RESEARCH PAPER 
 
3.3 Discussion and Integration  
 In study 2, we sought to extend our findings on the structure of the life story in PTSD 
by exploring the notion that not only do intrusive memories of past traumatic experiences 
structure our autobiographical narratives, they also inform our sense of self, and act as a 
reference point for our expectations and attributions in daily life (e.g. Robinaugh & McNally, 
2011). Our predictions in line with this (and based on the findings from study 1) were that the 
PTSD group would identify the most stressful or traumatic event in their lives as more 
centrally defining in terms of how they see themselves, relative to the controls, as measured 
by the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007), that individuals with 
PTSD would display greater negativity across the self-concept as well as greater 
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compartmentalisation of both positive and negative components of the self. We also predicted 
that redundancy of positive information across the different self-aspects would be reduced in 
those with PTSD relative to those without. 
 Consistent with our predictions and the findings from study 1 relating to the life story, 
across self-aspects, individuals with PTSD used a greater proportion of negative cards and 
had a more compartmentalized self-structure than individuals without PTSD. However, in 
contrast to our predictions, there were no significant differences in positive redundancy or 
overlap between self-aspects. 
 The results from study 2 add support to the theory that individuals with PTSD use 
strategies to compartmentalise or “ring-fence” the distressing or toxic information related to 
their past traumatic experiences. These additional findings suggest that these strategies are 
utilised by those with PTSD not only to prevent this negative and potentially distressing 
information from spreading or contaminating other parts of their history or life story, but also 
to separate it from other, more positive aspects of their self-concept.  
 These findings are consistent with the fairly well-established psychological 
phenomenon of “splitting” the self into distinctly positive and negative aspects (the good me 
vs. the bad me), which is believed to be an important mechanism for coping with both 
negative experiences and negative knowledge about the self (e.g. Bowlby, 1980; Sullivan, 
1953). As discussed, there are also mechanisms which people with PTSD frequently use to 
inhibit the reliving symptoms and overwhelming emotions associated with the disorder. 
These include avoidance but also suppression, repression, and dissociation (including 
depresonalisation and derealisation; e.g. Holmes et al., 2005). Dissociative strategies and the 
different ways in which they can manifest in the symptomatic presentation of PTSD are 
explored more fully in chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Research paper: Prevalence of Auditory Pseudohallucinations in Adult Survivors of 
Physical and Sexual Trauma with Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)  
Authors: Clifford, G., Dalgleish, T., & Hitchcock, C. 
Accepted for publication in Behavior, Research and Therapy on 29/10/2018 
Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/5axzs/ 
Citation: Clifford, G., Dalgleish, Tim., & Hitchcock, C. (2018). Prevalence of auditory 
pseudohallucinations in adult survivors of physical and sexual trauma with chronic post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Behaviour Research and Therapy. 111. 
10.1016/j.brat.2018.10.015.9 
For this paper, the candidate planned the study, collected all of the data, analysed the 
results and wrote the paper. The co-authors supervised the research process and made 
comments on iterative drafts of the manuscript. 
4.1  Background to the Study 
Throughout chapters 1-3 of this thesis, we have identified and discussed a number of 
mechanisms, which people with PTSD frequently use to inhibit the reliving symptoms and 
overwhelming emotions associated with the disorder. Dissociation during traumatic events is 
one of these mechanisms and a well-recognised phenomena in the research literature (Holmes 
et al., 2005; Murray, Ehlers & Mayou, 2002). One element of a dissociative mechanism that 
has been identified as occurring in response to trauma is an auditory verbal hallucination 
(AVH). Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) have been defined as the experience of 
hearing a voice in the absence of an appropriate external stimulus (Stanghellini & Cutting, 
2003). 
AVHs are commonly associated with psychosis (American Psychiatric Association, 
                                                        
9 Published version of the manuscript is included in Appendix 3.0 
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2013) but have also been identified in other disorders (Pilton, Verese, Berry & Bucci, 2015), 
where the experience of voices can impede therapeutic efficacy. In non-psychotic conditions, 
AVHs are most commonly reported in cases of combat-related Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) (David, Kutcher, Jackson, & Mellman, 1999; Hamner, Frueh, Ulmer & 
Arana, 1999; Seedat, Stein, Oosthuizen, Emsley, & Stein, 2003). Studies with civilian 
samples have been much less common. A critical question that has been raised in the 
literature is whether AVHs in PTSD are better conceptualised as pseudohallucinations linked 
to dissociative states, rather than as psychotic symptoms.  
Brewin and Patel (2010) suggested that AVHs are reported by 67% of a civilian 
sample with PTSD, but this runs counter to clinical descriptions of the disorder; AVHs are 
not included as a criterion in the DSM-V, nor are they included as a key focus of treatment in 
any of the current evidence-based interventions for PTSD. Therefore, there remains an 
important question of whether particular types of trauma exposure or trauma history are 
likely to be associated with pseudohallucinations and whether there was an association 
between the experience of pseudohallucinations and other dissociative symptoms. 
In study 3, using both a self-report measure of dissociative experiences and a semi-
structured interview to assess pseudohallucinations in trauma survivors, we sought to 
determine if the prevalence of pseudohallucinations in a British sample of adult survivors of 
repeated physical and sexual trauma was as high as has been previously reported. We also 
aimed to determine whether the frequency of pseudohallucinations was associated with the 
experience of childhood versus adult trauma, with other dissociative symptomatology and 
with the experience of comorbid depression.  
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4.2 Research paper: Prevalence of Auditory Pseudohallucinations in Adult Survivors 
of Physical and Sexual Trauma with Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)  
4.2.1 Abstract 
Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) are commonly associated with psychosis but 
are also reported in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Hearing voices after the 
experience of stress has been conceptualised as a dissociative experience. Brewin and Patel’s 
(2010) seminal study reported that hearing voices is relatively common in PTSD, as hearing 
voices was associated with PTSD in half and two thirds of military veterans and survivors of 
civilian trauma, respectively. The authors conceptualised these voices as “auditory 
pseudohallucinations.” To build upon this work, we administered Brewin and Patel's’ 
interview to adult survivors (n = 40) of physical and sexual trauma with chronic PTSD, and 
healthy controls (n = 39). In contrast to previous findings, only 5% (n = 2) of our PTSD 
sample reported recently hearing a voice that was consistent with an auditory 
pseudohallucination, with no reports in our control group. Thus, no support was provided for 
auditory pseudohallucinations as a significant symptom in this population. 
4.2.2 Introduction 
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) can be defined as the experience of hearing a 
voice in the absence of an appropriate external stimulus (Stanghellini & Cutting, 2003). 
However, the conceputalisation of AVHs and the extent to which hearing voices can be 
considered phenomenologically independent from other intrusive, unwanted and/or 
unintended cognitions, has been a matter of enduring academic and clinical debate 
(e.g., Aleman & Larøi, 2008; Slade & Bentall, 1988). AVHs are commonly associated 
with psychosis(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and are recognised as a frequent 
source of distress and interference with functioning. As a result, AVHs are a major target of 
pharmacological interventions (Shergill, Murray, & McGuire, 1998) and psychological 
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therapies (Thomas et al., 2014) for psychosis. However AVHs have also been identified in 
other disorders (Pilton, Verese, Berry & Bucci, 2015), where the experience of voices can 
impede therapeutic efficacy. Consequently, there are recommendations for tailoring existing 
therapeutic interventions (such as cognitive behaviour therapy; CBT) specifically for the 
treatment of AVHs (e.g. Smailes, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, McCarthy-Jones, & Dodgson, 
2015). Although other types of (pseudo)hallucinatory experiences, such as visual and 
olfactory hallucinations have been described in individuals with severe PTSD (e.g. Hamner, 
1997; Hamner, Frueh, Ulmer, & Arana, 1999), the focus of the current study was on the 
experience of hearing voices. 
In non-psychotic conditions, AVHs are most commonly reported in cases of combat-
related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (David, Kutcher, Jackson, & Mellman, 
1999; Hamner et al., 1999; Seedat, Stein, Oosthuizen, Emsley, & Stein, 2003). Prevalence 
rates of AVHs in combat-related PTSD range from 20% to 58% (Brewin & Patel, 
2010; David et al., 1999; Hamner et al., 1999; Ivezic, Bagariæ, Oruè, Mimica, & Ljubin, 
2000; Seedat et al., 2003). Studies with civilian samples have been much less 
common. Anketell et al. (2010) evaluated a mixed sample of general psychiatric outpatients 
and those who had experienced conflict-related trauma and found that 50% of their sample 
with chronic PTSD reported AVHs. Similarly, Brewin and Patel (2010) suggested that AVHs 
are reported by a remarkable 67% of a civilian sample with PTSD. 
This suggested preponderance of AVHs in sufferers of PTSD runs counter to clinical 
descriptions of the disorder. AVHs are not included as a criterion in the DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) criteria for PTSD, nor are they included as a key focus 
of treatment in any of the current evidence-based interventions for PTSD (i.e., eye movement 
desensitisation and reprocessing [EMDR], trauma-focused CBT, prolonged exposure, and 
cognitive processing therapy [CPT])). If AVHs are indeed a common and central component 
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of the phenomenology of not only combat-related but civilian PTSD then this would have 
important nosogolical and therapeutic implications. Given this, the nature of AVHs in PTSD 
and the frequency of their experience in community PTSD samples is in need of further 
investigation and that is the focus of the present study. 
A critical question is whether AVHs in PTSD are better conceptualised as 
pseudohallucinations linked to dissociative states, rather than as psychotic symptoms. Strong 
links between psychotic symptoms, including AVHs, and dissociative experiences have been 
demonstrated in a number of studies, in both clinical and non-clinical populations 
(see Moskowitz, Barker-Collo, & Ellson, 2004 for review). Allen, Coyne, and Console 
(1997) argued that dissociative detachment deprives individuals of “internal and external 
anchors”. The absence of anchors is proposed to increase an individual's sense of feeling 
disconnected from the world, interpersonal relationships, and within their intrapersonal self, 
resulting in a sense of confusion and disorientation, and critically, in an impairment in 
reality-testing. In this way, Moskowitz and Corstens (2007) proposed that for individuals 
hearing voices when exposed to high levels of stress, AVHs should be conceptualised as 
dissociative experiences. Similarly, Longden, Madill, and Waterman (2012) proposed that 
voices could be conceptualised as dissociated or ‘disowned components of the self’, arising 
from the failure to integrate adverse and traumatic sensory and psychological experiences 
into the context of the self. Hallucinatory experiences might therefore reflect directly or 
indirectly dissociated traumatic content (e.g., the voice of an abuser) impinging on conscious 
awareness (e.g. Anketell et al., 2010), rather than a psychotic symptom. 
Indeed, prior research has demonstrated a strong correlation in veterans with PTSD 
between hearing voices and other dissociative experiences both in the present and at the time 
the traumatic event occurred (Brewin & Patel, 2010). Wearne, Curtis, Genetti, Samuel, and 
Sebastian (2017) also showed that dissociative experiences (including depersonalisation and 
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derealisation) were a better predictor of AVHs than a diagnosis of PTSD. Both theory and 
prior research therefore suggest that the experience of AVHs in PTSD may be better 
understood as a dissociative experience and thus conceptualised as ‘pseudohallucinations’ 
and we shall use this term for the rest of the current article. A focus of the present study was 
therefore on the association between the experience of such pseudohallucinations and other 
dissociative symptoms. 
For those experiencing civilian PTSD this raises the question of whether particular 
types of trauma exposure or trauma history are more or less likely to be associated with the 
experience of pseudo-hallucinations, as we know that dissociation is differentially associated 
with particular profiles of trauma exposure (Briere, 2006). The experience of 
childhood sexual abuse, has been established as a predictor of pseudohallucinations in 
samples both with and without psychosis (Hammersley & Fox, 2006; McCarthy-Jones, 
2011; Read, McGregor, Coggan, & Thomas, 2006; Wearne et al., 2017), although the 
properties of the voices in these populations do not appear to differ between those with and 
without CSA (e.g. Offen, Waller, & Thomas, 2003). For this reason, the present study 
focused on a civilian sample presenting with PTSD following sexual assault, abuse or 
violence either in childhood or adulthood. We reasoned that the predicted high incidence of 
dissociation in this population would mean that the clinical presentation should include 
pseudohallucinations if such experiences are indeed a prevalent symptom in civilian samples. 
This population also allowed us to elucidate putative associations between 
pseudohallucinations and trauma in childhood. 
Hamner and colleagues (Hamner, 1997; Hamner et al., 1999) have also suggested that 
pseudohallucinations in PTSD might be best accounted for as a function of comorbid 
depression. Since depression is not typically associated with high levels of 
dissociation, Brewin and Patel (2010) proposed that finding high levels of 
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pseudohallucinations in a depressed sample would argue against their being a dissociative 
phenomenon. In their study of civilians with PTSD, Brewin and Patel (2010) collected an 
additional depressed sample without a primary diagnosis of PTSD. They found that 10% of 
the depressed sample reported the experience of pseudohallucinations and that these 
individuals scored in the low range on dissociative measures.1 From this, Brewin and Patel 
(2010) concluded that pseudohallucinations were not a function of comorbid depression but 
likely to be an aspect of dissociation. However, showing that pseudohallucinations do not 
characterize individuals with depression is not the same as investigating the role of comorbid 
depression in those with PTSD. In the present study, we therefore evaluated the relationship 
between depression comorbidity and pseudohallucinations in our community PTSD sample. 
In sum, using both a self-report measure of dissociative experiences and a semi-structured 
interview to assess pseudohallucinations in trauma survivors (Brewin & Patel, 2010), we 
sought to determine if the prevalence of pseudohallucinations in a British sample of adult 
survivors of repeated physical and sexual trauma was as high as reported in the two previous 
studies with civilian samples (Anketell et al., 2010; Brewin & Patel, 2010). We also aimed to 
determine whether the frequency of pseudohallucinations was associated with the experience 
of childhood versus adult trauma. Finally, we aimed to explore the nature of 
pseudohallucinations by determining if their experience was associated with other 
dissociative symptomatology and with the experience of comorbid depression. 
4.2.3 Method 
4.2.3.1 Participants 
Ethics approval was obtained from the NHS National Research Ethics Service 
(reference 11/H0305/1). We recruited adults (aged 18–62) with a current diagnosis of 
chronic2 PTSD (n = 40) according to the DSM-IV (APA, 2013), following a history of sexual, 
physical and/or emotional abuse (as Criterion A events), and a healthy control group with no 
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history of disordered mental health (n = 40), as determined using the Structured Clinical 
Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, Williams, & Janet, 1996). Fifteen 
of the PTSD participants were recruited from the Haven – A Sexual Assault Referral Centre 
(SARC) in Paddington. They were invited to take part following attendance at the Haven 
follow-up clinic or during an assessment for counseling or psychological therapy. Twenty-
five of the PTSD participants and all of the control participants were recruited from the MRC 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Panels –databases of some 2000 community 
volunteers who have agreed to help with psychological research. Volunteers were recruited to 
the panels via advertisements in local newspapers. 
According to the SCID-I, 35 (88%) of the PTSD group were exposed to between two 
and ‘too many to count’ past traumatic experiences (‘Criterion A traumas’). Nineteen 
(47.5%) reported that they experienced trauma prior to the age of 18, with the remaining 52% 
having only experienced trauma during adulthood (allowing us to compare AVHs between 
those with and without childhood trauma histories). Thirty eight percent of the total sample 
had experienced sexual assault during adulthood. All participants met DSM-IV criteria for 
chronic PTSD occurring as a result of these traumatic experiences. Sixteen (40%) had a 
comorbid diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), as determined by the SCID-I. One 
control participant met criteria for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and was excluded. 
4.2.3.2 Procedure and Measures 
Participants completed the measures in a single session, individually and face-to-face 
with the experimenter, in a quiet testing room. All participants completed the SCID-I, to 
derive diagnoses of PTSD and other Axis I disorders and to determine that criteria 
for Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders were not met. In addition, 
participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 19613) to assess current depression symptomatology, along with two 
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measures of hearing voices – the Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DES-II; Item 27 focuses 
on hearing voices), and a semi-structured interview to assess hearing voices (Brewin & Patel, 
2010). 
4.2.3.2.1 Dissociative Experiences Scale-II (DES-II; Carlson & Putnam, 1993). 
The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-II) is a 28-item self-report instrument and 
widely used clinical tool to measure dissociation. The DES-II has good validity and 
reliability, and good psychometric properties (Carlson et al., 1993; Carlson & Putnam, 1993). 
Hearing voices is included as Item 27 on the DES-II: “Some people sometimes find they hear 
voices inside their head that tell them to do things or comment on things they are doing. 
Circle a number (0–100) to show what percentage of time this happens to you.” This item is 
part of a subset of DES-II items (the Dissociative Experiences Scale-II Taxon; DES-T; 
comprising items 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 22 and 27) that differentiate individuals with pathological 
dissociation from those showing normal variation in dissociative experiences (Waller, 
Putnam, & Carlson, 1996). 
4.2.3.2.2 Auditory Pseudohallucinations Interview (Brewin & Patel, 2010).  
Pseudohallucinations Interview was administered to all PTSD and control 
participants. This measure was taken from prior evaluations of pseudohallucinations (Brewin 
& Patel, 2010). To our knowledge, this measure has not been used in any other published 
studies. We administered the semi-structure interview in its entirety, as used by Brewin and 
Patel (2010). 
The interview asked "Have you been aware in the past week of a stream of thoughts 
that repeats a very similar message over and over again inside your head? Sometimes the 
thoughts may just comment, or give instructions, or say if something is good or bad”. If 
participants responded yes, they were asked "Do you experience this as a voice or as a 
stream of thoughts?4″ If identified as a voice, details of up to three separate voices were 
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recorded, including gender, whether it was a voice they recognised, how the voice referred to 
them, how often they currently heard the voice, when they had first noticed the voice, 
whether the voice related in any way to a past traumatic experience and the extent to which 
the voice seemed real (i.e., like someone was actually speaking to them). Participants 
described what the voice typically said and rated the effect of hearing the voice on a five-
point scale for the extent to which they a) believed the content, b) could disagree with the 
voice, and c) could control the voice. Finally, again using five-point scales, they were asked 
to rate the extent to which encouraging, critical, happy, angry, rational, intimidating, 
supportive, and strong described each voice. 
4.2.4 Results 
Demographic and symptom data are presented in Table 4.1. We observed the 
expected between-group difference in BDI-I scores. The control group were younger and 
more educated than the PTSD group, thus these variables were covaried in analyses. All 
results remained the same when the participants who had only experienced one trauma (n = 5) 
were removed from analyses, and data were re-analysed including only those who had 
experienced repeated traumas. The relationship between the number of experienced traumatic 
events and the key outcome measures is presented in Fig. 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Mean (standard deviation) clinical Characteristics of PTSD Participants and 
Controls  
 PTSD Group 
(n=40) 
Control Group 
(n=39) 
Statistical Test Effect Size 
(d) 
Years in Education 14.15 (2.54) 17.03 (1.90) t(70.37)= 5.78, p<.001  
Age (in years) 34.40 (12.35) 28.95 (8.22) t(67.39)=2.33, p=.02  
Beck Depression 
Inventory score  
27.10 (12.59) 3.46 (6.16) t(55.39)=10.42, p<.001  
Dissociative 
Experiences Scale1 
(DES-II) score 
26.80 (18.95) 5.41 (6.04) F(1, 75) = 22.03, p<.001 0.54 
DES-II Item 27  
(hearing voices) score 
13.00 (25.34) 0.00 (0.00) F(1, 75) = 6.36, p=.01 0.29 
DES-T score 21.44 (19.36) 1.85 (3.33) F(1, 75) = 19.57, p <.001 0.51 
1. DES-II analyses covaried age and education  
 
Figure 4.1. a) Relationship between the Number of Experienced Traumatic Events and the 
CTSQ Total Score for the PTSD Group 
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b) Relationship between the Number of Experienced Traumatic Events and the DES-II Total 
Score for the PTSD Group 
 
 
c) Relationship between the Number of Experienced Traumatic Events and the DES-T for the 
PTSD Group 
 
4.2.4.1 DES-II data.  
DES scores across groups are also displayed in Table 4.1. As can be seen from the 
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the PTSD group scoring significantly higher on all indices. Scores on Item 27 were strongly 
correlated with the sum of the remaining DES-T items, r (38) = 0.68, p < .001. 
Within the PTSD sample, 13/40 (32.5%) answered positively (reported hearing voices >10% 
of the time) to Item 27. This contrasts with 48.4% of Brewin and Patel's (2010) veteran 
sample. None of the controls endorsed this item. 
Those within the PTSD group reporting childhood trauma (n = 19) scored 
significantly higher on the DES-II (M = 33.31, SD = 22.52), t(36) = 2.32, p = .03, and on the 
DES-T (M = 27.04, SD = 23.33), t(36) = 2.08, p=.05, than those reporting trauma only in 
adulthood (n = 21; DES-II: M = 19.55, SD = 12.57; DES-T: M = 14.47, SD = 12.22). 
However, critically, there was no support for a difference between groups on Item 27 
(childhood: M = 11.58, SD = 25.44; adulthood: M = 11.05, SD = 22.08), t(36) = 0.07, p = .95, 
d = 0.02, where the effect size was trivial (Cohen, 1992). 
There were positive significant correlations between the DES-T scores and the total 
score on the CTSQ, r(38) = 0.64, n = 40, p < .001and the BDI, r(38) = 0.45, n = 40, p = .004) 
for the PTSD group. 
Sixteen (40%) participants with PTSD also had a diagnosis of MDD. Scores on the 
DES-II did not significantly differ between those with (DES-II: M = 28.48, SD = 17.20; DES-
T:M = 23.52, SD = 17.97; Item 27: M = 11.25, SD = 26.05) and without (DES-II: M = 25.67, 
SD = 20.31; DES-T: M = 20.05, SD = 20.50; Item 27: M = 14.17, SD = 25.35) comorbid 
MDD on the DES-II, t(38) = 0.46, p = .65, DES-T, t(38) = 0.55, p > .05, or Item 27, t(38) = -
0.35, p = .73 and effect sizes were trivial (0.11 for DES-II, 0.12 for DES-T and 0.10 for Item 
27) (Cohen, 1992). 
4.2.4.2  Semi-structured interview  
In response to the interview, 18/40 (45%) participants with PTSD reported having 
experienced a stream of thoughts in the past week. Of these, 11 (61.1%) had an MDD 
 112 
diagnosis and eight (44.4%) reported experiencing childhood trauma. However, only two 
(11.11%) of those participants reported hearing repetitive thoughts in the form of a voice 
speaking to them. Each had PTSD following childhood trauma (one had experienced sexual 
and one physical childhood abuse). This contrasts starkly with Brewin and Patel's 
(2010) finding of 67% of a heterogeneous civilian PTSD sample reporting voices on the same 
interview measure. Both participants here regarded the voice as a manifestation of their own 
thoughts (a “pseudohallucination”, Brewin & Patel, 2010). Each reported hearing one voice, 
which they recognised. One participant identified the voice as her father, who referred to her 
by name, and the other was identified as the female participant's own voice, which referred to 
them as ‘stupid bitch’ and was described as ‘talking to me like someone else would’. In both 
cases, the voice was heard ‘many times a day’. The effect of the voice was described as 
positive in one case (own voice) and negative in the other (father's voice). Both participants 
described the voice as having been present since childhood. 
In the control group, 3/39 (8%) participants reported having experienced a stream of 
thoughts, but none identified these as a voice. 
4.2.5 Conclusions  
In this study, we sought to determine if the prevalence of auditory 
pseudohallucinations in a British sample of adult survivors of physical and sexual trauma 
with chronic PTSD was as high as reported in the two previous studies with civilian samples 
(Anketell et al., 2010; Brewin & Patel, 2010). We also aimed to determine whether the 
frequency of auditory pseudohallucinations was associated with the experience of childhood 
versus adult trauma. Finally, we aimed to explore the nature of auditory pseudohallucinations 
by determining if their experience was associated with other 
dissociative symptomatology and with the experience of comorbid depression. 
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In our PTSD sample, 32.5% answered positively (reported hearing voices >10% of 
the time) to Item 27 of the DES-II. When this question was presented within a semi 
structured interview, 45% of the PTSD group endorsed such experiences. However, when 
probed as to whether they experienced this “as a voice or a stream of thoughts”, only 2/40 
(5%) of our sample of survivors of physical and sexual trauma reported recently hearing “a 
voice” that was consistent with an auditory pseudohallucination. This is significantly lower 
than the 67% of Brewin and Patel's (2010) PTSD sample, using the same semi-structured 
interview approach, and than the 50% reported by Anketell et al. (2010). None of our healthy 
control participants endorsed hearing voices on the interview measure nor on item 27 of the 
DES-II. 
We also sought to evaluate the relationship of the experience of childhood trauma and 
of comorbid depression with the experience of hearing voices. However, as only two 
participants endorsed hearing voices, meaningful analyses were not possible. Of note, 
however, we found no support for differential endorsement of the relevant items on the DES 
for those with PTSD as a function of childhood trauma, or for those with PTSD and comorbid 
depression. 
There are a number of factors which may have contributed to the discrepancy in 
endorsement of voices on the DES-II relative to the interview. A key difference between 
these measures is that during the interview the individual is required to explicitly distinguish 
between the endorsed experience being either a) a voice talking to them or b) a stream of 
thoughts, and the majority (all bar two) of the participants reported that it was a stream of 
thoughts. It is possible that the DES-II may capture rumination and internal self-talk, and thus 
the more fine-grained evaluation provided by the interview question may account for why the 
incident reduced from that reported in the DES-T. Of course, there is also the possibility that 
participants did not want to discuss the voice face-to-face with a clinician for fear of negative 
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evaluation or discomfort, and thus more readily reported hearing voices in the self-report 
format but we feel this is unlikely given that participants had consented to take part in the 
study knowing that this was a focus. These issues will need to be addressed in future studies. 
In our sample of adults with a history of repeated physical and sexual trauma, we 
therefore found no evidence to support the previously reported high prevalence rates of 
auditory pseudohallucinations in other PTSD samples assessed using similar interview 
measures. The question of course is raised as to why there should be such a discrepancy 
between our findings and previous work. One possibility is that auditory 
pseudohallucinations are not a feature, specifically, of PTSD populations who have 
experienced repeated sexual or physical interpersonal trauma. However, given the previous 
literature linking such trauma exposure to higher levels of dissociation (Briere, 2006) and to 
the experience of auditory pseudohallucinations in individuals with and 
without psychosis (Hammersley & Fox, 2006; McCarthy-Jones, 2011; Read, van Os, 
Morrison, & Ross, 2015; Wearne & Genetti, 2015), one would have predicted a priori a 
higher prevalence of AVHs in the present sample relative to a heterogeneous community 
sample of the kind evaluated by Brewin and Patel (2010). Another possibility is although 
auditory pseudohallucinations have been conceptualised in the literature as a distinct 
psychological symptom, they should instead be considered as an artefact of recurrent 
intrusive memories and the auditory re-experiencing of traumatic events. We found that 
18/40 of our PTSD group reported having experienced a stream of thoughts but only two 
reported this was a voice speaking to them when probed by a clinician with extensive 
experience of working with complex PTSD populations. Perhaps only these two participants 
had found the metaphor of “hearing voices” to be a helpful way of explaining a recurrent 
intrusion. 
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A recent review (Steel, 2015) explored the relationship 
between hallucinations (including AVHs) and stressful or traumatic life events, with the 
reviewed studies indicating that there was a 12–40% overlap in the content of 
pseudohallucinations and traumatic memories The largest phenomenological survey of AVHs 
to date involved interviewing 199 voice hearers (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014). Of these, 12% 
reported that they heard voices, which were identical replays of memories of previous 
conversations, whilst 31% reported that the relationship was similar but not identical. 
Similarly, studies reviewed by Steel (2015) suggested the presence of thematic links between 
prior trauma and the content of hallucinations. Steel (2015) concluded that the relationship 
between hallucinations and past traumatic experiences remains elusive, and thus is in need of 
further investigation. If AVHs are the auditory re-experiencing of past traumatic events then 
this has important implications for treatment; for example, the content of AVHs may 
represent hotpots that require rescripting in trauma-focused CBT and other similar 
interventions. 
Limitations of this study include the specific focus on individuals with a chronic 
history of multiple incidences of sexual, physical and/or emotional abuse, rather than a 
broader inclusion of other, non-interpersonal traumatic experiences. As is common when 
working with survivors of repeated traumas, it was difficult to distinctly separate out different 
trauma types and their timing, especially with those who had experienced childhood trauma, 
and this therefore represents a methodological limitation. Our control and PTSD groups were 
also not matched for age and education level, although this turned out to be moot as there was 
minimal difference in our core construct of interest – endorsement of hearing voices in a 
semi-structured clinical interview. An additional limitation of the study was not including a 
formal measure of PTSD severity, such as the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale 
 116 
(CAPS; Blake et al., 1995), although all participants did meet criteria for the Chronic PTSD 
specifier on the SCID. 
In summary, in contrast to our predictions we found no support for a significant 
presence of auditory pseudohallucinations in a civilian sample of adults with chronic PTSD 
following sexual and/or physical interpersonal trauma. Our results suggest that prior reports 
of high prevalence of auditory pseudohallucinations in civilian samples are in need of further 
replication. 
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4.3 Discussion and integration 
In our sample of adults with a history of repeated physical and sexual trauma, we 
found no evidence to support the previously reported high prevalence rates of auditory 
pseudohallucinations in other PTSD samples assessed using similar interview measures. We 
predicted that there would be a higher prevalence of AVHs in a sample of individuals who 
had developed PTSD following repeated sexual or physical interpersonal trauma, relative to a 
heterogeneous community sample of the kind evaluated by Brewn and Patel (2010). This is 
due to literature linking exposure to interpersonal trauma with higher levels of dissociation 
(Briere, 2006). However, this was not the case.  
AVHs have been proposed as a distinct psychological symptom, that have been 
observed in individuals with and without psychosis  (Hammersley & Fox, 2006; McCarthy-
Jones, 2011; Read et al., 2005; Wearne et al., 2015), but we have discussed the possibility 
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that AVHs should be considered as an artefact of the intrusive memories and auditory re-
experiencing of traumatic events, commonly experienced by individuals with PTSD. In 
support of this, Steel (2015)’s review which explored the relationship between AVHs and 
stressful or traumatic events, found a 12-40% overlap in the content of pseudohallucinations 
and traumatic memories. Clinically, we understand and recognise that intrusive memories of 
past traumatic experiences are frequently auditory, as well as visual. And individuals with 
PTSD who report ‘hearing a voice,’ can often identify that voice as one of a past abuser, and 
often identify particular content as a ‘reliving’ or ‘re-experiencing’ of something said to 
them. However, we do not have enough evidence from our study to fully support this. 
The relationship between AVHs or “pseudohallucinations” and past traumatic 
experiences clearly needs further investigation, as it has clear implications for treatment. If 
AVHs are the auditory re-experiencing of past traumatic events the content of AVHs may 
represent “hotspots” that require rescripting in trauma-focused CBT and other similar 
interventions. Perhaps future studies could focus more on the content of AVHs and the 
overlap between AVHs and past traumatic events, with less reliance on this experience being 
conceptualised as “hearing voices.” 
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5.1 Background to the Study 
Much of the research literature has identified that multiple early traumatic experiences 
commonly result in impairment in developmental processes including the ability to recognise, 
identify and regulate emotion. Impairments in regulating emotion are significant for 
individuals with PTSD as they can compromise one’s ability to cope with and minimise the 
distress associated with the re-experiencing symptoms, which characterise the disorder. 
Emotional awareness and effective emotion regulation have been associated with good 
mental health, but emphasis has also been placed on the diversity of emotional experience 
(Quoidbach et al., 2014). It has been suggested that more specific, differentiated emotional 
states have greater adaptive value than less differentiated, more global affective states 
because differentiated emotional states can be more easily identified and understood by 
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others and are less subject to misattribution (e.g., Kehner, Locke & Aurain, 1993). It has also 
been argued that differentiated emotional states provide richer information to guide the use of 
specific strategies to effectively regulate emotion (Barrett & Gross, 2001; Barrett et al., 
2001), which is important for individuals with PTSD in the regulation of distressing 
emotions. 
Quoidbach et al., (2014) examined the benefits of greater emotional diversity – or 
emodiversity as it has been termed and found that greater levels of emodiversity were 
associated with better mental and physical health. In study 4, we sought to expand existing 
research findings on the association between emodiversity and mental health to explore the 
relationship between emodiversity and clinical manifestations of PTSD. In order to do this, 
we used the data collected for the self-structure and life structure studies in studies 1 and 2. 
with our samples of female survivors of sexual abuse and assault with PTSD, relative to non-
clinical control participants.  
5.2 Research paper: Negative and positive emotional complexity in the 
autobiographical representations of sexual trauma survivors with posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) 
5.2.1 Abstract 
This study examined the diversity of experienced positive and negative emotions – 
emodiversity – within two existing datasets involving female survivors of sexual abuse and 
assault, with chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Study 1 investigated the 
structure of the self-concept and Study 2 explored the organization of past autobiographical 
knowledge. In each study, we measured emodiversity for positive and negative emotion 
constructs in the PTSD samples, relative to healthy control participants with no PTSD and no 
history of sexual trauma. Results confirmed our hypotheses that individuals with chronic 
PTSD would show elevated negative emodiversity and reduced positive diversity across both 
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the structure of the self-concept and the structure of the life narrative, relative to control 
participants. The current results differ from community studies where greater negative 
emodiversity is associated with better mental health but mirror those from a prior study with 
individuals with Major Depressive Disorder. This suggests that valence-based differences in 
emodiversity are potentially a broader transdiagnostic marker of chronic emotional disorder. 
5.2.2 Introduction  
Emotions are fundamental to human experience. Historically, research indicates that 
high levels of positive emotion and low levels of negative emotion are an essential 
component of good mental health and subjective well-being (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001). 
However, there is increasing interest in how the complexity of emotion experience, over and 
above this simple balance of positive and negative felt emotions, can underpin mental health 
(Barrett, 2017). The richness and complexity in people’s self-reported experience of emotion 
is a primary aspect of the broad concept of emotional complexity (e.g., Lindquist & Barrett, 
2008), which has been linked to adaptive emotion regulation and mental health (Labouvie-
Vief & Medler, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2001).  
 Emotional complexity has been operationalized in a variety of ways, which can be 
grouped into two broad categories: emotional granularity and emotional covariation. 
Granularity (Barrett, 1998, 2004; Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001) refers to 
the degree to which individuals can describe their emotional life with precision, using 
discrete emotion descriptors to precisely characterize different emotions. Covariation, or 
dialecticism, refers to the experience of both positive and negative emotional states in a 
contemporaneous way, or in ways that are temporally related (Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999). 
Emotional granularity and emotional covariation measures have been reported to capture 
important aspects of the complexity of one’s emotional life (Quoidbach et al., 2014). For 
example, the propensity to experience positive and negative affect independently 
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(‘granularity’) has been linked to various indicators of adjustment (Carstensen, Pasupathi, 
Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Coifman, Bonanno, & Rafaeli, 2007; Reich, Zautra, & Davis, 
2003).  
Recent research has focused on the diversity of emotion experience that an individual 
reports, and questions have been asked regarding whether the diversity within an individual’s 
emotional life is beneficial for greater mental and physical health (Quoidbach et al., 2014; 
although see Sommers, 1981, for discussion of ‘emotional range’). The thesis is that there are 
individual differences in how people understand, interpret and communicate the range and 
nature of their own emotion experience. Some people are more aware of and able to articulate 
a wide range of discrete, specific emotions while others are more prone to represent how they 
feel with a relatively narrow set of specific descriptors alongside more global self-
characterizations of their emotional life (e.g., feeling ‘good’ or ‘bad’) . It has been suggested 
that a wider range of experience of specific, differentiated emotional states (e.g., happiness, 
excitement, and exhilaration) has greater adaptive value than a narrower range and than less 
differentiated, more global affective states (e.g., feeling good). The theory is that 
differentiated emotional states can be more easily identified and understood by others around 
us, and are less subject to misattribution (e.g., Kehner, Locke & Aurain, 1993). Moreover, 
differentiated emotional states are also argued to provide richer information to guide the use 
of specific strategies to effectively regulate emotion (Barrett & Gross, 2001; Barrett et al., 
2001). This approach fits within a broader view that biological and psychological flexibility 
is beneficial for adaptive mental functioning and promotes greater resistance to disease (e.g., 
Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010).  
Quoidbach et al., (2014) examined the psychological and mental health benefits of 
such greater emotional diversity – or emodiversity as it has been termed. The concept of 
emodiversity was derived from the literature on biodiversity (i.e., the variety and differential 
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prevalence of different types of life forms within an ecosystem). Greater biodiversity has 
been associated with adaptive flexibility and greater resilience within an ecosystem 
(Danovaro et al., 2008; Elmqvist et al., 2003; Heller & Zavaleta, 2009; Potvin & Gotelli, 
2008; Rammel & van den Bergh, 2003; Tilman, Reich, & Knops, 2006). Quoidbach et al. 
(2014) therefore adapted the Shannon Biodiversity Index (Shannon, 1948) to quantify 
emodiversity using two domains: the richness (how many specific emotions are experienced); 
and evenness (the extent to which specific emotions are experienced in the same proportion) 
in what they described as the ‘human emotional ecosystem.’ Their hypothesis was that greater 
emodiversity would be associated with comparable benefits in emotional and physical health, 
over and above the frequency of positive and negative emotions experienced. 
  Quoidbach et al. (2014) surveyed 37,000 participants in the general population to 
measure symptoms of depression and the self-reported diversity of experienced emotion 
(emodiversity). They computed three emodiversity indices (positive, negative, and global) 
using the formula derived from the Shannon Biodiversity Index. The richness and evenness 
of an individual’s emotional experience was computed for each of the three indices. Results 
suggested that greater levels of emodiversity, whether computed for positive emotions, 
negative emotions or all emotions, were associated with better mental health, in the form of 
lower levels of self-reported depression symptoms, as well as better physical health, for 
example, levels of attendance at a doctor’s (Quoidbach et al., 2014).  
 In related research, the tendency to use undifferentiated global emotion descriptors 
(particularly global negative descriptors) established from both self-report and ecological 
assessment data has been shown to be associated with a range of mental health disorders 
including borderline personality disorder (Tomko et al., 2015), social anxiety (Kashdan & 
Farmer, 2014) and major depressive disorder (Demiralp et al., 2012). Researchers have also 
recently found that greater diversity in specific positive emotion experience is associated with 
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lower levels of systemic inflammation, providing a biological basis, perhaps, to help explain 
how positive emodiversity promotes physical health (Ong, Benson, Zautra, & Ram, 2017).  
Complexity in an individual’s experience of emotion, including emodiversity, is 
proposed to index the degree of complexity in the underlying conceptual structure of 
emotions. Theories of how such conceptual understanding might develop – for instance, the 
Levels of Emotional Awareness (LEA) approach (Lane & Schwarz, 1987) –  posit that 
increased complexity of emotion experience emerges as a function of the underlying 
emotional schemas that have developed from early childhood onwards. In this analysis, 
differences across individuals in the complexity of their emotional lives reflect individual 
variation in the complexity of the underlying emotional representations that evolve 
throughout development (Lane & Nadel, 2000). This has led to the proposal (Werner-Seidler 
et al., 2018) that individuals who have suffered from chronic, sometimes lifelong, mental 
health problems may actually experience greater diversity of negative emotion experiences, 
due to their long history, familiarity and discourse with negative emotional constructs (Beck, 
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Ratcliffe, 2015). In this view, negative emodiversity would 
reflect lifelong ‘expertise’ with negative emotions (Werner-Seidler et al., 2018) rather than 
some form of protection against mental health problems (cf. Quoidbach et al., 2014). 
Werner-Seidler et al (2018) investigated this proposal in individuals with chronic and 
lifelong depression. They found that, in contrast to those with elevated scores on depression 
measures in a general population sample (Quoidbach et al., 2014), chronically depressed 
individuals instead showed elevated levels of emodiversity for negative emotions relative to 
control participants who had never suffered depression. For positive emotions, emodiversity 
was reduced in the chronic, clinically depressed sample in line with the previous community 
findings. Werner-Seidler et al. (2018) proposed that, taken together, these findings suggest 
that, although negative emodiversity in the wider population may offer some protection 
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against depression, for those with chronic clinical depression greater negative emodiversity 
will have emerged out of their long-term immersion in a complex, emotionally negative, 
personal narrative.  
In the current study we sought to expand on these existing findings by examining the 
relationship between emodiversity and another mental health condition - chronic 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Our rationale was first to establish whether the greater 
negative emodiversity associated with recurrent depression extended beyond this clinical 
syndrome to another chronic mental health problem. Second, recurrent depression is 
characterized by negative emotionality that infuses an individual’s broadest representations 
of the self, the world and the future (Beck et al., 1979). In contrast, PTSD is ostensibly 
characterized by negative affect associated with an external precipitating event or events 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), although the affective repercussions are often 
more profound than this (Bernsten & Rubin, 2006, 2007). We were therefore interested in 
whether a disorder where negative emotionality is potentially more constrained to discrete 
areas of experience, would in fact be characterized by elevated negative emodiversity across 
the entire autobiographical narrative, as has been found in recurrent depression (Werner-
Seidler et al., 2018). For that reason, as in the prior clinical depression study (Werner-Seidler 
et al., 2018), we examined emodiversity within data that reflected the broadest notions of the 
self and the personal past. 
Specifically, we examined emodiversity within two existing PTSD datasets. The first 
investigated the structure of self-concept (Clifford, Hitchcock & Dalgleish, 2018a) and the 
second explored the organization of past autobiographical knowledge (Clifford, Hitchcock & 
Dalgleish, 2018b) in female survivors of sexual abuse and assault, with chronic PTSD. In 
each study, we measured emodiversity for positive and negative emotion constructs in the 
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PTSD samples, relative to healthy control participants with no PTSD and no history of sexual 
trauma.  
Based on the earlier clinical depression study (Werner-Seidler et al., 2018), we 
hypothesized that individuals with chronic PTSD would show elevated negative emodiversity 
and reduced positive diversity across both the structure of the self-concept and the structure 
of the life narrative.  
5.2.3 Study 1: Emodiversity within the self-structure in PTSD 
5.2.3.1 Method 
5.2.3.1.1 Participants 
Participants for Study 1 were drawn from the study by Clifford et al. (2018a) on the 
self-structure in PTSD.  Full details for inclusion and exclusion are reported in the original 
article. Briefly, participants were included in the PTSD group if they currently met diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) (n = 23). Fifteen of these 
participants were recruited from the Haven; A Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC) in 
London. They were invited to take part following attendance at the Haven follow-up clinic or 
during an assessment for counseling or psychological therapy. Eight participants were 
recruited from the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Clinical Volunteer Panel – a 
database of approximately 400 community volunteers with a history of significant mental 
health problems. Volunteers are recruited to the panel via advertisements in local newspapers 
and through local clinics. 
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The participants without PTSD (the Control Group; n = 22), had no history of PTSD 
and no reported history of sexual assault or abuse. They were recruited from the MRC 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit Volunteer Panel – a database of approximately 2000 
community volunteers who have agreed to help with psychological research. Volunteers are 
recruited to the panel via advertisements in local newspapers. 
PTSD diagnosis and history, and other Axis I and II psychiatric comorbidity 
according to the DSM-IV were determined by having participants complete the Structured 
Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders – Clinician Version (SCID, Version 2.0; 
First, Spitzer, Williams & Gibbon, 1996) and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-
TR Axis II Personality Disorders (Borderline, Avoidant and Dependant). To be eligible for 
the study, participants had to be fluent in English and over 18 years of age. Exclusion criteria 
comprised a diagnosis of substance dependence, a history of psychosis, and organic brain 
injury. No participants were excluded on these bases. 
5.2.3.1.2 Materials and Measures 
Self-Structure Task. The Self-Structure Task is described in Clifford et al. (2018a). 
The task was adapted from Showers (1992; Showers & Kevlyn, 1999; Showers & Kling, 
1996). Participants are given a description of how ‘self-aspects’ are defined and asked to 
identify and describe each of their different ‘self-aspects’. Participants are then given a deck 
of 48 cards, each containing a positive or negative trait adjective or phrase and asked to 
choose all cards which they felt were relevant in describing each of the self-aspects 
identified. Participants were instructed to use as many or as few adjectives as were relevant, 
and that repetitions were permitted. Four self-structure metrics (proportion of negative cards 
used, compartmentalization, and positive and negative redundancy) were derived and these 
metrics are reported in Clifford et al. (2018a).  
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Emodiversity. Emodiversity across the card-sort data was calculated as in Werner-
Seidler et al. (2018), using the formula below. This procedure was based on the formula 
provided by Quoidbach et al (2014), which was originally derived from the Shannon 
biodiversity index (Shannon, 1948):  
Emodiversity = ∑(𝑝𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1
 x  ln  𝑝𝑖) 
Where s = the number of total number of emotional trait adjective cards used in the card sort 
task by a given participant, and pi is the proportion of s made up by cards for each emotion 
trait experienced. A value is calculated for each distinct trait card used, which is then imputed 
into the above formula. This formula takes into account both the number of traits reported as 
experienced (richness), as well as the degree to which different traits make up an individual’s 
emotion experience (evenness/abundance). High values represent more diverse emotion 
experience. Emodiversity indices are calculated separately for negative and positive 
emotional traits.  
5.2.3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the tasks and measures individually and face-to-face with the 
experimenter, in a quiet testing room. Once they had consented, participants completed the 
SCID and then the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) to assess current symptoms of depression, and the Centrality of Events Scale 
(CES -Negative; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, 2007) to measure of the extent to which a 
traumatic memory forms a central component of personal identity. The questionnaire 
measures were designed to validate our categorical participant group assignments by 
revealing significantly worse self-reported mood and symptoms of PTSD in the PTSD group 
relative to the Control Group. In a separate session, approximately a week later, participants 
completed the card-sorting task. 
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5.2.3.2 Results 
5.2.3.2.1 Participant characteristics 
As described in Clifford et al. (2018a), according to the SCID, in the PTSD group, 
nine participants also met criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), with 
a current Major Depressive Episode, 19 met criteria for a past Major Depressive Episode, one 
for current panic disorder (secondary to PTSD), four for current Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD) and two for current Avoidant Personality Disorder.  In the Control Group, 
one participant met criteria for current MDD and five met criteria for a past Major Depressive 
Episode. The participant in the Control Group who met criteria for current MDD was 
excluded from analyses.  
The remaining descriptive group data are presented in Table 5.1. Effect sizes are 
presented as Cohen’s ds. All confidence intervals (CIs) are 95% confidence intervals. The 
PTSD and Control Groups did not significantly differ in age, t(43) = 1.48, p = .15, d = 0.45 
[95% CI: -0.18, 1.08] or education level, t(43) = 1.96, p = .06, d = 0.60 [-0.03, 1.23]. There 
were the expected differences in BDI and CES scores between the groups, BDI: t(27.78) = 
6.76, p < .001, d = 2.57 [1.73, 3.41]; CES: t(39.87) = 6.96, p < .001, d = 2.20 [1.41, 3.00]. 
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Table 5.1 Means (and standard deviations) of participant characteristics in Study 1. 
Category PTSD Group  
(n=23) 
Control Group 
(n=21*) 
Years in education 14.87 (2.32) 16.18 (2.17) 
Age (in years) 35.87 (14.03) 30.05 (12.26) 
Beck Depression Inventory  24.77 (12.83) 4.82 (5.23) 
Centrality of Events Scale  80.00 (15.49) 42.95 (19.60) 
Note. *data for one Control Group participant were set aside due to the presence of current 
MDD 
5.2.3.2.2 Emodiversity 
The Positive and Negative Emodiversity findings are presented in Figure 5.1. Across 
all participants, Negative and Positive Emodiversity scores were not significantly correlated, 
r(45)= -.05, p = .75, demonstrating that it is valid to examine diversity indices separately 
across different valence domains (Quoidbach et al., 2014).  
To examine patterns of Positive and Negative Emodiversity across groups, we 
conducted a mixed model ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) as the within-subjects 
factor, Group (PTSD, Control) as the between-groups factor, and Emodiversity index as the 
dependent variable (cf. Werner-Seidler et al., 2018). There was a significant main effect of 
Valence, F(1,43) = 23.94, p < .001, d = 1.48 [0.78, 2.18], such that there was greater Positive 
Emodiversity than Negative Emodiversity, and a significant main effect of Group, 
F(1,43)=5.77, p=.02, d= 0.73 [0.09, 1.37], with greater Emodiversity  in the PTSD Group 
relative to the Control Group. There was also a significant Valence × Group interaction, 
F(1,43) = 39.34, p < .001,  d= 1.89 [1.14, 2.64].  In line with our predictions, follow-up 
ANOVAs demonstrated significantly greater Negative Emodiversity for the PTSD group, 
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F(1, 43) = 24.90, p < .001, d = 1.51 [0.81, 2.21], and significantly greater Positive 
Emodiversity for the Control Group, F(1, 43) = 4.47, p = .04, d =0.64 [0.01, 1.27]. 
 
  
Figure 5.1 Mean (+1 SE) performance (y-axis) for the PTSD and Control Groups for 
Negative and Positive Emodiversity within the Self-Structure Task in Study 1 
5.2.3.2.2.1 Emodiversity and emotional negativity/positivity within the Self Structure  
We next sought to evaluate whether these differential emodiversity effects across 
groups were a function of greater overall endorsement of emotional words (cf. Quoidbach et 
al., 2014; Werner-Seidler et al., 2018). We first looked at Negative Emodiversity. As a 
function of our formula to calculate emodiversity, higher levels of Negative Emodiversity are 
linked to the selection of a greater number of negative cards overall in the card-sort, so we 
cannot simply use the latter when trying to disentangle emodiversity and general negativity. 
However, we can compute the number of times a diverse set of selected negative cards is 
used repeatedly by each participant across their Self Structure (i.e., Negative Repetitions). To 
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calculate this, we used the following formula: Negative Repetitions = (Total number of 
negative cards used – number of distinct negative cards used)/number of distinct negative 
cards used. The PTSD Group had a higher mean level of Negative Repetitions (M=0.94, 
SD=0.85) relative to the Control Group (M=0.47, SD=0.39), t(31.38) = 2.40, p = .02; d= 0.86 
[0.21, 1.51], reflecting a greater repeated endorsement of their diverse set of negative cards 
across their self-aspects.  
We next entered these Negative Repetition scores as a covariate into our main 
analyses to see if the greater repeated negativity of the PTSD group mitigates our core 
findings. The pattern of core emodiversity results was unchanged, with a significant Valence 
×Group interaction, F(1,41) = 31.75, p< .001, d = 1.70 [0.97, 2.43] and follow-up 
comparisons showing greater Negative Emodiversity for the PTSD Group compared to the 
Control Group, F(1,42) = 17.14, p <.001, d = 1.25 [0.57, 1.93], but lower levels of Positive 
Emodiversity, F(1,42) = 8.03, p = .007; d= 0.86 [0.21, 1.51].  
Using the same formula, we computed the number of times a diverse set of selected 
positive cards was used repeatedly by each participant across their self-structure (i.e., Positive 
Repetitions). Interestingly, the PTSD Group actually had a marginally higher mean level of 
Positive Repetitions reflecting a greater repeated endorsement of their diverse set of positive 
cards across their self-aspects (M=1.33, SD=1.37) relative to the Control Group (M=1.25, 
SD=0.80), although this difference was not significant t(43) = 0.23, p = .82, d = 0.07 [-0.55, 
0.69].  
We then entered these Positive Repetition scores as a covariate into our core analyses 
and again the pattern of results was unchanged, with a significant Valence × Group 
interaction, F(1,42) = 39.68, p < .001, d= 1.90 [1.15, 2.65], and follow-up comparisons 
showing significantly greater Negative Emodiversity for the PTSD Group, F(1, 42) = 25.07, 
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p < .001, d= 1.51 [0.81, 2.21], and significantly greater Positive Emodiversity for the Control 
Group, F(1, 42) = 6.59, p = .01, d= 0.77 [0.13, 1.41]. 
5.2.3.3 Discussion  
Study 1 investigated the diversity of endorsed emotion descriptors – emodiversity – across 
the self-structure in individuals with chronic PTSD following sexual trauma relative to 
healthy controls with no history of such experiences. In line with our predictions, we found 
that, relative to healthy controls, our PTSD participants endorsed a greater diversity of 
emotion descriptors within the negative affective domain and a reduced diversity of positive 
descriptors. These effects appeared to be independent of the frequency of endorsement of 
those descriptors. These findings mirror the emodiversity results in individuals with chronic 
Major Depressive Disorder reflecting on their autobiographical past (MDD; Werner- Seidler 
et al., 2018). Thus, findings suggest that elevated negative emodiversity may be a broader 
transdiagnostic marker of emotional disorders, rather than a specific feature of any one 
syndrome within the mood, anxiety and stressor disorder spectrum. 
 The current findings and the previous findings in individuals with depression 
(Werner-Seidler et al., 2018) are discrepant to earlier results with community samples of 
mostly healthy individuals. Quoidbach et al. (2014) had shown an association between 
greater negative emodiversity and reduced symptoms of depression, with the authors arguing 
that emodiversity thereby serves as a protective factor against mental health problems. The 
present results suggest that, in chronic clinical samples, different processing dynamics might 
be operating with greater negative emodiversity in these groups reflecting immersed 
‘expertise’ with negative affective experiences. 
 In Study 2 we sought to replicate the present results using the same task as the prior 
findings in groups with clinical depression (Werner-Seidler et al., 2018). In the task, 
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participants endorse a diversity of emotion descriptors with reference to the entirety of their 
past autobiography as opposed to their current self-concept. 
5.2.4 Study 2: Emodiversity within the Life Structure in PTSD 
5.2.4.1 Method 
5.2.4.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Participants in Study 2 were drawn from Clifford et al (2018b) and full details on 
participant recruitment and inclusion criteria are provided there. These criteria are identical to 
those for Study1. The PTSD and Control groups in Clifford et al. (2018b) were not matched 
for years in education. Due to the likely importance of education as an influence on 
conceptual measures such as emodiversity, prior to completing analyses we excluded data 
from four participants from the original PTSD Group in Clifford et al (2018b) who had a low 
number of years in education and one member of the Control Group with a high number of 
years in education, to ensure a better balance across groups. This gave us a PTSD group of 
n=23 and a Control Group of n = 22. Of this PTSD Group, 15 participants were recruited 
from the Haven; and eight were recruited from the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit 
Clinical Volunteer Panel.  
Nine of the participants in the PTSD group and 8 participants in the control group 
were also participants in Study 1. The pattern of results remained the same when these 
participants were excluded from the analyses.  
The procedure was as for Study 1 except for the Life Structure Task being 
administered in place of the Self Structure task. 
Life Structure Task. The Life Structure task is described in detail in Clifford et al. 
(2018b). In brief, participants were asked to think back over their life and divide it into 
chapters. Participants then provided a relevant heading for each chapter and completed the 
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card sort task as outlined in Study 1, this time allocating cards to life chapters instead of self-
aspects. Positive and Negative Emodiversity were calculated as described in Study 1. 
5.2.4.2 Results 
5.2.4.2.1 Descriptive Group Data  
According to the SCID, in the PTSD group, five participants also met criteria for 
current MDD, 22 met the criteria for a past Major Depressive Episode, seven for current 
panic disorder (secondary to PTSD), two for current Agoraphobia, five for current Borderline 
Personality Disorder, and two for current Avoidant Personality Disorder.  In the Control 
Group, three participants met criteria for a past episode of MDD and one for current panic 
disorder. 
The descriptive group data are presented in Table 5.2. The groups did not differ in 
age, t(43) = 0.27, p = .79, d = 0.08 [-0.53, 0.69], nor years in education, t(43) = 1.90, p = .07, 
d = 0.58 [-0.04, 1.20]. There were the expected differences in BDI and CES scores between 
the PTSD and Control groups – BDI: t(22.89) = 8.79, p < .001, d = 3.67 [2.65, 4.68]; CES: 
t(42.10) = 8.81, p < .001, d = 2.72 [1.86, 3.58]. 
 
Table 5.2.  Means (and standard deviations) of participant characteristics in Study 2. 
Category PTSD Group  
(n=23) 
Control 
Group 
(n=22) 
Years in Education 14.91 (2.83) 16.36 (2.26) 
Age (in years) 36.70 (13.48) 35.55 (15.05) 
Beck Depression Inventory  25.09 (12.69) 1.59 (1.76) 
Centrality of Events Scale  82.09 (16.43) 36.55 (18.17) 
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5.2.4.2.2 Emodiversity  
The emodiversity data for the Life Structure task are presented in Figure 5.2. As in 
Study 1, across all participants, Negative and Positive Emodiversity scores were not 
significantly correlated, r(45)= -.05, p = .76.  
As for Study 1, to examine patterns of Positive and Negative Emodiversity across 
groups, we conducted a mixed ANOVA with Valence (negative, positive) as the within-
subjects factor, Group (PTSD, Control) as the between-subjects factor, and the emodiversity 
index as the dependent variable. As in Study 1, there was a main effect of Valence, F(1,43) = 
9.39, p = .004, d= 0.91 [0.27, 1.55], with significantly higher Positive Emodiversity across 
the Life Structure. However, unlike Study 1, there was no significant main effect of Group,  
F <1. As hypothesized and in line with the results of Study 1, there was a significant Valence 
× Group interaction, F(1,43) = 11.98, p < .001, d= 1.03 [0.38, 1.68]. Follow-up ANOVAs 
again showed significantly greater Negative Emodiversity in the PTSD group, F(1, 43) = 
5.42, p = .03, d = 0.69 [0.06, 1.32], and significantly greater Positive Emodiversity in the 
Control Group, F(1, 43) = 5.60, p = .02, d = 0.71 [0.08, 1.34]. 
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Figure 5.2 Mean (+1 SE) performance (y-axis) for the PTSD and Control Groups for 
Negative Emodiversity and Positive Emodiversity across the Life Structure in Study 2. 
5.2.4.2.3 Emodiversity and Negativity/Positivity 
As for Study 1, we repeated our main analyses covarying Negative and Positive 
Repetitions. The PTSD Group (M = 1.29, SD = 0.91) had a numerically higher mean level of 
Negative Repetitions relative to the Control Group (M = 1.25, SD = 1.27), but this difference 
was not significant t(43) = 0.19, p = .91, d = 0.06 [-0.55, 0.67]. Covarying for Negative 
Repetition scores in our main emodiversity analyses again left the pattern of results 
unchanged, with a significant Valence × Group interaction, F(1,42) = 12.02, p = .001 d = 1.03 
[0.38, 1.68] and follow-up paired comparisons showing greater Negative Emodiversity, 
F(1,42) = 5.61, p = .02; d = 0.71 [0.08, 1.34], but lower levels of Positive Emodiversity,  
(1,42) = 5.66, p = .02; d = 0.71 [0.08, 1.34], in the PTSD Group compared to the Control 
Group. 
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The Control Group (M=2.52, SD=1.43) had a significantly higher mean level of 
Positive Repetitions relative to the PTSD Group (M=1.46, SD=1.57), t(42.91) = 2.37, p = .02; 
d = 0.72 [0.09, 1.35]. Entering these Positive Repetition scores as a covariate into our main 
analyses did impact the pattern of significant results. There remained a significant Valence × 
Group interaction, F(1,42) = 8.87, p = .005; d = 0.89 [025, 1.53], and the follow-up paired 
comparison continued to show greater Negative Emodiversity, F(1,42) = 5.94, p = .02; d= 
0.73 [0.10, 1.36], for the PTSD group relative to the Control Group. However, there was no 
longer a significant group difference for Positive Emodiversity, F(1,42) = 1.91, p = .17, d 
=0.41 [-0.21, 1.03].  
5.2.4.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 replicated the critical negative emodiversity results from Study 
1, demonstrating that our participants with chronic PTSD following sexual trauma exhibited 
greater negative emodiversity relative to healthy controls with no such history. However, 
once we adjusted analyses to account for the frequency with which the diverse emotion 
descriptors were employed, the group difference in positive emodiversity was no longer 
significant. 
These results suggest that within a different autobiographical domain (i.e., the life 
narrative relative to self-concept), chronic PTSD following sexual trauma remains 
characterized by greater negative emodiversity, independent from the frequency with which 
negative emotion descriptors are endorsed. In the positive domain, the findings support the 
notion that positive emodiversity is also reduced in our sample with PTSD but that such 
reduced positive emodiversity may go hand-in-hand with a reduced endorsement of positive 
emotion terms more generally. 
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5.2.5 General Discussion  
Across two studies we showed that sexual trauma survivors with a diagnosis of 
chronic PTSD endorsed a greater diversity of negative emotion descriptors when describing 
either their current self-structure (Study 1) or their autobiographical past (Study 2), relative to 
healthy control participants who had no such trauma history. This greater negative 
emodiversity appears to be independent of the frequency of endorsement of negative 
descriptors. Relatedly, in both studies we showed that those with PTSD also exhibited 
reduced positive emodiversity relative to controls. In Study 1, this appeared to be 
independent of the frequency of endorsement of those positive descriptors. However, when 
examining the life-structure in Study 2, the group difference was no longer significant when 
adjusting for endorsement frequency, suggesting that the frequency and diversity of positive 
emotion descriptor use are highly associated. 
 The current results mirror those in another chronic mental health condition – recurrent 
Major Depressive Disorder (Werner-Seidler et al., 2018) – using the same life structure 
methodology as in the current Study 2. This suggests that valence-based differences in 
emodiversity are potentially a broader transdiagnostic marker of emotional disorder. The 
current results, along with those from Werner-Seidler et al. (2018), are somewhat divergent 
from earlier studies using community samples (Quoidbach et al., 2014) which suggested that 
greater emodiversity (including in the negative valence domain) is associated with fewer 
symptoms of mental ill health. 
 As discussed in the Introduction, taken together these studies suggest that in a wider 
community context, greater negative emodiversity may be associated with protection against 
mental health difficulties, but that this protective factor is not evident for chronically unwell 
individuals. Once significant difficulties become established and consolidated over time, the 
chronic immersion in negative affective self-referent material and the relative paucity of 
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positive self-reference material may see that those with chronic emotional disorders such as 
PTSD and recurrent MDD develop ‘expertise’ in negative affective experiences. This would 
afford concomitantly greater diversity in the ways that such negative experiences are 
described and articulated. 
 It is proposed that greater emodiversity in community samples (Quoidbach et al., 
2014) may lead to better mental health as more affective differentiation in the description of 
emotional life reflects more granularity in the emotional experiences themselves. This is in 
turn associated with an enhanced ability to target emotion regulation strategies at specific 
emotion experiences, with consequent enhancement of overall emotion regulation and of 
mental health (e.g. Barrett & Gross, 2001; Barrett et al., 2001). The current data do not 
necessarily contradict this analysis. It remains possible that chronic emotional disorders such 
as recurrent depression and PTSD are in fact associated with an enhanced underlying 
capacity for emotion regulation but that emotions in the day-to-day remain more 
dysreguylated as a simple function of the severity and dysfunctionality that unwell 
individuals are trying to regulate. In a sense this would not be surprising as trauma survivors 
with PTSD report spending large amounts of their time trying to regulate aversive negative 
cognitions and affect. They are therefore highly practiced with the techniques even if they are 
often experienced as ineffectual. Although this view has not been investigated directly (most 
studies examine self-reported emotion regualtion using questionnaires which confounds 
capacity and day-to-day experience; e.g. Ehring & Quack, 2010) there is some support in the 
literature. For example, young adults who have been exposed to childhood adversity perform 
better, and show reduced neural engagement of emotion regulatory circuitry in the brain, on a 
laboratory emotion regualtion task relative to participants who report no such adversity 
(Schweizer, Walsh, Stretton, Dunn, Goodyer & Dalgleish, 2016; see also Sheperd &Wild, 
2014).  
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The studies reported here, either together or individually, have some possible 
limitations that merit discussion. We did not ask participants to generate their own 
descriptive words for the cards used in the self- and life-structure tasks. This was to ensure 
that there were equal quantities of positive and negative descriptors matched for emotional 
intensity, world length and frequency. Future studies could adopt an ideographic approach, 
potentially in combination with experience sampling methods, to provide a richer 
personalized evaluation of diversity. For both studies we recruited participants with chronic 
PTSD and with a history of interpersonal trauma. Selecting such a severe trauma placed 
constraints on our selection of control participants. It is prohibitively difficult to find 
survivors of sexual trauma with only a few or no significant symptoms of past or current 
PTSD to serve as a trauma-matched control sample. We therefore had to recruit a comparison 
sample  who both had no history of sexual trauma and no history of PTSD to any trauma. 
This precludes disentangling whether it is the presence of PTSD rather than the trauma 
history itself which accounts for our results.  
 A limitation of the life structure task is that, although it focuses on the whole life 
narrative, it remains retrospective. Similarly, while the self-structure task lacks this historical 
element, it does require participants to reflect on self-aspects that they may not currently have 
immediate cognitive access to. It is therefore possible that a methodology that permitted 
contemporaneous consideration of past life chapters or of alternative current self-aspects may 
have generated a different set of results.  
Finally, the sample sizes for each study were modest, as is often the case for hard-to-
recruit clinical samples. However, the replication of the results across two different versions 
of the card sorting task mitigates these sampling concerns. The study samples were also all 
female. It would therefore be important to replicate the current findings with larger samples 
including individuals with PTSD who have experienced different traumas, and who are male.  
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 In summary, across two studies we showed that PTSD following sexual trauma is 
associated with the endorsement of a greater diversity of negative emotion descriptors and a 
reduced diversity of positive emotion descriptors when describing either the self or the 
autobiographical past relative to healthy control participants with no history of sexual trauma. 
These results, along with similar findings in individuals with chronic depression (Werner-
Seidler et al., 2018), suggest that elevated negative emodiversity may be a transdiagnostic 
marker of chronic emotional disorders. This contrasts somewhat with proposals in the 
emotion literature that enhanced negative emodiversity represents a protective factor against 
mental health difficulties.  
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5.3 Discussion and Integration  
Across two studies we showed that sexual trauma survivors with a diagnosis of 
chronic PTSD endorsed a greater diversity of negative emotion descriptors when describing 
either their current self-structure or their autobiographical past, relative to healthy control 
participants who had no such trauma history. The current results mirror those in another 
chronic mental health condition – recurrent Major Depressive Disorder (Werner-Seidler et 
al., 2018) but are somewhat divergent from earlier studies using community samples 
(Quoidbach et al., 2014) which suggested that greater emodiversity (including in the negative 
valence domain) is associated with fewer symptoms of mental ill health. In light of the results 
from our studies, we propose that in a wider community context, greater negative 
emodiversity may be associated with protection against mental health difficulties, but that 
this protective factor is not evident for chronically unwell individuals. 
Throughout this thesis, we have discussed how the affective domain problems 
identified in CPTSD have been characterised by emotion dysregulation. Multiple early 
traumatic experiences commonly result in impairment in developmental processes including 
the ability to recognise, identify and regulate emotion. In light of the results from study 4, we 
suggest that chronic emotional disorders such as recurrent depression and PTSD could be 
associated with an enhanced underlying capacity for emotion regulation but that emotions in 
the day-to-day remain more dysreguylated as a simple function of the severity and 
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dysfunctionality that individuals with these disorders are trying to regulate. This theory is 
consistent with individuals with PTSD reporting that they spend large amounts of their time 
trying to regulate aversive negative cognitions and affect, and supported by our findings from 
studies 1 and 2 - that individuals with PTSD commonly use strategies to compartmentalise or 
“ring-fence” the distressing or toxic information related to their past traumatic experiences. 
Individuals with PTSD are therefore highly practiced with the techniques even if they are 
often experienced as ineffectual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
CHAPTER 6 
Research paper: Developing an Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group Intervention for 
PTSD with complex features: a group case series with survivors of repeated interpersonal 
trauma10  
Authors: Clifford, G., Meiser-Stedman, R., Johnson, R. D., Hitchcock, C., & Dalgleish, T. 
Accepted for publication in European Journal of Psychotraumatology on 17/06/2018 
Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/85bm9/ 
Citation: Clifford, G., Meiser-Stedman, R., Johnson, R. D., Hitchcock, C., & Dalgleish, T. 
(2018). Developing an Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group Intervention for PTSD with 
complex features: a group case series with survivors of repeated interpersonal 
trauma. European journal of psychotraumatology, 9(1), 1495980. 
doi:10.1080/20008198.2018.1495980 
For this paper, the candidate planned the study, collected all of the data, analysed the 
results and wrote the paper. The co-authors supervised the research process and made 
comments on iterative drafts of the manuscript. 
6.1 Background 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, some researchers have argued that interventions for PTSD 
should be adapted to address the additional symptoms identified in individuals presenting 
with more complex presentations of the disorder. An expert consensus survey (Cloitre et al., 
2012) indicated that 84% of 50 expert clinicians endorsed a phase-based or sequenced approach 
as a first line treatment for CPTSD, involving three phases, each with a distinct function. STAIR 
is a phase-based, sequential treatment that has been specifically developed to treat women (in 
individual therapy) who had experienced childhood sexual abuse. The efficacy of the phase-
based treatment approach for treating CPTSD has only been addressed in two studies to date, 
                                                        
10 Published version of the paper is included in Appendix 4.0 
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but at present, there is no clear evidence-base to demonstrate consistently superior treatment 
effects for the use of a standard or phase-based approach to treating complex features 
(e.g.,Wagenmans, Van Minnen, Sleijpen, & De Jongh, 2018; Bongaerts, Van Minnen, & De 
Jongh, 2017; Van Minnen et al., 2012). 
Group therapy for PTSD is not currently included in any treatment guidelines (e.g. Forbes 
et al., 2010). However, the group–based format is commonly used in health care settings (e.g., 
Foy et al., 2000), and a recent meta-analysis demonstrated its efficacy, relative to waitlist control, 
in reducing PTSD symptoms (d=0.56; Sloan et al., 2013). Some evidence has emerged in recent 
years to demonstrate that group treatments have promising effects on both core PTSD 
symptoms (e.g., Sikkema et al., 2007) and the negative affect cluster of symptoms for 
samples with complex trauma histories (e.g., group therapy for incarcerated women; Bradley 
& Follingstad, 2003; trauma-focused group therapy; Classen et al., 2011). However, in 
reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the majority of group-based interventions have 
not explicitly addressed the complex features of CPTSD. 
In study 5, we describe the development, facilitation and evaluation of a group 
intervention for individuals who had experienced repeated interpersonal trauma: an Emotion-
and Memory-Processing Group Programme. We implemented the recommended phased-
based approach for more complex presentations of PTSD and based our group programme on 
the STAIR (Cloitre, Cohen, & Koenen, 2006) protocol.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the cardinal symptoms of PTSD centre on intrusive memories 
of the traumatic experience that are prototypically high in frequency, sensorily-laden, 
involuntary, distressing, fragmented and relatively immune to attempts at prevention. To 
facilitate group-based delivery, we replaced the NST phase of the STAIR programme with a 
number of different mnemonic control techniques, such as identifying triggers to traumatic 
memories and describing the associated meanings, emotions and physiological sensations, 
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cognitive/narrative restructuring and imagery rescripting. Analysis of memory processes in PTSD 
and their link with problematic appraisals and behaviors that maintain PTSD has led to the 
development of specific theory-guided treatment procedures for this condition (e.g. Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & Fennell, 2005). We incorporated a number 
of these specific theory-guided treatment procedures into our intervention to facilitate processing 
of trauma memories in a group format.  
As explored throughout this thesis, the affective domain problems in CPTSD have been 
characterised by emotion dysregulation, including alterations in attention and consciousness 
(e.g. dissociation, depersonalization, and derealization). We therefore also incorporated 
sessions into the group programme on emotional awareness, psychoeducation and regulation. The 
final protocol therefore consisted of a skills training in affective and interpersonal regulation 
(STAIR) phase, a memory processing phase, and a consolidation phase which was delivered over 
twelve group-based sessions.  
We completed a three-group case series of the Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group 
Programme for complex features of PTSD with female survivors of rape or sexual assault. 
Guidance on the development of complex interventions (e.g., Medical Research Council [MRC], 
2000) recommends that novel clinical techniques are first piloted in small studies, such as case 
series that serve to establish the promise of a new approach, and are important in refining an 
intervention (through use of clinician and participant feedback) prior to commencement of trials.  
The key focus of study 5 was to develop the novel treatment manual to the point that it may be 
evaluated in a future feasibility trial, and to provide a preliminary, uncontrolled estimate of any 
effects of the intervention.  
Study 5 details the delivery of the programme, and provides a preliminary examination of 
acceptability, feasibility and the potential efficacy of the intervention in reducing symptoms of 
PTSD, along with measures of complex features, namely emotion dysregulation, dissociation, 
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and interpersonal difficulties. 
The full treatment manual for the group is included in Appendix 5.0 at the end of the thesis. 
6.2 Research paper: Developing an Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group 
Intervention for PTSD with complex features: a group case series with survivors of 
repeated interpersonal trauma  
6.2.1 Abstract  
Individuals who experience repeated interpersonal trauma exposure often present with 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with more complex features. There is currently no 
consensus regarding whether current evidence-based interventions for PTSD need to be 
tailored to better account for these complex features. However, one recommended adaptation 
is to adopt a phase-based or sequenced approach involving three phases, each with a distinct 
function. This paper describes the development of a 12-session Emotion- and Memory-
Processing Group Programme, adapted from Cloitre’s Skills Training in Affective and 
Interpersonal Regulation (STAIR) phase-based treatment protocol. A single case series 
provided a preliminary examination of the group-based intervention’s efficacy for three 
groups of women with a history of repeated interpersonal trauma and PTSD with complex 
features (N = 15; age 19–46 years) at The Haven Sexual Assault Referral Centre in London. 
Results revealed significant reductions in: PTSD, complex features of PTSD, and depression, 
along with improvements in process measures of maladaptive cognitions and emotion 
processing. Results from this case series demonstrate that an Emotion- and Memory-
Processing Group Programme holds promise for treating individuals with a history of 
interpersonal trauma in outpatient settings, and provides evidence to warrant the completion 
of a feasibility trial. 
6.2.2 Introduction 
Individuals presenting with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are not a 
homogenous group. Those who experience repeated interpersonal trauma, such as sexual and 
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domestic violence, and abuse in childhood often present with PTSD with more complex 
features (Karatzias et al., 2017; Powers et al., 2017) than individuals exposed to single-
incident traumas (Herman, 1997). Proposed diagnostic criteria for Complex PTSD (CPTSD) 
in the ICD-11 (due to be published in 2018) include the defining criteria of PTSD (re-
experiencing, avoidance, numbing, and hyperarousal), in addition to the presence of at least 
one symptom in each of three self-organization features: affect dysregulation, negative self-
concept, and interpersonal disturbance. The affective domain problems are characterized by 
emotion dysregulation, including alterations in attention and consciousness (e.g. dissociation, 
depersonalization, and derealization). Negative self-concept criteria include persistent beliefs 
about oneself as diminished, defeated, or worthless, and interpersonal disturbances are 
defined by persistent difficulties in sustaining relationships (Briere, Kaltman, & Green, 2008; 
Cloitre, Garvert, Brewin, Bryant, & Maercker, 2013; Cloitre et al., 2009). 
There is contention in the literature regarding whether PTSD and CPTSD can be 
conceptualized as different disorders (see Resick et al., 2012, for discussion), and there is 
currently no consensus regarding whether tailoring current evidence-based interventions for 
PTSD (e.g. eye movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR], trauma-focussed 
cognitive behavioural therapy [CBT]) for complex features will improve treatment outcomes 
(Cloitre et al., 2012; Van Minnen, Harned, Zoellner, & Mills, 2012). A number of authors 
propose that trauma-focused treatments can be offered to those who have experienced 
repeated interpersonal trauma without any major modifications (e.g. Cook, Schnurr, & 
Foa, 2004; Resick, Nishith, & Griffin, 2003; Van Minnen et al., 2012). Others propose that 
outcomes for complex presentations can be improved using a phase-based or sequenced 
approach involving three phases, each with a distinct function (e.g. Cloitre et al., 2012). 
Phase one focuses on ensuring the individual’s safety, reducing symptoms, and increasing 
important emotional, social, and psychological competencies. Phase two focuses on 
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processing the unresolved aspects of the individual’s memories of traumatic experiences. 
Phase three involves consolidation of treatment gains to facilitate engagement in 
relationships, work or education, and community life. At present, there is no clear evidence-
base to demonstrate consistently superior treatment effects for the use of a standard or phase-
based approach to treating complex features (e.g. Wagenmans, Van Minnen, Sleijpen, & De 
Jongh, 2018; Bongaerts, Van Minnen, & De Jongh, 2017; Van Minnen et al., 2012). 
Other elements of treatment format are also in need of further examination, including 
the use of group-based delivery. There are a number of advantages to offering group-based 
treatment, including a shared focus on resolution of symptoms through psychoeducation and 
skills training, which can be effective in terms of both time and cost. Relative to individual 
therapy, group interventions may be particularly useful for survivors of repeated 
interpersonal trauma, to normalize symptoms, foster social support, and enable observational 
learning (Dorrepaal et al., 2012; Zlotnick et al., 1997). Group therapy can provide an 
opportunity for individuals to experience, explore, and work through individual difficulties 
with others perceived to be in some way similar to oneself (e.g. Foy et al., 2000), and help 
them to make sense of their own experiences and responses to trauma (Klein & 
Schermer, 2000). In turn, this can reduce self-blame and feelings of disconnection or 
isolation from others (e.g. Johnson & Lubin, 2000). 
Group therapy for PTSD is not currently included in any treatment guidelines (e.g. 
Forbes et al., 2010). However, the group-based format is commonly used in health care 
settings (e.g. Foy et al., 2000), and a recent meta-analysis demonstrated its efficacy, relative 
to waitlist control, in reducing PTSD symptoms (d= 0.56; Sloan, Feinstein, Gallagher, Beck, 
& Keane, 2013). Indeed, group-based cognitive processing therapy (CPT) yields superior 
treatment effects for both PTSD and depression symptoms, relative to a present-focused 
group therapy (Resick et al., 2015) and combined individual and group treatment for adults 
 159 
with childhood sexual trauma (Chard, 2005), with some evidence of a significant effect on 
complex features (e.g. reductions in dissociation following combined individual and group 
therapy; Chard, 2005). Other group treatments have also demonstrated promising effects on 
both core PTSD symptoms (e.g. Sikkema et al., 2007) and the negative affect cluster of 
symptoms for samples with complex trauma histories (group therapy for incarcerated women; 
Bradley & Follingstad, 2003; trauma-focussed group therapy; Classen et al., 2011). 
However, the majority of group-based interventions have adopted an education and 
supportive counselling or traditional cognitive-behavioural approach and not explicitly 
addressed the complex features of CPTSD. This is a vital need within the field, as meta-
analysis suggests that current group-based treatments produce smaller effect sizes for 
indiviudals with more complex trauma histories (e.g. repeated interpersonal trauma; Sloan et 
al., 2013), compared to mixed trauma samples, suggesting that it may be necessary to 
explicitly address complex features to maximize therapeutic gains for this group. Dorrepaal et 
al. (2013) conducted the first study evaluating enhanced PTSD treatment in group format 
with a specifically CPTSD population: a randomized controlled trial of a 20-week 
stabilization-focussed cognitive behavioural treatment (CBT) for child-abuse-related CPTSD. 
The protocol included sessions on psychoeducation, skills training to target the negative 
affect domain of complex symptoms (learning to tolerate negative emotions and decrease 
avoidance), and cognitive restructuring. The results demonstrated significant improvements 
in symptoms of PTSD and CPTSD. We aimed to move beyond this initial study by more 
explicitly addressing all three symptom domains of CPTSD, with a greater emphasis on 
memory processing work, and in a shorter-time frame (three rather than five months) that can 
more easily fit within the time constraints of clinical services. 
Here we describe the development and preliminary evaluation of a group intervention 
for individuals who have experienced repeated interpersonal trauma: an Emotion- and 
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Memory-Processing Group Programme. Developing an efficacious group treatment for PTSD 
requires careful consideration of the process of intervention, as well as its content (e.g. Foy et 
al., 2000; Hickling & Blanchard, 1999; Resick & Schnicke, 1993). To implement the phase-
based approach, we based our group programme on the Skills Training in Affective and 
Interpersonal Regulation (STAIR; Cloitre, Cohen, & Koenen, 2006) protocol. STAIR is a 
phase-based, sequential treatment that was specifically developed to treat women (in 
individual therapy) who had experienced childhood sexual abuse (Cloitre, Koenen, Cohen, & 
Han, 2002). The treatment first emphasizes skills training in affective and interpersonal 
regulation (STAIR) to improve daily life functioning, while the second module (Narrative 
Story Telling; NST) focuses on the re-appraisal of trauma memories. In NST, patients are 
asked repeatedly to imagine and then retell the details of their traumatic experiences, which 
can be difficult to facilitate effectively in a group format due to the risk of trauma narratives 
triggering responses among fellow group members. Prior research has addressed in a variety 
of ways, including asking group participants to write their trauma narrative and complete 
imaginal exposure either while in the group (Beck, Coffey, Foy, Keane, & Blanchard, 2009) 
or as homework (Castillo et al., 2016). We therefore required participants to complete 
exposure at home by writing out a narrative of the trauma between sessions, to retain 
elements of NST from the original protocol. However, we did not ask participants to share a 
full account of their traumatic experiences within the group sessions. 
To facilitate group-based delivery, therefore, we replaced the NST phase of the 
STAIR programme with a number of different mnemonic control techniques. Given the key 
role of memory characteristics in predicting prognosis, we aimed to include greater emphasis 
(relative to STAIR) on memory-processing work, in line with existing evidence-based 
treatments (e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus, & 
Fennell, 2005). Trauma-focused interventions typically involve processing and ‘updating’ 
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trauma memories (e.g. Ehlers & Wild, 2015), and these techniques can be easily implemented 
in a group format. The second phase of treatment thereby included identifying triggers to 
traumatic memories and describing the associated meanings, emotions and physiological 
sensations, cognitive/narrative restructuring, and imagery rescripting. In sum, the final 
protocol consisted of a skills in affective and interpersonal regulation phase, a memory 
processing phase, and a skills consolidation phase, delivered over 12 group-based sessions. 
We completed a three-group case series of the Emotion- and Memory-Processing 
Group Programme for complex features of PTSD with female survivors of rape or sexual 
assault. Guidance on the development of complex interventions (e.g. Medical Research 
Council [MRC], 2000) recommends that novel clinical techniques are first piloted in small 
studies, such as case series that serve to establish the promise of a new approach, and are 
important in refining an intervention (through use of clinician and participant feedback) prior 
to commencement of trials. The key focus of this study was to develop the novel treatment 
manual to the point that it may be evaluated in a future feasibility trial, and to provide a 
preliminary, uncontrolled estimate of any effects of the intervention. 
This case series details the delivery of the programme, and provides a preliminary 
examination of acceptability, feasibility, and potential efficacy of the intervention in reducing 
symptoms of PTSD, along with measures of complex features, namely emotion 
dysregulation, dissociation, and interpersonal difficulties. We also looked at changes in 
posttraumatic cognitions, and depression. Hypotheses for our primary outcomes were: (1) 
The intervention would show promising acceptability and feasibility, determined by an 
average attendance of at least eight of the 12 sessions and completion of at least 50% of 
homework tasks (75% attendance was the rule used within the clinical service from which the 
participants were recruited, for continuation of psychological treatment. Based on our clinical 
experience, with this client group, we considered 50% of homework tasks to be the minimum 
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someone could complete and still engage satisfactorily between sessions); (2) Participants 
would show a reduction in core symptoms of PTSD and associated complex features from 
pre- to post-treatment. Hypotheses for our secondary outcomes were: (3) Participants would 
show a reduction in associated symptoms of depression and anxiety from pre- to post-
treatment; (4) Participants would show a reduction in scores on process measures of 
maladaptive cognitions and emotion processing associated with the onset and maintenance of 
PTSD (Dalgleish, 2004). 
6.2.3 Method 
6.2.3.1 Participants  
We conducted three intervention groups in London in 2012–2014. Participants were 
15 women aged 19–46 years (M = 27.93; SD = 6.86). Five women participated in the first 
group, six in the second group (although one dropped out as she was hospitalized due to 
suicide risk after the initial assessment, before group began, and her data were set aside) and 
five in the third group. 
Inclusion criteria were that participants experienced complex features of PTSD, had 
been raped or sexually assaulted in the 12 months prior to the group, and had also 
experienced at least one prior interpersonal trauma in their lives. Exclusion criteria were 
insufficient knowledge and understanding of English and current substance dependence. No 
participants were excluded on this basis. 
We operationalized CPTSD by cross-referencing participants’ scores on the Complex 
Trauma Symptoms Questionnaire (CTSQ; Mendelsohn et al., unpublished). The CTSQ items 
index the ICD-11 criteria for CPTSD, providing a measure of perceived threat, emotion 
regulation difficulties, sense of self, self-recognition and agency, interpersonal difficulties, 
emotional blunting, and meaning attached to the trauma. Responses to each item on the 
CTSQ ranged from 0 (not at all), 1 (a little bit), 2 (moderately), 3 (quite a bit) and 4 
(extremely). Eleven participants met criteria for at least one symptom on each of the domains 
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(affect, negative self-concept and relational disturbance), determined by a score of two or 
more on the CTSQ. Three participants met criteria for at least one symptom on two out of 
three of the domains. One participant described mild complex features, scoring one on a 
number of criteria on each of the subscales. 
Participants were recruited following assessment at The Haven (Sexual Assault 
Referral Centre) (n = 11); by the Sexual Offences Investigative Team (n = 1); by the Sexual 
Health Psychology service (n = 2); from the Praed Street Project (supporting women in the 
sex industry; n = 1); from Eaves (a voluntary sector organization supporting female victims 
of violence; n = 1). The group programme was offered as an adjunct to treatment as usual, 
which involved one or two follow-up medical review and/or support sessions with 
nurses/support workers at The Haven. 
6.2.3.2 Measures 
6.2.3.2.1 Symptom and Clinical Impact Measures  
PTSD was diagnosed with the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et 
al., 1995). The CAPS is a semi-structured interview which assesses the PTSD diagnostic 
criteria defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed; DSM-
IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994 - The CAPS for DSM-IV was used as the CAPS 
for DSM-V was not available when the first group started.) . The CAPS includes 
standardized questions to determine frequency and intensity of each symptom in the 
preceding month. A total severity score for is determined by summing scores for the 17 core 
symptoms. 
The CAPS has good psychometric properties (Weathers, Keane, & Davidson, 2001) 
and is a sensitive and specific measure of PTSD (Hovens et al., 1994). Inter-rater reliability is 
high (‘Frequency’ r = .92–1.00; ‘Intensity’ r = .93–.98; ‘Severity’ r = .89; Hovens et 
al., 1994). Test-retest reliabilities range from .77 to .96 for the three symptom clusters and 
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from .90 to .98 for the 17-item core symptom scale (Blake et.al., 1995). Internal consistency 
for the severity score was high in the current sample (α = .82). 
The Complex Trauma Symptoms Questionnaire (CTSQ; Mendelsohn et 
al., unpublished) is a 49-item assessment measure intended to assess CPTSD symptoms and 
has been used in previous evaluation of a phase-based approach for treating PTSD in women 
with a history of interpersonal violence (Cloitre et al., 2014). Internal consistency was high in 
the current sample (α = .97). 
Comorbid Axis I diagnoses were determined using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV disorders (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). The SCID-I 
assesses DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. The interview takes 45–90 minutes to complete. It is 
divided into six self-contained modules that can be administered in sequence. The reliability 
and validity of the SCID-I for DSM-IV is well established and has been reported in several 
published studies (e.g. Lobbestael, Leurgans, & Arntz, 2011; Zanarini et al., 2000). 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) indexed symptoms of depression using 21 questions about how the subject 
has been feeling in the last week. Internal consistency was high in the current sample 
(α = .81). The BDI-I was used for legacy reasons to provide comparability across studies 
within the research unit. 
6.2.3.2.2 Process Measures   
The Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & 
Orsillo, 1999) is a 33-item measure of negative and dysfunctional post-trauma cognitions 
about the self and world. Cognitive models of PTSD emphasize these dimensions as foci of 
change in cognitive-behavioural interventions (Dalgleish, 2004). The three factors have good 
test-retest reliability and discriminate well between traumatized individuals with and without 
PTSD (Foa et al., 1999). Internal consistency was high in the current sample (α = .96). 
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The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 36-
item self-report measure designed to measure emotion dysregulation. Items focus on lack of 
emotional awareness, lack of emotional clarity, non-acceptance of negative emotions, lack of 
strategy building, lack of control of impulsive behaviors, and inability to behave in 
accordance with goals under negative emotions. The DERS has good test-retest reliability, 
and adequate construct and predictive validity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Internal consistency 
was high in the current sample (α = .91). 
6.2.3.3 Description of the Intervention11  
The 12-session group programme comprised: one session involving an introduction to 
the group and an overview of the subsequent sessions; three sessions focused on emotional 
awareness and regulation, identifying and labelling feelings, emotion management, distress 
tolerance and acceptance of feelings, and experiencing positive emotions; two sessions 
focused on navigating interpersonal problems, exploration and revision of maladaptive 
schemas, effective assertiveness, awareness of social context (including exploration of other 
people’s reactions to rape and sexual assault), and flexibility in interpersonal expectations 
and behaviours; one session for psychoeducation focused on symptoms of PTSD and the 
impact of trauma on memory; four sessions focused on exposure and mnemonic techniques to 
better manage trauma memories, identifying triggers to and re-conditioning flashbacks, 
imagery and nightmare rescripting, narrative restructuring, and the method of loci (Dalgleish 
et al., 2013; Werner-Seidler & Dalgleish, 2016); and one session for summary and review 
(see Supplementary materials for an outline of the final 12 session Emotion- and Memory-
Processing Group Intervention). 
As noted, exposure was not a mandatory part of the group programme. Although we 
focused on techniques of memory restructuring, such as imagery and nightmare rescripting 
                                                        
11 The full treatment manual for the group is included in Appendix 5.0 at the end of the thesis. 
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exercises which involved an element of exposure, we did not facilitate an in-the-moment 
reliving sessions as a group but, similar to Beck et al. (2009), set an exposure exercise for 
homework by asking participants to write out a narrative of their traumatic experience(s). 
Minor modifications were made following each of the groups in the case series, in 
line with case series development (MRC, 2000), based on both reflections of the facilitators 
and specific feedback provided by group members. We offered sessions corresponding to 
each of the recommended phases for complex presentations of PTSD. Although the initial 
presentation of the phases was in the linear order originally proposed, development of the 
manual throughout the case series saw that in Groups 2–3, the phases became more 
integrated. In particular we continued to use elements of stabilization work in the trauma-
processing stage, as group members reported difficulties in practising the regulation of 
emotions and management of distress before any trauma-focused processing had taken place. 
We therefore re-ordered the group sessions to alternate between processing/managing 
memories and then regulating/coping with the distress, rather than having distinct, linear 
phases. Facilitators observed ambivalence towards and avoidance of homework tasks and 
therefore dedicated more time to addressing the reasons for avoidance and included more 
frequent re-iteration of the importance of between-session exercises. Facilitators also 
modified the session on ‘interpersonal schemas’ to focus more generally on interpersonal 
difficulties following a traumatic event as the former was difficult to facilitate in a group 
within a single session. 
The first group was facilitated by a Senior Clinical Psychologist and a Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist; the second and third groups were facilitated by a Senior Clinical 
Psychologist and a Mental Health Independent Sexual Violence Advisor. Participants were 
asked to attend all 12 group sessions, each of which was two hours long, including a 
20 minute break. The sessions comprised a combination of clinician-led teaching, group 
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discussions, group exercises, and discussion of homework tasks. Each session began with a 
review of the homework tasks, an update for any of the group members who had not been 
present, and then an overview of the current session. Each session ended with a description of 
the homework tasks for the following week. 
6.2.3.4 Procedure  
Ethics approval was obtained from the NHS National Research Ethics Service 
(reference 11/H0305/1). During pre- and post-intervention assessments, participants 
completed the study measures individually and face-to-face in a quiet testing room. 
Following provision of informed consent, participants completed the CAPS and the SCID-I 
with the assessor, then the self-report questionnaire symptom and process measures. Group 
sessions took place on a weekly basis in a room in St. Mary’s Hospital, London, UK. 
6.2.4 Results 
6.2.4.1 Description of the Sample 
The socio-demographic, trauma history, and diagnostic information of the study 
participants is presented in Table 6.1 and pre- and post-treatment scores on symptom and 
process measures are presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.1: Sociodemographic, trauma history and diagnostic information of study 
participants 
 Group 1 
(n = 5) 
Group 2 
(n = 5) 
Group 3 
(n = 5) 
Total 
(n = 15) 
Sociodemographic     
   Employed (full or part-time) 3 1 3 7 
    Full-time study 
    Education1  
0 
2/3/0/0 
3 
1/1/2/1 
2 
0/0/3/2 
5 
3/4/5/3 
    Married/co-habiting 
    Children 
    Ethnicity2 
0 
1 
4/1/0/0 
0 
1 
1/2/1/1 
0 
0 
4/1/0/0 
0 
2 
9/4/1/1 
Trauma History     
    Abuse in Childhood3 1/1/1 1/2/1 2/0/2 4/3/4 
    Abuse in Adulthood4 3/5/2 2/5/2 2/5/1 7/15/5 
    Adulthood Road Traffic Accident 0 0 1 1 
    Adulthood Natural Disaster 0 1 0 1 
Current Axis I comorbidities     
    Major depressive disorder 3 3 1 7 
    Eating disorder  0 1 0 1 
    Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 0 0 1 1 
    Panic Disorder5 1 1 2 4 
1 Secondary education/College/Further Education – Undergraduate/Further Education – 
Postgraduate;   
2 White/Black/Asian/Mixed;  
3 Sexual/Physical/Emotional  
4 Domestic Violence/Rape or Sexual Assault/Physical Assault;  
5 Secondary to PTSD diagnosis  
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Table 6.2: Pre- and Post-treatment Scores for Symptom and Process Measures 
 Pre Post   
 M SD M SD t (15) d 
CAPS Severity 72.92 16.00 56.31 17.28 2.70* 1.18 
DERS 116.46 23.42 93.54 16.49 3.97** 1.13 
Beck Depression Inventory 26.62 9.06 16.23 4.71 5.82*** 1.44 
CTSQ Total Score 100.38 43.54 63.92 31.76 4.12** 0.96 
  Chronic state of perceived threat 17.15 6.99 12.38 6.42 2.63 0.71 
  Emotion dysregulation 16.85 5.51 12.77 5.72 2.32 0.73 
  Disturbed sense of self 25.92 13.36 16.54 11.58 3.54** 0.75 
  Lack of Recognition and Agency 9.54 6.05 4.15 3.89 4.46** 1.06 
  Interpersonal disturbances 13.15 7.40 10.08 7.27 1.50 0.42 
  Emotional blunting 12.38 6.89 6.62 3.64 3.47** 1.05 
  Lack of Meaning 5.38 3.48 1.38 1.66 4.76*** 1.47 
PTCI Total Score 171.77 40.83 128.08 29.71 4.41** 1.22 
  Negative cognitions about the self 4.49 1.31 3.28 0.88 3.79** 0.48 
  Negative cognitions about the world 5.11 1.29 4.29 1.00 4.37** 0.47 
  Self-blame 4.15 1.03 2.80 1.19 3.90** 0.52 
Note. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
All participants presented with complex features of PTSD, including emotion 
regulation difficulties, interpersonal problems, impulsive and/or self-destructive behaviour, 
high levels of dissociation, substance-related problems, and somatic symptoms. Fourteen of 
the 15 met criteria for DSM-IV PTSD on the CAPS at baseline. The participant who did not 
meet criteria for PTSD on the CAPS at baseline presented with PTSD symptoms of 
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avoidance and physiological arousal. However, she did not present with reliving symptoms at 
that time due to very high levels of dissociation and disconnection from her emotions. 
All participants had been raped or sexually assaulted in the 12 months prior to the 
group and had also experienced at least one prior interpersonal trauma in their lives. 
Participants reported being exposed to between two and too many to count past traumatic 
experiences, as measured by the SCID-I. Seven of the 15 participants had experienced too 
many to count past traumatic experiences due to prolonged abuse in childhood or an adult 
relationship. Baseline severity on the CAPS was comparable with levels reported in a high 
dissociation sample of victims of childhood sexual and/or physical abuse (Cloitre et 
al., 2012), victims of childhood sexual abuse (Chard, 2005), and rape victims with a 
childhood sexual abuse history (Resick et al., 2003). 
6.2.4.2 Group Attendance and Homework Adherence  
The main adherence outcomes of interest were mean number of group sessions 
completed and percentage of homework tasks completed. There was only one drop out from 
the intervention (one member of the first group was hospitalized due to suicide risk) and data 
are presented for the remaining 15 group completers. Participants attended an average of 
9.07/12 sessions (SD = 2.99; range 2–12). An average of 8.8 sessions were attended in the 
first group, 8.0 in the second group, and 10.2 in the third group. Across groups, participants 
completed between five and 28 homework tasks in total (out of 32 tasks set) 
(M = 15.14, SD = 8.11). An average of 17.2 homework tasks were completed for the first 
group, 9.4 for the second group, and 19 for the third group. Overall, eight of the 15 group 
participants (53%) wrote out a narrative of their traumatic experience in between sessions 
eight and nine (four in the first group, one in the second group, and three in the third group). 
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6.2.4.3 Clinical Outcomes 
The main clinical outcomes of interest were the effect sizes for the symptom and 
process measures. Prior to the group intervention, 14 participants met DSM-V criteria for 
PTSD on the CAPS. This reduced to five post-treatment. Table 6.2 shows the inferential 
statistics and effect sizes assessing change from pre- to post-treatment on CAPS severity 
score, the CPTSD measure (CTSQ), BDI, PTCI, and DERS for the three groups 
combined. Figure 6.1 presents pre- and post- scores for each participant on the CAPS, CTSQ, 
and PTCI. Analyses were Bonferroni corrected for multiple testing (α = .05/15 = .003). 
 
Figure 6.1: Pre- and post-scores on the CAPS, CTSQ, and PTCI 
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6.3 Wider Discussion/Integration 
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As can be seen, there were medium to large effect sizes (Cohen, 1977) for 
improvement on all clinical and process outcomes. Although traditional statistical 
significance was not the focus of this case series, it is worth noting that these effects reached 
statistical significance (albeit uncorrected for multiple comparisons) for the CAPS, BDI, 
PTCI, DERS, and the majority of the subscales of the CPTSD measure. 
6.2.4.4 Calculation of Reliable Change  
Reliable change (Christensen & Mendoza, 1986) indexes whether participants 
changed sufficiently enough to ensure that the change is unlikely to be due to simple 
measurement unreliability. The formula for the standard error of change is: SD1√ (2) ×√ (1-
rel), where SD1 is the initial standard deviation and rel indicates the test-retest reliability of 
the measure. The formula for criterion level, based on change that would happen less than 5% 
of the time by unreliability of measurement alone, is: 1.96 × SD1√ (2) × √ (1-rel). Using this 
calculation, reliable change was observed for four participants on the CAPS, nine on the BDI, 
seven on the DERS, and six on the PTCI (see Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3: Reliable Change and Clinically Significant Change for Combined Groups 
   Reliable Change Clinically Significant 
Change 
 Test-retest 
Reliability 
SE of 
Change 
Criterion n (%) Criterion n (%) 
CAPS - 
Severity 
0.83 9.47 18.55 4 (27) 15 point 
change  
6 (40) 
Beck 
Depression 
Inventory  
 
0.89 4.25 8.33 9 (60) 18% 
decrease  
10 (75) 
Difficulties in 
Emotion 
Regulation 
Scale  
 
0.88 11.47 22.49 7 (47)   
Post-
traumatic 
Cognitions 
Inventory  
0.82 24.50 48.02 6 (40)   
Note. n = number of participants who met the change criterion.  
6.2.4.5 Calculation of Clinically Significant Change  
Clinically significant change indexes whether the participant’s score on a given 
measure has shifted from a score typically associated with the presence of clinical problems 
to a score typical of the healthy population. On the BDI, clinically significant change was 
defined as an 18% reduction in total score (Button et al., 2015). On the CAPS, a 15-point 
change indicates clinically significant change (Weathers et al., 2001). Clinically significant 
change was observed for six participants on the CAPS and 10 on the BDI (see Table 6.3). 
6.2.5 Discussion  
This case series has demonstrated initial evidence for the feasibility, acceptability, and 
efficacy of the Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group Intervention. Our primary aim was 
to determine feasibility and acceptability of the intervention. There was only one drop out 
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from treatment – who was admitted to hospital – and participants attended an average of 9.07 
of 12 sessions and completed an average of 15.14 of the 32 homework tasks set. These 
outcomes provide initial support for the intervention being feasible and broadly acceptable to 
participants, although a more in-depth qualitative assessment is now indicated. 
We also aimed to explore treatment efficacy. Results demonstrated medium to large 
effect-size improvements on all clinical and process outcomes. Interestingly, effect sizes for 
change in emotion regulation, a core element of CPTSD, and change in depression 
symptoms, perhaps as an index of the negative mood component of CPTSD, were in fact 
larger than overall severity of PTSD symptoms. For the CAPS, BDI, PTCI, DERS, and the 
majority of the subscales of the CPTSD measure, these reached traditional statistical 
significance despite the modest sample size. Furthermore, at post-treatment all three groups 
demonstrated a reduction in the number of participants who met criteria for PTSD, with nine 
of 14 participants no longer having a PTSD diagnosis post-treatment. Forty percent of 
participants demonstrated clinically significant change and 27% demonstrated reliable change 
on the CAPS. A large effect size (d = 1.18) for pre-to-post-treatment change in CAPS 
symptom severity was superior to the moderate effect size reported in meta-analysis of 
within-group effects of existing group treatments (Standardized mean gain = 0.55) for 
survivors of repeated sexual violence (as experienced by our sample) (Sloan et al., 2013). 
Together, these results suggest that the Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group Intervention 
shows promise for reducing symptoms of PTSD, other complex features of PTSD, and 
depression in clients with a history of repeated interpersonal trauma. 
There are a number of potential strengths of this protocol. The intervention 
incorporated elements of the phase-based treatment model into a single group programme. 
We integrated techniques such as imagery- and nightmare-rescripting to help facilitate the 
processing of trauma memories, along with sessions focused on the consolidation of 
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treatment gains, including ‘emotionally engaged living’, ‘interpersonal emotion regulation’, 
and the ‘method of loci’ (Dalgleish et al., 2013; Werner-Seidler & Dalgleish, 2016). This 
study addresses a research gap by examining the effectiveness of a trauma-focused 
intervention for clients with a history of interpersonal trauma and complex features of PTSD 
in a group setting, by incorporating the use of mnemonic control techniques and exposure-
based interventions. This Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group Programme has 
promising outcomes as a resource-limited trauma-focused intervention for clients with a 
history of repeated interpersonal trauma. NICE guidelines currently recommend individual 
trauma-focused therapy for individuals with PTSD but, as part of a stepped-care approach 
with limited time and resources available, there is promise for this group intervention. 
6.2.5.1 Limitations and Future Research  
This case series was an important first step in evaluating the clinical utility of the 
programme, however, there were some limitations to the study. As recommended for early-
stage work to explore clinical efficacy (Medical Research Council, 2000), we utilized a small 
sample size, which limits confidence in the conclusions drawn from the results. Two 
participants did experience an increase in PTSD symptoms from pre- to post-treatment; 
however, the small sample size limited evaluation of potential participant characteristics or 
moderators, which may have influenced treatment effects. Finer examination of patient-level 
change will be an important aspect of future, larger studies. Further, absence of an established 
diagnostic criteria and psychometric measures for CPTSD limited the availability of rigorous 
measures with which in index our outcomes. In addition, not all patients met diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD and although all participants had experienced at least two past interpersonal 
traumas, only seven participants had experienced prolonged abuse in childhood or an adult 
relationship. Variation of treatment effects within different trauma-exposed samples thereby 
warrants further consideration. Other limitations include the lack of follow-up to measure the 
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long-term effects of the intervention and no personality disorder assessments were 
performed. Moving forward, the increasing emphasis on CPTSD in clinical literature will 
ensure the availability of sound clinical measures that can be used in future research. As 
group processes such as peer support, or the normalization of experiences, are likely to 
contribute to improvement in symptoms, comparison against a control group will be an 
important next step in developing the intervention. Future studies will need to explore the 
facilitation of the group programme with a greater number of participants, against control 
groups. 
Further refinement of a treatment protocol is a key aim of a case series, and we 
identified potential areas in which the intervention may be further developed. Due to 
concerns identified in the research literature (Beck et al., 2009), direct exposure was not a 
mandatory part of the group programme. Although we focused on techniques of memory 
restructuring which involved an element of exposure due to participants being asked to 
describe their trauma memories (e.g. imagery rescripting), we did not facilitate an in-the-
moment reliving session as a group, which would be valuable to consider moving forward. 
Avoidance difficulties are a fundamental part of the PTSD presentation and a direct 
target of trauma-focused interventions. It is difficult to address avoidance in a group setting 
and to ensure that group participants actually complete homework tasks, such as practicing 
imagery rescripting or writing out a trauma narrative. Fewer than half of the participants 
wrote a trauma narrative for homework and, of those who did, it was difficult to determine to 
what extent they had been emotionally engaged with the task at the time. This will thereby 
need further exploration, as engagement in homework may need to be enhanced to improve 
treatment effects. Finally, although the group intervention focused specifically on ‘emotion 
regulation’ and ‘interpersonal emotional regulation’, and achieved good outcomes on a 
standardized measure of emotion regulation – the DERS – the programme nevertheless only 
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included two-hour sessions focused specifically on each. Group participants had a history of 
repeated interpersonal trauma and all had some difficulties in emotion regulation and social 
relationships, and may have benefitted from further intervention in this area. 
6.2.5.2 Conclusion  
This study represents an important initial step for building knowledge about effective 
group-based interventions for individuals who present with complex features of PTSD 
following a history of interpersonal trauma. Group-based treatments are a practical, cost-
effective, and efficacious treatment approach for many psychological disorders, and here we 
have presented preliminary evidence for a group-based treatment approach, which includes 
elements (e.g. exposure, memory rescripting) essential to effective treatment for trauma 
survivors. Evidence from this case series provides a solid platform for future completion of a 
controlled trial of treatment efficacy, as this protocol presents a novel and promising group-
based treatment. 
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END OF RESEARCH PAPER 
6.3 Discussion and Integration  
Study 5 detailed the development of a 12-session Emotion- and Memory-Focused Group 
Intervention for complex post-traumatic stress structured around Cloitre’s STAIR programme 
(Cloitre, Cohen, & Koenen, 2006), and the initial assessment of the group intervention’s utility as 
a clinical technique, using a case series design, in line with recommendations for the development 
of complex interventions (e.g., Medical Research Council, MRC, 2000).  We aimed to develop 
the treatment protocol in preparation for a future feasibility trial, to provide a preliminary 
examination of the group programme’s efficacy for reducing symptoms of PTSD, CPTSD and 
depression in female victims of rape or sexual assault, and to explore the initial acceptability and 
feasibility of the protocol, by monitoring drop out, attendance and completion of homework tasks 
in a series of three groups of women.  
Our results indicated that the programme holds promise as a clinical technique. There 
were medium to large effect-size improvements on all clinical and process outcomes. For the 
CAPS, BDI, PTCI, DERS and the majority of the subscales of the CPTSD measure, these 
reached traditional statistical significance (p < .05) despite the modest sample size. Furthermore, 
at post-treatment all three groups demonstrated a reduction in the number of participants who met 
criteria for PTSD, with 9 of 14 participants no longer having a PTSD diagnosis post-treatment 
and with 40% of participants demonstrating clinically significant change and 27% demonstrating 
reliable change on the CAPS. 
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The intervention followed the ISTSS guidelines by incorporating elements of the phase-
based treatment model into a single group programme and there are a number of strengths of this 
protocol. Sessions focused on safety and stabilization by providing participants with a greater 
understanding and awareness of their emotions and teaching them strategies to better manage 
their emotions when they became overwhelming. We integrated techniques, such as group-based 
imagery- and nightmare-rescripting to help facilitate the processing of trauma memories and we 
included sessions focused on the consolidation of treatment gains, including ‘emotionally 
engaged living’, ‘interpersonal emotion regulation’ and the ‘method of loci.’ (Dalgleish et al., 
2013; Werner-Seidler & Dalgleish, 2016). This study addressed a critical research gap by 
examining the effectiveness of a trauma-focused intervention for clients with complex trauma 
histories in a group setting. This group programme incorporated the use of mnemonic control 
techniques and exposure-based interventions, a key feature of efficacious treatments for PTSD 
(e.g. Foa et al., 2005). 
This Emotion and Memory-Focused group programme has promising outcomes for a 
time-limited trauma-focused intervention for clients with complex trauma histories. NICE 
guidelines currently recommend individual trauma-focused therapy for individuals with PTSD 
but, as part of a stepped-care approach with limited time and resources available, there is promise 
for this group intervention. 
Further refinement of a treatment protocol is a key aim of a case series, and we have 
identified in the manuscript potential areas in which the intervention may be further developed. 
To expand on the area of affective domain problems in PTSD and CPTSD, symptoms of emotion 
regulation and interpersonal disturbance have been conceptualised as the ‘emotional, social, 
cognitive and psychological competencies that either failed to develop properly or that 
deteriorated due to prolonged exposure to complex trauma’ (ISTSS guidelines, page 5, 2008), 
requiring interventions to target ‘improvement in key functional capacities for self-regulation and 
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strengthening of psychosocial and environmental resources.’ (page 5) Although the group 
intervention focused specifically on ‘emotion regulation’ and ‘interpersonal emotional 
regulation,’ and achieved good outcomes on a standardized measure of emotions regulation – the 
DERS – as discussed in the manuscript, future Group Programmes would benefit from a greater 
focus on these areas of intervention. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
General Discussion  
 
7.1 Overview  
 Each of the studies in this thesis includes an extensive discussion of the findings 
within the five research papers presented in chapters 2 through 6. At the end of each chapter, 
I have also included a discussion and integration section, linking the findings of each of the 
research papers with the over-arching themes of the thesis. Chapter 7, therefore, presents a 
more general discussion incorporating the broader clinical implications and general 
limitations of the research.   
7.2 Summary of Aims  
This thesis investigates how memory systems may become disrupted by trauma and 
what this means for the development of the sense of self and consequent symptoms 
associated PTSD and CPTSD presentations. The overarching questions of the thesis, which I 
aimed to answer within each of the research studies, were: 1) whether the organisation of past 
autobiographical knowledge and self-concept differed in individuals with PTSD following 
sexual trauma relative to non-clinical controls; 2) whether pseudohallucinations were 
prevalent in those with PTSD; 3) whether there was an association between emotional 
diversity and clinical manifestations of PTSD; and 4) whether a group intervention 
integrating some of the emerging intervention techniques for more complex features of PTSD 
would be effective. 
The first study (see chapter 2) explored the components of autobiographical memory, 
by examining the organisation of past autobiographical knowledge in a sample of sexual 
trauma survivors with PTSD compared to a sample of individuals with depression, and 
healthy controls using a self-descriptive card-sorting task. The second study (see chapter 3) 
explored self-identity by examining the structure of the self-concept in a sample of sexual 
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trauma survivors with PTSD compared to healthy controls using a self-descriptive card-
sorting task. The third study (see chapter 4) explored the prevalence of pseudohallucinations 
in a British sample of adult survivors of repeated physical and sexual trauma. The fourth 
study (see chapter 5) sought to expand existing research findings on the association between 
emodiversity and mental health to explore the relationship between emodiversity and clinical 
manifestations of PTSD. The fifth study of this thesis (see chapter six) outlined the 
development and preliminary evaluation of a group intervention for individuals who had 
experienced repeated interpersonal trauma. 
7.3 Summary of the Findings 
The results from studies 1 and 2 indicated that individuals with PTSD utilise a greater 
proportion of negative descriptors across their life story and self-concept, when compared to 
non-clinical controls. Those with PTSD also use strategies to compartmentalise or “ring-
fence” the distressing or toxic information related to their past traumatic experiences, rather 
than allowing it to pervade or contaminate other, more positive aspects of their life story and 
self-concept. As discussed, this is consistent with our understanding of PTSD (and the 
symptoms in the DSM-V criteria for the disorder) – that PTSD typically includes persistent 
avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma, such as attempts to avoid talking or thinking 
about what happened, avoiding contact with specific reminders or anything that might trigger 
re-experiencing symptoms and the associated unpleasant emotions. These findings do 
however contrast with previous research in individuals with clinical depression who have 
been found to demonstrate greater overall negativity, but also greater redundancy of negative 
attributes across the life story, reduced positive redundancy, and stronger affective 
compartmentalization than those who had never suffered from depression. (e.g. Showers & 
Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Dalgleish et al., 2011). 
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 In study 3, in our sample of adults with a history of repeated physical and sexual 
trauma, we found no evidence to support the previously reported high prevalence rates of 
auditory pseudohallucinations in PTSD samples assessed using similar interview measures. 
In light of this, we discussed the possibility that Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) 
could be considered as an artefact of the intrusive memories and auditory re-experiencing of 
traumatic events, which are commonly experienced by individuals with PTSD. 
 In study 4, we showed that sexual trauma survivors with a diagnosis of chronic PTSD 
endorsed a greater diversity of negative emotion descriptors when describing either their 
current self-structure or their autobiographical past, relative to healthy control participants 
who had no such trauma history. We suggested that chronic emotional disorders such as 
recurrent depression and PTSD could be associated with an enhanced underlying capacity for 
emotion regulation but that emotions in the day-to-day remained more dysreguylated as a 
simple function of the severity and dysfunctionality of symptoms that individuals with these 
disorders are trying to regulate.  
Finally, the results from the group programme outlined in study 5 revealed medium to 
large effect-size improvements on all clinical and process outcomes. We concluded that the 
Emotion and Memory-Focused Group Programme has promising effects as a time-limited 
trauma-focused intervention for clients with complex trauma histories. NICE guidelines currently 
recommend individual trauma-focused therapy for individuals with PTSD but, as part of a 
stepped-care approach with limited time and resources available, there is promise for this group 
intervention. 
7.4 Current Theories of PTSD 
 I will now consider the findings from the five research papers presented in chapters 2 
through 6, in light of the current theories of PTSD, to evaluate whether the extant theories 
adequately account for and conceptualise more complex presentations of the disorder.  
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A diagnosis of PTSD in the DSM-V requires a person to have had direct or indirect 
(e.g., witnessing or learning about the experience of a close friend or relative) experience of 
death, threatened death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual 
violence. The symptoms of PTSD develop in response to a specific incident (or incidents), 
and there is commonly an observable relationship between the characteristics of the traumatic 
incident experienced and the content of the intrusive images, the triggers to these, as well as 
the associated distress and physiological reactivity. 
It is well recognised in the literature that individuals presenting with PTSD are not a 
homogenous group. Individuals who experience repeated interpersonal trauma (including sexual 
and domestic violence and abuse in childhood) often present with PTSD with more complex 
features than those exposed to single-incident traumas (Herman, 1997). Despite increasing 
clinical interest and research regarding these complex features, the proposed ‘Complex 
PTSD’ (CPTSD) diagnosis in the ICD-11 has not yet been published. An argument has been 
made for a distinction between so-called Simple PTSD arising as a result of a single incident 
trauma and with symptoms largely restricted to those documented within the DSM-V and 
CPTSD that generally results from protracted exposure to repeated social and/or interpersonal 
trauma. However, the conceptualization of CPTSD continues to be controversial with many 
questioning its utility as a distinct diagnostic entity (e.g. Resick et al., 2012). 
 It has been argued that early trauma and the development of CPTSD can have a 
pervasive impact on one’s life history and sense of self, by changing how people construct 
their life narrative and perceive themselves, and impacting their emotions and their 
relationships with others, in a way that simple PTSD does not.  Some studies (e.g. Cloitre et 
al., 2009) suggest that exposure to multiple or repeated forms of maltreatment and trauma in 
childhood can lead to outcomes that are not simply more severe than the sequelae of single 
incident trauma, but are qualitatively different in their tendency to affect multiple affective 
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and interpersonal domains. Although there is a lack of consensus regarding the proposed 
distinction between simple and more complex presentations of PTSD, and therefore whether 
a separate treatment approach is required, there is extensive evidence of a relationship 
between the total number of past traumatic events in childhood and symptom complexity, 
including emotion regulation difficulties, interpersonal problems, impulsive and/or self-
destructive behavior, high levels of dissociation, substance-related problems, or somatic 
symptoms (Briere, Kaltman, & Green, 2008; Cloitre et al., 2009; Cloitre, Garvert, Brewin, 
Bryant, & Maercker, 2013).  
 One of the most widely accepted models of simple (or type I) PTSD is Ehlers and 
Clark’s (2000) cognitive model, which emphasises the role not only of the traumatic 
experience itself but also of self-relevant appraisals an individual makes of this experience 
and the use of maladaptive cognitive strategies (e.g., thought suppression) used in response to 
the experience. The model suggests that these appraisals maintain the sense of current threat 
as and when the traumatic experience intrudes into present awareness, thus these appraisals 
are instrumental in promoting the use of maladaptive strategies intended to control the threat 
and the current symptoms.  
 In order to conceptualise CPTSD (and accept it as a distinct diagnostic entity), it is 
important to establish what distinguishes CPTSD from simpler, more straightforward 
presentations of the disorder. A key distinction made is the repetition of past trauma, usually 
in an interpersonal domain – that is, that we are working with a client group who have not 
experienced a single criterion A trauma, but multiple traumatic experiences, often of a similar 
nature. When reverting back to Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive model, it follows that 
individuals who have experienced multiple past traumatic experiences would present with 
multiple intrusive memories of their experiences (which can often be merged or thematic in 
nature), and self-relevant appraisals related to each of these experiences, which, when 
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repeated over time, may have become more entrenched and therefore harder to challenge. 
Similarly, maladaptive strategies that have been used repeatedly in an attempt to control the 
threat may have become more long-standing and ingrained. It follows that some studies have 
suggested that exposure to multiple or repeated forms of maltreatment and trauma can lead to 
outcomes that are qualitatively different in their tendency to affect multiple affective and 
interpersonal domains (e.g. Cloitre et al., 2009). This suggestion has been supported by some 
recent research studies in this area and also observations made by Clinical Psychologists 
specializing in PTSD in clinical practice – that those meeting the proposed criteria for 
CPTSD are often qualitatively different in their clinical presentation, in terms of the type of 
symptoms they present with, the number of criteria met and not simply the severity of those 
symptoms.  
 Avoidance strategies (conceptualised as ‘maladaptive strategies’ by Ehlers and Clark, 
2000) are utilised both by individuals with ‘simple’ PTSD and those with more complex 
presentations of the disorder. Studies 1 and 2 supported the theory that individuals with 
PTSD use strategies to compartmentalise or “ring-fence” the distressing or toxic information 
related to their past traumatic experiences. Findings from these studies suggested that these 
strategies are utilised by those with PTSD not only to prevent this negative and potentially 
distressing information from spreading or contaminating other parts of their history or life 
story, but also to separate it from other, more positive aspects of their self-concept. Our 
clinical groups for these studies consisted of a sample of individuals who experienced 
sexual/physical abuse and/or assault and who, as a consequence, had developed PTSD, which 
makes it hard to generalise the results. We cannot yet be confident that survivors of more 
discrete or less severe trauma or to other, repeated traumatic experiences that are not 
interpersonal in nature, would utilise these avoidance strategies in the same way. 
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Avoidance strategies commonly used by those with PTSD to inhibit the reliving 
symptoms and overwhelming emotions associated with the disorder are incorporated in the 
cognitive model of PTSD and have been discussed throughout this thesis. Dissociation during 
traumatic events is one strategy used and a well-recognised phenomena in the research 
literature (Holmes et al., 2005; Murray, Ehlers & Mayou, 2002). As discussed more fully in 
chapter 4, one element of a dissociative mechanism that has been identified as occurring in 
response to trauma is an auditory verbal hallucination (AVH). The conceputalisation of 
AVHs and the extent to which hearing voices can be considered phenomenologically 
independent from other intrusive, unwanted and/or unintended cognitions identified in the 
cognitive model of PTSD, has been a matter of enduring academic and clinical debate 
(e.g., Aleman & Larøi, 2008; Slade & Bentall, 1988). There is also the question of whether 
AVHs are one of the distinct qualitative features that are reported more by individuals with 
more complex presentations of PTSD and, related to this, whether particular types of trauma 
exposure or trauma history are more or less likely to be associated with the experience of 
AVHs, as we know that dissociation is differentially associated with particular profiles of 
trauma exposure (Briere, 2006).  
 In study 3, using a sample of adults with a history of repeated physical and sexual 
trauma, we found no evidence to support the previously reported high prevalence rates of 
AVHs in other PTSD samples assessed using similar interview measures. We proposed that 
AVHs should be considered as an artefact of recurrent intrusive memories and the auditory 
re-experiencing of traumatic events. However, there is a possibility that AVHs are not a 
feature, specifically, of PTSD populations who have experienced repeated sexual or physical 
interpersonal trauma. We do not yet have enough evidence to be confident either way but this 
raises the question of whether different types of traumatic experience result in very different 
symptoms and constellations of symptoms, particularly in those presenting with more 
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complex forms of the disorder. One of the current challenges in investigating this more fully 
is the difficulty we have in distinctly separating out different trauma types and their timing, 
especially with those who have experienced childhood trauma (which can involve a different 
combination of psychological/emotional, physical and/or sexual abuse for each individual). 
The relationship between AVHs or “pseudohallucinations” and past traumatic experiences 
clearly needs further investigation, as it has clear implications for treatment. 
 The results from study 4, along with similar findings in individuals with chronic 
depression (Werner-Seidler et al., 2018) suggest that elevated negative emodiversity may be 
a transdiagnostic marker of chronic emotional disorders. Based on these findings, we 
proposed that, in a non-clinical population, greater negative emodiversity may be associated 
with protection against mental health difficulties. However, once significant psychological 
difficulties become established and consolidated over time, the chronic immersion in 
negative affective self-referent material and the relative paucity of positive self-referent 
material that goes along with such problems means that those with chronic emotional 
disorders such as PTSD develop ‘expertise’ in negative affective experiences, reflected in a 
greater diversity in the way they describe and articulate their experiences. 
Indeed, it is well understood that PTSD is conceptualised by a chronic immersion in 
negative affective self-referent material and a relative paucity of positive self-referent 
material. As discussed in chapter 1, PTSD can persist and symptoms can become exacerbated 
due to excessive negative appraisals of the traumatic event and its sequelae (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000) and thus can be perpetuated by negative social reactions such as criticism, attribution 
of blame or not being believed by others, which can then be internalised. In more complex 
presentations of PTSD, these self-relevant appraisals related to each past traumatic 
experience, repeated over time, may have become more entrenched and therefore harder to 
challenge. It therefore follows that the negative self-concept domain in the proposed criteria 
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for CPTSD includes these persistent and more entrenched (often referred to as “core beliefs”) 
beliefs about oneself as diminished, defeated, or worthless (e.g. Briere, Kaltman, & 
Green, 2008; Cloitre, Garvert, Brewin, Bryant, & Maercker, 2013; Cloitre et al., 2009). In the 
context of emodiversity, the proposal is that these more entrenched negative beliefs are 
reflected in a greater diversity in the way individuals with PTSD describe and articulate their 
experiences. 
The results from study 4 also led us to theorise about the possibility that chronic 
emotional disorders such as PTSD are in fact associated with an enhanced underlying 
capacity for emotion regulation but that emotions in the day-to-day remain more 
dysregulated as a result of the severity and dysfunctionality of the stressful and traumatic 
experiences that such individuals are trying to regulate. Difficulties in the ability to recognise, 
identify and regulate emotion have been identified in individuals with PTSD, particularly 
those with more complex presentations of the disorder. Current conceptualisations suggest 
that individuals with PTSD over-utilise relatively ineffective emotion regulation strategies, 
such as expressive suppression and under-utilise more effective emotion regulation strategies 
such as cognitive reappraisal (Boden et al, 2013). It follows that repeated unpleasant, 
traumatic experiences over time commonly result in more fully entrenched beliefs about the 
self, others and the world, but also beliefs in relation to one’s own ability to adequately 
understand, validate and manage distressing emotions. Consequently, the affective domain 
problems identified in the proposed diagnosis of CPTSD have also been characterised by 
emotion dysregulation. In relation to this and our findings from study 4, we might expect a 
relationship between the severity and dysfunctionality of PTSD symptoms and the extent of 
difficulties experienced in regulating emotion in more complex presentations of the disorder, 
though further research is needed to more fully investigate this. 
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In study 5, we describe the development, facilitation and evaluation of a group 
intervention for individuals who had experienced repeated interpersonal trauma, by 
implementing the recommended phased-based approach for more complex presentations of 
PTSD. The group programme was developed in order to address symptoms identified in 
proposed conceptualisations of CPTSD (e.g., ICD-11), which accept its utility as a distinct 
diagnostic entity. These conceptualisations include a number of symptoms and strategies 
identified in the studies presented throughout this thesis: the tendency to compartmentalise 
negative material through the use of avoidance strategies, alterations in attention and 
consciousness (including dissociation), entrenched, pervasive negative or “core” beliefs, and 
difficulties in regulating emotion.  
The group programme had promising outcomes for a time-limited trauma-focused 
intervention for clients with complex trauma histories. However, due to the group format and the 
limitations identified, it was difficult to accurately determine the mechanisms underlying the 
effects – specifically, which of the sessions (and particular intervention techniques within those 
sessions) accounted for an improvement in symptoms. As discussed within chapter 1, we 
recognise avoidance difficulties as a fundamental part of the PTSD presentation. However, 
we found it difficult at times to address avoidance in a group setting, to ensure that group 
participants actually completed in-session and homework tasks and to determine the extent to 
which they had been emotionally engaged with these tasks at the time.  
Clinical interventions tailored specifically to address the particular symptoms (or 
individual criteria) that characterise psychological disorders such as PTSD can inform our 
conceptualisation of these disorders, based on the efficacy of the interventions used. Results 
from study 5 showed that effect sizes for change in emotion regulation, a core element of 
CPTSD, and change in depression symptoms (perhaps as an index of the negative mood 
component of CPTSD) were in fact larger than overall severity of PTSD symptoms. For the 
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CAPS, BDI, PTCI, DERS, and the majority of the subscales of the CPTSD measure, pre-to-
post-intervention change reached traditional statistical significance despite the modest sample 
size. Although these findings suggest a positive impact of the intervention of the qualitatively 
distinct symptoms associated with more complex presentations, we are not able to directly 
attribute particular group sessions or interventions used to the observed change in particular 
symptoms due to the issues discussed above.  Further refinement of this group programme 
(and interventions for this client group more generally) as well as the use of relevant (and 
perhaps more specifically tailored) outcome measures would be required to obtain a greater 
insight into more complex presentations of CPTSD and which of the symptoms (or symptom 
clusters) improve in response to particular therapeutic interventions. However, this study has 
taken a positive step in this direction, and indicated the such future research is worthwhile.  
Although the ICD-11 includes a proposal for diagnosis of CPTSD, and there has been an 
increasing clinical interest and research in this area, research studies are sparse and relatively 
recent, with most studies conducted within the last ten years. There remains contention in the 
field and a lack of agreement regarding whether CPTSD should be considered as a separate 
disorder and, if it is accepted as such, how it should be conceptualised. This thesis contributes to 
the conceptualisation of CPTSD through the identification of particular symptoms that 
characterise a client group who have experienced repeated interpersonal trauma: the 
compartmentalisation of negative material through the use of avoidance strategies; alterations in 
attention and consciousness (including dissociation); entrenched, pervasive negative or “core” 
beliefs; and difficulties in regulating emotion. The group programme was designed to address 
these difficulties, and the broader symptoms identified in the proposed conceptualisations of 
CPTSD.  The intervention was shown to be effective in treating and improving a number of 
the additional symptoms identified in more complex presentations of PTSD. Only with more 
research in this area can we further refine our understanding of these more complex presentations 
 200 
of CPTSD and determine how best to conceptualise and define individuals with such a wide 
range of past traumatic experiences and such a heterogenous range of clinical presentations.  
 
 
7.5 Current CPTSD Treatments 
 Following on from the previous discussion relating to the conceptualisation of 
CPTSD, and in light of the studies included in this thesis, I now consider whether the current 
treatments available are adequate in effectively treating more complex presentations of 
PTSD. 
 Although the ICD-11 includes a proposal for diagnosis of CPTSD, and there has been an 
increasing clinical interest and research in this area, there also remains a question regarding 
whether current evidence-based interventions for PTSD (e.g. eye movement desensitisation 
and reprocessing [EMDR], trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy [TF-CBT]) need to 
be tailored to better account for complex features (Cloitre et al., 2012; van Minnen, Harned, 
Zoellner, & Mills, 2012). 
Only the most recent NICE guidelines, published in December 2018 (NG116, section 
1.7.3) include recommendations for individuals with additional needs, including those with 
CPTSD. These recommendations include: increasing the duration or number of therapy 
sessions in order to ‘develop trust’ in the therapeutic relationship; taking into account the 
‘safety and stability of the person’s personal circumstances’ and being mindful of how this 
might affect engagement and treatment outcomes; ‘help the person manage any issues that 
might be a barrier to engaging with trauma-focused therapies, such as substance misuse, 
dissociation, emotional dysregulation, interpersonal difficulties or negative self-perception’; 
and provide any ‘ongoing support they will need’ to manage residual PTSD symptoms or 
comorbidities. Although these recent clinical guidelines go some way in incorporating some 
 201 
of the additional symptoms and challenges identified in individuals with more complex 
presentations of PTSD, there are no specific recommendations regarding the specific 
therapeutic interventions that should be used to address these. Some of the symptoms 
incorporated in conceptualisations of CPTSD and identified throughout this thesis, including 
‘dissociation, emotional dysregulation, interpersonal difficulties’ and ‘negative self-
perception’ are defined in the NICE guidelines as potential ‘barriers to engaging with 
trauma-focused therapies’ and it is recommended that therapists should ‘help the person 
manage’ these potential issues. However, there is no further detail provided in the guidelines 
regarding how these issues should be managed.  
 As discussed in Chapter 1, recent figures for PTSD suggest an average recovery rate 
of 37.8% (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2016) following TF-CBT but dropping 
as low as 15–20% for some services, making it one of the disorders with lowest recovery in 
UK-based Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) services (Murray, 2017). 
One reason proposed for the low recovery rates following treatment for PTSD relates to the 
recognised complexity of the disorder. It is widely accepted that the effects of trauma 
exposure are heterogeneous and according to a number of researchers, this heterogeneity is 
not addressed in many of the evidence-based therapies available to date (e.g. Cloitre, 2015). 
 Although there is a lack of agreement regarding whether the existing trauma-focused 
treatments for PTSD need to be modified for more complex presentations of the disorder, due 
to the recognised heterogeneity of the disorder and the low recovery rates following available 
treatments, some researchers and clinicians argue that interventions should be adapted to 
address the additional symptoms identified in individuals presenting with more complex 
presentations of the disorder. An expert consensus survey (Cloitre et al., 2011) indicated that 
84% of 50 expert clinicians endorsed a phase-based or sequenced approach as a first line 
treatment for CPTSD. However, the efficacy of the phase-based treatment approach for 
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treating CPTSD has only been addressed in two studies to date, both of which evaluated the 
efficacy of the STAIR treatment approach12. The first study (Cloitre, Koenen & Cohen, 2002) 
suggested that the combination of STAIR/exposure is feasible and leads to a decrease in 
PTSD and a broad range of other symptoms associated with CPTSD. The second study 
(Cloitre et al., 2010) evaluated the efficacy of STAIR/exposure versus supportive counselling 
followed by prolonged exposure, and versus STAIR followed by supportive counselling, with 
women who had PTSD related to childhood sexual and/or physical abuse. The application of 
STAIR/exposure was found to be associated with greater benefits compared to the 
support/exposure condition in terms of self-reported reduction in PTSD symptom severity 
and also symptoms associated with more complex presentations of the disorder including 
interpersonal problems, and emotion regulation, but only at the three and six month follow 
up. Immediately after treatment, all three experimental treatment conditions resulted in a 
substantial proportion of patients no longer meeting criteria for PTSD. However, it was 
argued that the lack of a treatment condition in which patients were directly exposed to their 
traumatic memories prevented definite conclusions being made about the relative benefits of 
a phase-based treatment approach over an immediate trauma-focused approach for patients 
suffering from PTSD related to childhood abuse (De Jongh et al., 2016).  
In the absence of further research studies investigating phased-based approaches for 
the treatment if CPTSD, there is no clear evidence-base at this time to demonstrate 
consistently superior treatment effects for the use of a standard or phase-based approach to 
treating complex features (e.g.,Wagenmans, Van Minnen, Sleijpen, & De Jongh, 2018; 
Bongaerts, Van Minnen, & De Jongh, 2017; Cloitre, 2016; Van Minnen et al., 2012). 
In study 5, we described the development, facilitation and evaluation of a group 
intervention for individuals who had experienced repeated interpersonal trauma: an Emotion-
                                                        
12 STAIR is a phase-based, sequential treatment that was specifically developed to treat women (in 
individual therapy) who had experienced childhood sexual abuse. 
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and Memory-Processing Group Programme. We implemented the recommended phased-
based approach for more complex presentations of PTSD by basing our group programme on 
the STAIR (Cloitre, Cohen, & Koenen, 2006) protocol. The group programme had promising 
outcomes for a time-limited trauma-focused intervention for clients with complex trauma 
histories. However, as noted above, due to the group format and the limitations identified, it was 
difficult to accurately determine which of the sessions (and particular interventions within those 
sessions) accounted for an improvement in symptoms.  
 The existing treatments for CPTSD are in an early stage of development. Although 
the phase-based STAIR approach has promising results for both individual and group 
treatment, further research in this area is needed. Specifically, it is necessary to refine the 
treatment protocols, to conduct robust, controlled trials with people with a wider range of 
trauma histories and to develop more specifically tailored outcome measures. Finer 
examination of patient-level change will be an important aspect of future, larger studies. 
However, the absence of an established diagnostic criteria and psychometric measures for 
CPTSD limits the possibility of rigorous outcome measures being utilised at this time.  
It follows that the clinical presentation and conceptualisation of CPTSD needs to be fully 
and more comprehensively defined before adequate treatment approaches can be developed. This 
also leaves us with the important question of whether we need to think about tailoring particular 
interventions to different constellations of symptoms of more complex presentations of PTSD in 
a more ‘transdiagnostic’ sense, rather than attempting to put together a “one size fits all” 
intervention. 
7.6 General Limitations   
 The specific limitations for each of the studies (1-5) are discussed in full within the 
respective manuscripts in chapters 2-6 of this thesis. Here I will draw out some more general 
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limitations in relation to the over-arching questions of the thesis and the research conducted 
with the aim of answering these questions.  
For the studies presented in this thesis, we selected participants with PTSD with a 
similarly chronic history. We focused on PTSD following sexual assault or abuse due to the 
recognition that presentations consistent with the ICD-11 criteria have been more frequently 
reported in survivors of repeated interpersonal and/or sexual trauma, relative to other trauma 
survivors (e.g., Karatzias et al., 2017; Powers et al., 2017). We anticipated that the long-lasting 
effects of such significant interpersonal trauma might have the clearest effects on the 
variables we sought to measure such as autobiographical memory, self-concept and overall 
life structure (Herman, 1992). 
 However, as identified throughout this thesis, individuals presenting with PTSD are 
not a homogenous group and some studies (e.g. Cloitre et al., 2009) suggest that exposure to 
multiple or repeated forms of maltreatment and trauma can lead to outcomes that are 
qualitatively different in their tendency to affect multiple affective and interpersonal 
domains. An increasing number of different types of traumatic experiences have been 
associated with an increasingly greater number of different types of symptoms experienced 
simultaneously (i.e., symptom complexity; Briere, Kaltman, & Green, 2008; van der Kolk, 
Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & Spinazzola, 2005) and this association can occur following 
repeated trauma in adulthood as well as childhood. 
 Our clinical groups for the studies outlined in this thesis consisted of a sample of 
individuals who experienced sexual/physical abuse and/or assault and who, as a consequence, 
had developed PTSD, which makes it hard to generalise the results from our studies to other 
trauma types. We cannot yet be confident that survivors of more discrete, less severe trauma 
or to other, repeated traumatic experiences that are not interpersonal in nature (such as 
combat-related trauma), would present with the same constellation of symptoms, utilise the 
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same strategies in managing those symptoms and respond in the same way to a phase-based 
treatment. Another limitation related to the samples used is that the participants were all 
female, and the sample sizes for the clinical groups were modest, as is often the case for hard-
to-recruit clinical samples.  
However, there is no suggestion in the pattern and magnitude of the results that lack 
of statistical power is responsible for any of the findings. More specifically in relation to our 
group programme (study 5), the small sample sizes in each of the groups we facilitated limits 
confidence in the conclusions drawn from the results. Two participants did experience an 
increase in PTSD symptoms from pre- to post-treatment, however, the small sample size 
limited evaluation of potential participant characteristics or moderators which may have 
influenced treatment effects. 
 Another limitation of studies 1-4 is the lack of replication, which also limits our 
ability to generalise our results. Repeating studies by testing the same or additional samples 
of the target population with the same methods can provide supportive or contradictory 
results and also control for any extraneous variables that might have confounded the original 
findings. Although we replicated the group programme three times as part of a case series, we 
did not include any follow-up to measure the longer-term effects of the intervention. 
Choice of control groups may also limit the strength of our conclusions. Our control 
groups for studies 1-4 comprised individuals who did not report a history of interpersonal 
trauma and who did not meet criteria for PTSD. This means that it is not possible to 
disentangle whether it is the development of PTSD rather than the trauma history, per se, that 
can account for differences in our findings from these studies. As discussed in the limitations 
section of each of our studies, it is very difficult to find individuals with this kind of trauma 
history, at the level of severity of our sample, who are without mental health problems and so 
any trauma-matched control group would likely present with significant symptoms of PTSD 
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(alongside diagnoses of other disorders) even though they might not meet criteria for a full 
diagnosis. In study 1, because the procedure for a previously conducted and published MDD 
study (see Dalgleish et al., 2011) was almost identical to our PTSD study, and the two studies 
were conducted in the same research setting by the same research team, we did statistically 
compare the MDD and PTSD groups, against controls, to further evaluate these apparent 
differences in life-structure across the two clinical groups. Other than study 1, however, we 
did not include comparison with a psychiatric control group which means we cannot be 
confident that our results are specific to PTSD. Similarly, our group programme case series 
outlined in study 5 did not include comparison against a control group/intervention. 
Finally, an additional limitation is that the studies outlined in this thesis were cross-
sectional, which makes it difficult for us to be confident in the causal role of the variables 
investigated (including the structure of the life story and self-concept and emodiversity) in 
the onset and maintenance of PTSD.  
7.7 Future Research Questions  
 As discussed previously in Chapter 7, research studies in the area of CPTSD are 
sparse and relatively recent. There are a number of questions which are yet to be answered, 
particularly in regards to whether CPTSD should be considered a separate disorder to 
‘simple’ or type 1 PTSD. This thesis contributes to the conceptualisation of CPTSD through the 
identification of particular symptoms in a client group who have experienced repeated 
interpersonal trauma. However, more research is required for us to further refine our 
understanding of these more complex presentations of CPTSD. 
 The proposal for a diagnosis of CPTSD in the ICD-11 and the inclusion of 
recommendations for treatment of individuals with additional needs (including those with 
CPTSD) in the most recently published NICE guidelines for PTSD are a step in the right question 
but a great deal more research in this area is required.  
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 Prior to the facilitation and evaluation of our group programme, the efficacy of the 
phase-based treatment approach for treating CPTSD had only been addressed in two studies 
and, in the absence of further research studies, there is not enough evidence to support the use 
of a phase-based approach to treating complex features of PTSD (e.g.,Wagenmans, Van 
Minnen, Sleijpen, & De Jongh, 2018; Bongaerts, Van Minnen, & De Jongh, 2017; Cloitre, 
2016; Van Minnen et al., 2012).  
 Future research directions could address the limitations identified in this thesis. For 
example, it would be beneficial to replicate the studies with clinical groups in larger samples 
including individuals with PTSD who have experienced different, non-interpersonal traumas, 
male as well as female participants and other psychiatric control groups. Future studies could 
also examine the replicability of the effects with survivors of more discrete or less severe 
trauma to seek to disentangle the experience of trauma from the presence of PTSD. Such 
studies would also speak to the generalisability of the effects from severe interpersonal 
trauma to other trauma categories. 
 In order to address the issue of causality, it would be beneficial to conduct 
longitudinal or experimental manipulation studies. For example, future studies could 
intervene to decompartmentalise the self-concept by encouraging individuals to generate 
negative aspects of mostly positive selves and positive aspects of mostly negative selves to 
determine if a more integrated structure led to a reduction in PTSD symptoms. As discussed 
in relation to study 5, finer examination of patient-level change will be an important aspect of 
future, larger studies. Moving forward, the increasing emphasis on CPTSD in clinical 
literature will hopefully also ensure the availability of sound clinical measures that can be 
used in future research in this area. This thesis has taken some positive steps toward 
improving understanding of the conceptualisation and treatment of CPTSD, but much more 
needs to be done to help to improve quality of life for affected individuals.  
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CAPS  Page 2
Criterion A.  The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present:
(1)  the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others
(2)  the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.   Note:  In children, this may be
expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior
I’m going to be asking you about some difficult or stressful things that sometimes happen to people. Some
examples of this are being in some type of serious accident; being in a fire, a hurricane, or an earthquake;
being mugged or beaten up or attacked with a weapon; or being forced to have sex when you didn’t want to.  I’ll
start by asking you to look over a list of experiences like this and check any that apply to you.  Then, if any of
them do apply to you, I’ll ask you to briefly describe what happened and how you felt at the time.
Some of these experiences may be hard to remember or may bring back uncomfortable memories or feelings.
People often find that talking about them can be helpful, but it’s up to you to decide how much you want to tell
me.  As we go along, if you find yourself becoming upset, let me know and we can slow down and talk about it.
Also, if you have any questions or you don’t understand something, please let me know.  Do you have any
questions before we start?
ADMINISTER CHECKLIST, THEN REVIEW AND INQUIRE UP TO THREE EVENTS.  IF MORE THAN THREE EVENTS
ENDORSED, DETERMINE WHICH THREE EVENTS TO INQUIRE (E.G., FIRST, WORST, AND MOST RECENT
EVENTS; THREE WORST EVENTS; TRAUMA OF INTEREST PLUS TWO OTHER WORST EVENTS, ETC.)
IF NO EVENTS ENDORSED ON CHECKLIST:  (Has there ever been a time when your life was in danger or you were
seriously injured or harmed?)
IF NO:  (What about a time when you were threatened with death or serious injury, even if you weren’t actually
injured or harmed?)
IF NO:  (What about witnessing something like this happen to someone else or finding out that it happened to
someone close to you?)
IF NO:  (What would you say are some of the most stressful experiences you have had over your life?)
EVENT  #1
What happened?  (How old were you?  Who else
was involved?  How many times did this happen?
Life threat?  Serious injury?)
How did you respond emotionally?  (Were you
very anxious or frightened?  Horrified?  Helpless?
How so?  Were you stunned or in shock so that
you didn’t feel anything at all?  What was that
like?  What did other people notice about your
emotional response?  What about after the event -
- how did you respond emotionally?)
Describe (e.g., event type, victim, perpetrator, age,
frequency):
A. (1)
Life threat?     NO   YES     [self ___  other ___]
Serious injury?     NO   YES     [self ___  other ___]
Threat to physical integrity?    NO  YES    [self ___ other ___]
A. (2)
Intense fear/help/horror?    NO  YES    [during ___ after ___]
Criterion A met?     NO    PROBABLE    YES
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EVENT  #2
What happened?  (How old were you?  Who else
was involved?  How many times did this happen?
Life threat?  Serious injury?)
How did you respond emotionally?  (Were you
very anxious or frightened?  Horrified?  Helpless?
How so?  Were you stunned or in shock so that
you didn’t feel anything at all?  What was that
like?  What did other people notice about your
emotional response?  What about after the event -
- how did you respond emotionally?)
Describe (e.g., event type, victim, perpetrator, age,
frequency):
A. (1)
Life threat?     NO   YES     [self ___  other ___]
Serious injury?     NO   YES     [self ___  other ___]
Threat to physical integrity?    NO   YES    [self ___ other ___]
A. (2)
Intense fear/help/horror?    NO  YES    [during ___ after ___]
Criterion A met?     NO    PROBABLE    YES
EVENT  #3
What happened?  (How old were you?  Who else
was involved?  How many times did this happen?
Life threat?  Serious injury?)
How did you respond emotionally?  (Were you
very anxious or frightened?  Horrified?  Helpless?
How so?  Were you stunned or in shock so that
you didn’t feel anything at all?  What was that
like?  What did other people notice about your
emotional response?  What about after the event -
- how did you respond emotionally?)
Describe (e.g., event type, victim, perpetrator, age,
frequency):
A. (1)
Life threat?     NO   YES     [self ___  other ___]
Serious injury?     NO   YES     [self ___  other ___]
Threat to physical integrity?     NO   YES     [self ___  other
___]
A. (2)
Intense fear/help/horror?     NO   YES     [during ___  after
___]
Criterion A met?     NO    PROBABLE    YES
For the rest of the interview, I want you to keep (EVENTS) in mind as I ask you some questions about how they
may have affected you.
I’m going to ask you about twenty-five questions altogether.  Most of them have two parts.  First, I’ll ask if
you’ve ever had a particular problem, and if so, about how often in the past month (week).  Then I’ll ask you how
much distress or discomfort that problem may have caused you.
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Criterion B.  The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the following ways:
1. (B-1)  recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions.
Note:  In young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.
Frequency
Have you ever had unwanted memories of
(EVENT)?  What were they like?  (What did you
remember?)  [IF NOT CLEAR:]  (Did they ever
occur while you were awake, or only in dreams?)
[EXCLUDE IF MEMORIES OCCURRED ONLY
DURING DREAMS]  How often have you had
these memories in the past month (week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much distress or discomfort did these
memories cause you?  Were you able to put
them out of your mind and think about
something else?  (How hard did you have to try?)
How much did they interfere with your life?
0 None
1 Mild, minimal distress or disruption of activities
2 Moderate, distress clearly present but still
manageable, some disruption of activities
3 Severe, considerable distress, difficulty
dismissing memories, marked disruption of
activities
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress, cannot
dismiss memories, unable to continue
activities
QV (specify)
______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
2. (B-2)  recurrent distressing dreams of the event.  Note:  In children, there may be frightening dreams without
recognizable content.
Frequency
Have you ever had unpleasant dreams about
(EVENT)?  Describe a typical dream.  (What
happens in them?)  How often have you had
these dreams in the past month (week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much distress or discomfort did these
dreams cause you?  Did they ever wake you
up?  [IF YES:]  (What happened when you woke
up?  How long did it take you to get back to
sleep?)  [LISTEN FOR REPORT OF ANXIOUS
AROUSAL, YELLING, ACTING OUT THE
NIGHTMARE] (Did your dreams ever affect anyone
else?  How so?)
0 None
1 Mild, minimal distress, may not have awoken
2 Moderate, awoke in distress but readily
returned to sleep
3 Severe, considerable distress, difficulty
returning to sleep
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress, did not
return to sleep
QV (specify)
______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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3. (B-3)  acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions,
hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when
intoxicated).  Note:  In young children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur.
Frequency
Have you ever suddenly acted or felt as if
(EVENT) were happening again?  (Have you ever
had flashbacks about [EVENT]?)  [IF NOT
CLEAR:]  (Did this ever occur while you were
awake, or only in dreams?)  [EXCLUDE IF
OCCURRED ONLY DURING DREAMS]  Tell me
more about that.  How often has that happened
in the past month (week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much did it seem as if (EVENT) were
happening again?  (Were you confused about
where you actually were or what you were doing at
the time?)  How long did it last?  What did you
do while this was happening?  (Did other people
notice your behavior?  What did they say?)
0 No reliving
1 Mild, somewhat more realistic than just
thinking about event
2 Moderate, definite but transient dissociative
quality, still very aware of surroundings,
daydreaming quality
3 Severe, strongly dissociative (reports images,
sounds, or smells) but retained some
awareness of surroundings
4 Extreme, complete dissociation (flashback),
no awareness of surroundings, may be
unresponsive, possible amnesia for the
episode (blackout)
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
4. (B-4)  intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect
of the traumatic event
Frequency
Have you ever gotten emotionally upset when
something reminded you of (EVENT)?  (Has
anything ever triggered bad feelings related to
[EVENT]?)  What kinds of reminders made you
upset?  How often in the past month (week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much distress or discomfort did
(REMINDERS) cause you?  How long did it last?
How much did it interfere with your life?
0 None
1 Mild, minimal distress or disruption of activities
2 Moderate, distress clearly present but still
manageable, some disruption of activities
3 Severe, considerable distress, marked
disruption of activities
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress, unable to
continue activities
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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5. (B-5)  physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the
traumatic event
Frequency
Have you ever had any physical reactions
when something reminded you of (EVENT)?
(Did your body ever react in some way when
something reminded you of [EVENT]?)  Can you
give me some examples?  (Did your heart race
or did your breathing change?  What about
sweating or feeling really tense or shaky?)   What
kinds of reminders triggered these reactions?
How often in the past month (week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong were (PHYSICAL REACTIONS)?
How long did they last?  (Did they last even after
you were out of the situation?)
0 No physical reactivity
1 Mild, minimal reactivity
2 Moderate, physical reactivity clearly present,
may be sustained if exposure continues
3 Severe, marked physical reactivity, sustained
throughout exposure
4 Extreme, dramatic physical reactivity,
sustained arousal even after exposure has
ended
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Criterion C.  Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
6. (C-1)  efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma
Frequency
Have you ever tried to avoid thoughts or
feelings about (EVENT)?  (What kinds of thoughts
or feelings did you try to avoid?)  What about
trying to avoid talking with other people about
it?  (Why is that?)  How often in the past month
(week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much effort did you make to avoid
(THOUGHTS/FEELINGS/CONVERSATIONS)?
(What kinds of things did you do?  What about
drinking or using medication or street drugs?)
[CONSIDER ALL ATTEMPTS AT AVOIDANCE,
INCLUDING DISTRACTION, SUPPRESSION, AND
USE OF ALCOHOL/DRUGS]  How much did that
interfere with your life?
0 None
1 Mild, minimal effort, little or no disruption of
activities
2 Moderate, some effort, avoidance definitely
present, some disruption of activities
3 Severe, considerable effort, marked
avoidance, marked disruption of activities, or
involvement in certain activities as avoidant
strategy
4 Extreme, drastic attempts at avoidance,
unable to continue activities, or excessive
involvement in certain activities as avoidant
strategy
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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7. (C-2)  efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma
Frequency
Have you ever tried to avoid certain activities,
places, or people that reminded you of
(EVENT)?  (What kinds of things did you avoid?
Why is that?)  How often in the past month
(week)?
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much effort did you make to avoid
(ACTIVITIES/PLACES/PEOPLE)?  (What did you
do instead?)  How much did that interfere with
your life?
0 None
1 Mild, minimal effort, little or no disruption of
activities
2 Moderate, some effort, avoidance definitely
present, some disruption of activities
3 Severe, considerable effort, marked
avoidance, marked disruption of activities or
involvement in certain activities as avoidant
strategy
4 Extreme, drastic attempts at avoidance,
unable to continue activities, or excessive
involvement in certain activities as avoidant
strategy
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
8. (C-3)  inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
Frequency
Have you had difficulty remembering some
important parts of (EVENT)?  Tell me more
about that.  (Do you feel you should be able to
remember these things?  Why do you think you
can’t?)  In the past month (week), how much of
the important parts of (EVENT) have you had
difficulty remembering?  (What parts do you still
remember?)
0 None, clear memory
1 Few aspects not remembered (less than 10%)
2 Some aspects not remembered (approx 20-
30%)
3 Many aspects not remembered (approx 50-
60%)
4 Most or all aspects not remembered (more
than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much difficulty did you have recalling
important parts of (EVENT)?  (Were you able to
recall more if you tried?)
0 None
1 Mild, minimal difficulty
2 Moderate, some difficulty, could recall with
effort
3 Severe, considerable difficulty, even with
effort
4 Extreme, completely unable to recall
important aspects of event
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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9. (C-4)  markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
Frequency
Have you been less interested in activities that
you used to enjoy?  (What kinds of things have
you lost interest in?  Are there some things you
don’t do at all anymore?  Why is that?)
[EXCLUDE IF NO OPPORTUNITY, IF
PHYSICALLY UNABLE, OR IF
DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE CHANGE
IN PREFERRED ACTIVITIES]  In the past month
(week), how many activities have you been
less interested in?  (What kinds of things do you
still enjoy doing?)  When did you first start to feel
that way?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 None
1 Few activities (less than 10%)
2 Some activities (approx 20-30%)
3 Many activities (approx 50-60%)
4 Most or all activities (more than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong was your loss of interest?  (Would
you enjoy [ACTIVITIES] once you got started?)
0 No loss of interest
1 Mild, slight loss of interest, probably would
enjoy after starting activities
2 Moderate, definite loss of interest, but still has
some enjoyment of activities
3 Severe, marked loss of interest in activities
4 Extreme, complete loss of interest, no longer
participates in any activities
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
10. (C-5)  feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
Frequency
Have you felt distant or cut off from other
people?  What was that like?  How much of the
time in the past month (week) have you felt that
way?  When did you first start to feel that way?
(After the [EVENT]?)
0 None of the time
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%)
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong were your feelings of being distant
or cut off from others?  (Who do you feel closest
to?  How many people do you feel comfortable
talking with about personal things?)
0 No feelings of detachment or estrangement
1 Mild, may feel “out of synch” with others
2 Moderate, feelings of detachment clearly
present, but still feels some interpersonal
connection
3 Severe, marked feelings of detachment or
estrangement from most people, may feel
close to only one or two people
4 Extreme, feels completely detached or
estranged from others, not close with anyone
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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11. (C-6)  restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)
Frequency
Have there been times when you felt
emotionally numb or had trouble experiencing
feelings like love or happiness?  What was that
like?  (What feelings did you have trouble
experiencing?)  How much of the time in the past
month (week) have you felt that way?  When did
you first start having trouble experiencing
(EMOTIONS)?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 None of the time
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%)
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much trouble did you have experiencing
(EMOTIONS)?  (What kinds of feelings were you
still able to experience?)  [INCLUDE
OBSERVATIONS OF RANGE OF AFFECT
DURING INTERVIEW]
0 No reduction of emotional experience
1 Mild, slight reduction of emotional experience
2 Moderate, definite reduction of emotional
experience, but still able to experience most
emotions
3 Severe, marked reduction of experience of at
least two primary emotions (e.g., love,
happiness)
4 Extreme, completely lacking emotional
experience
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
12. (C-7)  sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life
span)
Frequency
Have there been times when you felt there is no
need to plan for the future, that somehow your
future will be cut short?  Why is that?  [RULE
OUT REALISTIC RISKS SUCH AS LIFE-
THREATENING MEDICAL CONDITIONS]  How
much of the time in the past month (week) have
you felt that way?  When did you first start to
feel that way?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 None of the time
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%)
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong was this feeling that your future will
be cut short?  (How long do you think you will
live?  How convinced are you that you will die
prematurely?)
0 No sense of a foreshortened future
1 Mild, slight sense of a foreshortened future
2 Moderate, sense of a foreshortened future
definitely present, but no specific prediction
about longevity
3 Severe, marked sense of a foreshortened
future, may make specific prediction about
longevity
4 Extreme, overwhelming sense of a
foreshortened future, completely convinced of
premature death
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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Criterion D.  Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two
(or more) of the following:
13. (D-1)  difficulty falling or staying asleep
Frequency
Have you had any problems falling or staying
asleep?  How often in the past month (week)?
When did you first start having problems
sleeping?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Sleep onset problems? Y    N
Mid-sleep awakening? Y    N
Early a.m. awakening? Y    N
Total # hrs sleep/night _____
Desired # hrs sleep/night _____
Intensity
How much of a problem did you have with your
sleep?  (How long did it take you to fall asleep?
How often did you wake up in the night?  Did you
often wake up earlier than you wanted to?  How
many total hours did you sleep each night?)
0 No sleep problems
1 Mild, slightly longer latency, or minimal
difficulty staying asleep (up to 30 minutes loss
of sleep)
2 Moderate, definite sleep disturbance, clearly
longer latency, or clear difficulty staying
asleep (30-90 minutes loss of sleep)
3 Severe, much longer latency, or marked
difficulty staying asleep (90 min to 3 hrs loss
of sleep)
4 Extreme, very long latency, or profound
difficulty staying asleep (> 3 hrs loss of sleep)
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
14. (D-2)  irritability or outbursts of anger
Frequency
Have there been times when you felt especially
irritable or showed strong feelings of anger?
Can you give me some examples?  How often
in the past month (week)?  When did you first
start feeling that way?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong was your anger?  (How did you show
it?)  [IF REPORTS SUPPRESSION:]  (How hard
was it for you to keep from showing your anger?)
How long did it take you to calm down?  Did
your anger cause you any problems?
0 No irritability or anger
1 Mild, minimal irritability, may raise voice when
angry
2 Moderate, definite irritability or attempts to
suppress anger, but can recover quickly
3 Severe, marked irritability or marked attempts
to suppress anger, may become verbally or
physically aggressive when angry
4 Extreme, pervasive anger or drastic attempts
to suppress anger, may have episodes of
physical violence
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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15. (D-3)  difficulty concentrating
Frequency
Have you found it difficult to concentrate on
what you were doing or on things going on
around you?  What was that like?  How much of
the time in the past month (week)?  When did
you first start having trouble concentrating?
(After the [EVENT]?)
0 None of the time
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%)
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How difficult was it for you to concentrate?
[INCLUDE OBSERVATIONS OF
CONCENTRATION AND ATTENTION IN
INTERVIEW]  How much did that interfere with
your life?
0 No difficulty with concentration
1 Mild, only slight effort needed to concentrate,
little or no disruption of activities
2 Moderate, definite loss of concentration but
could concentrate with effort, some disruption
of activities
3 Severe, marked loss of concentration even
with effort, marked disruption of activities
4 Extreme, complete inability to concentrate,
unable to engage in activities
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
16. (D-4)  hypervigilance
Frequency
Have you been especially alert or watchful,
even when there was no real need to be?  (Have
you felt as if you were constantly on guard?)  Why
is that?  How much of the time in the past month
(week)?  When did you first start acting that
way?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 None of the time
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%)
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How hard did you try to be watchful of things
going on around you?  [INCLUDE
OBSERVATIONS OF HYPERVIGILANCE IN
INTERVIEW]  Did your (HYPERVIGILANCE)
cause you any problems?
0 No hypervigilance
1 Mild, minimal hypervigilance, slight
heightening of awareness
2 Moderate, hypervigilance clearly present,
watchful in public (e.g., chooses safe place to
sit in a restaurant or movie theater)
3 Severe, marked hypervigilance, very alert,
scans environment for danger, exaggerated
concern for safety of self/family/home
4 Extreme, excessive hypervigilance, efforts to
ensure safety consume significant time and
energy and may involve extensive
safety/checking behaviors, marked
watchfulness during interview
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
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17. (D-5)  exaggerated startle response
Frequency
Have you had any strong startle reactions?
When did that happen?  (What kinds of things
made you startle?)  How often in the past month
(week)?  When did you first have these
reactions?  (After the [EVENT]?)
0 Never
1 Once or twice
2 Once or twice a week
3 Several times a week
4 Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong were these startle reactions?  (How
strong were they compared to how most people
would respond?)  How long did they last?
0 No startle reaction
1 Mild, minimal reaction
2 Moderate, definite startle reaction, feels
“jumpy”
3 Severe, marked startle reaction, sustained
arousal following initial reaction
4 Extreme, excessive startle reaction, overt
coping behavior (e.g., combat veteran who
“hits the dirt”)
QV (specify)
_______________________________
Trauma-related?   1 definite   2 probable   3 unlikely
Current  _____ Lifetime  _____
Past week
F _____
I _____
Past month
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Lifetime
F _____
I _____
Sx: Y   N
Criterion E.   Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than 1 month.
18.  onset of symptoms
[IF NOT ALREADY CLEAR:]  When did you first start having
(PTSD SYMPTOMS) you’ve told me about?  (How long after
the trauma did they start?  More than six months?)
________ total # months delay in onset
With delayed onset (> 6 months)?       NO
YES
19.  duration of symptoms
 [CURRENT] How long have these
(PTSD SYMPTOMS) lasted
altogether?
[LIFETIME] How long did these
(PTSD SYMPTOMS) last altogether?
Duration more than 1 month?
Total # months duration
Acute (< 3 months) or chronic
(> 3 months)?
Current
NO     YES
________
acute    chronic
Lifetime
NO     YES
________
acute    chronic
Criterion F.  The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning.
20.  subjective distress
[CURRENT] Overall, how much have you been
bothered by these (PTSD SYMPTOMS) you’ve
told me about?  [CONSIDER DISTRESS
REPORTED ON EARLIER ITEMS]
[LIFETIME] Overall, how much were you
bothered by these (PTSD SYMPTOMS) you’ve
told me about? [CONSIDER DISTRESS
REPORTED ON EARLIER ITEMS]
0 None
1 Mild, minimal distress
2 Moderate, distress clearly present but still
manageable
3 Severe, considerable distress
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress
Past week
_____
Past month
_____
Lifetime
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21.  impairment in social functioning
[CURRENT] Have these (PTSD SYMPTOMS)
affected your relationships with other people?
How so?  [CONSIDER IMPAIRMENT IN SOCIAL
FUNCTIONING  REPORTED ON EARLIER ITEMS]
[LIFETIME] Did these (PTSD SYMPTOMS) affect
your social life?  How so? [CONSIDER
IMPAIRMENT IN SOCIAL FUNCTIONING
REPORTED ON EARLIER ITEMS]
0 No adverse impact
1 Mild impact, minimal impairment in social
functioning
2 Moderate impact, definite impairment, but
many aspects of social functioning still intact
3 Severe impact, marked impairment, few
aspects of social functioning still intact
4 Extreme impact, little or no social functioning
Past week
_____
Past month
_____
Lifetime
_____
22.  impairment in occupational or other important area of functioning
[CURRENT -- IF NOT ALREADY CLEAR]  Are you
working now?
IF YES:  Have these (PTSD SYMPTOMS)
affected your work or your ability to work?
How so?  [CONSIDER REPORTED WORK
HISTORY, INCLUDING NUMBER AND
DURATION OF JOBS, AS WELL AS THE
QUALITY OF WORK RELATIONSHIPS. IF
PREMORBID FUNCTIONING IS UNCLEAR,
INQUIRE ABOUT WORK EXPERIENCES
BEFORE THE TRAUMA.  FOR
CHILD/ADOLESCENT TRAUMAS, ASSESS
PRE-TRAUMA SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND
POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF BEHAVIOR
PROBLEMS]
IF NO:  Have these (PTSD SYMPTOMS)
affected any other important part of your
life?  [AS APPROPRIATE, SUGGEST
EXAMPLES SUCH AS PARENTING,
HOUSEWORK, SCHOOLWORK, VOLUNTEER
WORK, ETC.]  How so?
[LIFETIME -- IF NOT ALREADY CLEAR]  Were
you working then?
IF YES:  Did these (PTSD SYMPTOMS) affect
your work or your ability to work?  How so?
[CONSIDER REPORTED WORK HISTORY,
INCLUDING NUMBER AND DURATION OF
JOBS, AS WELL AS THE QUALITY OF WORK
RELATIONSHIPS. IF PREMORBID
FUNCTIONING IS UNCLEAR, INQUIRE ABOUT
WORK EXPERIENCES BEFORE THE
TRAUMA.  FOR CHILD/ADOLESCENT
TRAUMAS, ASSESS PRE-TRAUMA SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE AND POSSIBLE PRESENCE
OF BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS]
IF NO:  Did these (PTSD SYMPTOMS) affect
any other important part of your life? [AS
APPROPRIATE, SUGGEST EXAMPLES SUCH
AS PARENTING, HOUSEWORK,
SCHOOLWORK, VOLUNTEER WORK, ETC.]
How so?
0 No adverse impact
1 Mild impact, minimal impairment in
occupational/other important functioning
2 Moderate impact, definite impairment, but
many aspects of occupational/other important
functioning still intact
3 Severe impact, marked impairment, few
aspects of occupational/other important
functioning still intact
4 Extreme impact, little or no occupational/other
important functioning
Past week
_____
Past month
_____
Lifetime
_____
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 Global Ratings
23.  global validity
ESTIMATE THE OVERALL VALIDITY OF RESPONSES.
CONSIDER FACTORS SUCH AS COMPLIANCE WITH THE
INTERVIEW, MENTAL STATUS (E.G., PROBLEMS WITH
CONCENTRATION, COMPREHENSION OF ITEMS,
DISSOCIATION), AND EVIDENCE OF EFFORTS TO
EXAGGERATE OR MINIMIZE SYMPTOMS.
0 Excellent, no reason to suspect invalid
responses
1 Good, factors present that may adversely
affect validity
2 Fair, factors present that definitely reduce
validity
3 Poor, substantially reduced validity
4 Invalid responses, severely impaired mental
status or possible deliberate “faking bad” or
“faking good”
24.  global severity
ESTIMATE THE OVERALL SEVERITY OF PTSD
SYMPTOMS.  CONSIDER DEGREE OF
SUBJECTIVE DISTRESS, DEGREE OF
FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT, OBSERVATIONS OF
BEHAVIORS IN INTERVIEW, AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING REPORTING STYLE.
0 No clinically significant symptoms, no distress
and no functional impairment
1 Mild, minimal distress or functional impairment
2 Moderate, definite distress or functional
impairment but functions satisfactorily with
effort
3 Severe, considerable distress or functional
impairment, limited functioning even with
effort
4 Extreme, marked distress or marked
impairment in two or more major areas of
functioning
Past week
_____
Past month
_____
Lifetime
_____
25.  global improvement
RATE TOTAL OVERALL IMPROVEMENT PRESENT SINCE
THE INITIAL RATING.  IF NO EARLIER RATING, ASK HOW
THE SYMPTOMS ENDORSED HAVE CHANGED OVER THE
PAST 6 MONTHS.  RATE THE DEGREE OF CHANGE,
WHETHER OR NOT, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, IT IS DUE TO
TREATMENT.
0 Asymptomatic
1 Considerable improvement
2 Moderate improvement
3 Slight improvement
4 No improvement
5 Insufficient information
 
 
292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
295 
Beck Depression Inventory-I 
 
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully. Then 
pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling the past 
week, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you picked. If several statements in 
the group seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each 
group before making your choice. 
 
1. 0 I do not feel sad. 
 1 I feel sad.  
 2 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it. 
 3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
   
2. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
 1 I feel discouraged about the future. 
 2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
 3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
   
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure. 
 1 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
 2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
 3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
   
4. 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
 1 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to. 
 2 I don’t get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
 3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
   
5. 0 I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
 1 I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
 2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
 3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
   
6. 0 I don’t feel I am being punished.  
 1 I feel I may be punished. 
 2 I expect to be punished. 
 3 I feel I am being punished. 
   
7. 0 I don’t feel disappointed in myself. 
 1 I am disappointed in myself. 
 2 I am disgusted with myself. 
 3 I hate myself. 
   
8. 0 I don’t feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
 1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
 2 I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
 3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
   
9. 0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
 1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
 2 I would like to kill myself. 
 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
   
10. 0 I don’t cry any more than usual. 
 1 I cry more now than I used to. 
 2 I cry all the time now. 
 3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can’t cry even when I want to. 
Continued over page… 
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11. 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
 1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
 2 I feel irritated all the time now. 
 3 I don’t get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
   
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people. 
 1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
 2 I have lost of my interest in other people. 
 3 I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
   
13. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
 1 I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
 2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions that before. 
 3 I can’t make decisions at all anymore. 
   
14. 0 I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to. 
 1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
 2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive. 
 3 I believe that I look ugly. 
   
15. 0 I can work about as well as before. 
 1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
 2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
 3 I can’t do any work at all. 
   
16. 0 I can sleep as well as usual. 
 1 I don’t sleep as well as I used to. 
 2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
 3 I wake up several hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
   
17. 0 I don’t get more tired than usual. 
 1 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
 2 I get tired from doing almost anything. 
 3 I am too tired to do anything. 
   
18. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
 1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
 2 My appetite is much worse now. 
 3 I have not appetite at all anymore. 
   
19. 0 I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately. 
 1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
 2 I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
 3 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
  I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. Yes __  No __ 
   
20. 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
 1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or 
constipation. 
 2 I am very worried about physical problems and it’s hard to think of much else. 
 3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else. 
   
21. 0 I have not noticed any recent changes in my interest in sex. 
 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
 2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
 3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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The Centrality of Events Scale 
 
Please think back upon the most stressful or traumatic event in your life and answer the 
following questions in an honest and sincere way, by circling a number from 1 to 5. 
1. This event has become a reference point for the way I 
understand new experiences. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
2. I automatically see connections and similarities 
between this event and experiences in my present life. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
3. I feel that this event has become part of my identity. totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of 
important themes in my life. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
5. This event is making my life different from the life of 
most other people. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
6. This event has become a reference point for the way I 
understand myself and the world. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
7. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type 
of event think differently than I do. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
8. This event tells a lot about who I am. totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
9. I often see connections and similarities between this 
event and my current relationships with other people. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of my 
life story. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
11. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this 
type of event, have a different way of looking upon 
themselves than I have. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
12. This event has colored the way I think and feel about 
other experiences. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
13. This event has become a reference point for the way I 
look upon my future. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event 
would be in the middle with threads going out to many 
other experiences. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
15. My life story can be divided into two main chapters: 
one is before and one is after this event happened. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
16. This event permanently changed my life. totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
17. I often think about the effects this event will have on 
my future. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
18. This event was a turning point in my life. totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a 
different person today. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
20. When I reflect upon my future, I often think back to 
this event. 
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree 
 
 
298 
 
Post-Traumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI) 
 
This questionnaire lists different thoughts which people may have after a traumatic experience. 
In this questionnaire we are interested in the way that YOU thought, IN THE LAST MONTH, in 
regard to the traumatic event that you have experienced. 
         
Please read each statement carefully and decide how much you have AGREED or DISAGREED 
with each statement during the last month. 
 
For each of the thoughts, please show your answer by choosing the number from the scale 
below which BEST DESCRIBES HOW MUCH YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT and placing 
the number next to that statement. People react in many different ways; there are no right or 
wrong answers to these statements. 
                                                                                                        
  1                        2                     3                  4            5       6 7  
 
Totally        Disagree     Disagree       Agree             Agree           Totally 
Disagree     Very Much     Slightly             Neutral       Slightly        Very Much       Agree 
                                                                                                                                    
 
       1. My reactions since the event mean that I am going crazy. 
 
       2. Somebody else would have stopped the event from happening. 
 
       3. I feel like an object, not like a person. 
 
       4. I have to be on guard all the time. 
 
       5.  Nothing good can happen to me anymore. 
 
       6. I will not be able to control my anger and will do something terrible. 
 
       7. The event happened to me because of the sort of person I am.  
 
       8. The world is a dangerous place. 
 
       9. I feel like I don't know myself any more. 
 
     10. If I think about the event, I will not be able to handle it. 
 
     11. People can't be trusted. 
 
     12. My life has been destroyed by the event. 
 
     13. Somebody else would not have gotten into this situation. 
 
     14. I can't deal with even the slightest upset. 
 
     15. I feel dead inside. 
 
     16. People are not what they seem 
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PTCI (continued) 
  
 1                        2                     3                  4            5       6 7  
 
Totally        Disagree     Disagree       Agree             Agree           Totally 
Disagree     Very Much     Slightly             Neutral       Slightly        Very Much       Agree 
                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                 
      17. I can't rely on myself. 
 
      18. There is something wrong with me as a person. 
 
      19. I will never be able to feel normal emotions again. 
 
      20. I have to be especially careful because you never know what can happen     
               next. 
 
      21. My reactions since the event show that I am a lousy coper. 
 
      22. I am inadequate. 
 
      23. You can never know who will harm you. 
 
      24. I feel isolated and set apart from others. 
 
      25. I have no future. 
 
      26. There is something about me that made the event happen. 
 
      27. I have permanently changed for the worse. 
 
      28. I can't rely on other people. 
 
      29. I can't trust that I will do the right thing. 
 
      30. I am a weak person. 
 
      31. The event happened because of the way I acted. 
 
      32. I used to be a happy person but now I am always miserable. 
 
      33. I can't stop bad things from happening to me. 
 
      34. I will not be able to tolerate my thoughts about the event, and I will fall apart. 
 
      35. I will not be able to control my emotions, and something terrible will happen. 
 
      36. You never know when something terrible will happen. 
 
      37. I should be over this by now 
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Appendix 2.0: Ethical Approval 
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Appendix 3.0: Research paper: Prevalence of Auditory Pseudohallucinations in  
Adult Survivors of Physical and Sexual Trauma with Chronic  
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
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Appendix 4.0: Research paper: Developing an Emotion- and Memory-Processing  
Group Intervention for PTSD with complex features: a group case  
series with survivors of repeated interpersonal trauma 
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Appendix 5.0: Emotion- and Memory-Processing Group Intervention for PTSD with  
Complex Features: Manual  
 
Number of Sessions: 12 
Number of Clients: 6-8 
 
Overview 
 
Each week consists of a 2 hour group session, with a 20 minute break. There is a 
different topic considered each week, along with different skills. In keeping with 
theories of learning, the main focus should be on developing self-efficacy in using the 
skills, as well as providing group members with information and explanations about 
problems and symptoms. Experience of running the groups has shown that key skills 
and concepts need to be demonstrated and practiced in the group on a weekly basis for 
them to be used effectively by clients. There also has to be strong emphasis on the 
importance of practice, encouragement to use the key techniques and frequent 
discussions identifying the ways in which participants have found the techniques useful 
as well as difficulties that prevent the use of particular techniques. 
 
Assessment Measures: At assessment and at the end of the group 
 
Screening & PTSD Measures 
a) Clinician- Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) 
b) SCID-I for Mood Disorders; Anxiety and Other Disorders (excl. PTSD) 
c) Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PCTI; Foa et al., 1999) 
d) Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 
e) The Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) 
Complex Trauma & Emotion Regulation Measures 
f) Complex Trauma Symptoms Questionnaire (CTSQ; Cloitre et al.) 
g) Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) 
Memory Measures 
h) Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003) 
i) Trauma Memory Modality Questionnaire (TMMQ; Meiser-Stedman, Smith, Yule & 
Dalgleish, 2003) 
 
Symptom Monitoring: Throughout the group sessions 
 
 Flashback/intrusion diary (frequency, nowness & distress ratings) 
 Adherence Monitoring (Session adherence & Homework adherence) 
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Weekly Session Plan 
 
Session 1: Introduction to the Group 
 
Session 2: Emotional Awareness 
 
Session 3: Psychoeducation - PTSD and Memory 
 
Session 4: ‘Rape’ – Meaning, Myths & Other People’s Reactions 
 
Session 5: Emotion Regulation 
 
Session 6: Emotionally Engaged Living 
 
Session 7: Interpersonal Emotion Regulation 
 
Session 8. Flashbacks – Identifying Triggers and Re-Conditioning 
 
Session 9: Imagery & Nightmare Rescripting 
 
Session 10: Narrative Restructuring & Nightmare Rescripting 
 
Session 11: Method of Loci 
 
Session 12. Summary & Review 
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Session 1. Introduction to the Group 
 
 Introductions 
 
- Ask each group member to say their name and one thing about themselves 
- Icebreaker exercise 
 
 Group Outline 
 
- Housekeeping  
- An outline of what the group will involve: Phase 1 – Psychoeducation, 
Emotion Regulation & Interpersonal Difficulties; Phase 2 – Memory Control 
- Expectations of group members (attendance, participation in activities where 
possible, notes taken in sessions to read at home, homework to complete, 
symptoms to monitor throughout) 
- Action/contingency planning in case of difficulties (e.g. making contact 
outside the group, speaking to facilitators at the end) 
 
 Group Rules 
 
- Group members asked to come up with rules for the group, which will be 
written up (contact when not attending, confidentiality, anonymity, respect 
for each other’s views and opinions, listening when others are speaking, 
emotional expression, leaving the room etc.) 
 
 Overview of the Weekly Session Plan and the Core Focus of the Group 
 
- Hand out a weekly session plan and provide an overview of what each of the 
sessions will involve. Ensure that group members understand what is to be 
included in the group programme and answer any questions that arise 
- Go over/check dates (accounting for bank holidays, annual leave etc.) 
 
 Identify Goals for the End of the Group Sessions 
 
- Ask each of the group members to identify hopes/expectations/goals for the 
end of the group and write these up 
- Discuss what is reasonable to expect given the length of the programme and 
limitations of the group format 
- Emphasise the importance of adhering to therapeutic 
techniques/suggestions and the collaborative approach for symptomatic 
improvement 
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Session 1 Handout: Weekly Session Plan 
 
Session Number Session Topic Date 
Session 1 Introduction to the 
Group 
 
 
 
Session 2 Emotional Awareness 
 
 
 
Session 3 Psychoeducation - PTSD 
and Memory 
 
 
Session 4 ‘Rape’ – Meaning, Myths 
& Other People’s 
Reactions  
 
Session 5 Emotion Regulation  
  
 
 
Session 6 Emotionally Engaged 
Living 
 
 
Session 7 Interpersonal Emotion 
Regulation  
 
 
Session 8 
 
Flashbacks – Identifying 
Triggers and Re-
Conditioning 
 
Session 9 
 
Imagery & Nightmare 
Rescripting 
 
 
Session 10 
 
Narrative Restructuring 
& Nightmare Rescripting 
 
 
Session 11 Method of Loci 
 
 
 
Session 12 Summary & Review 
 
 
 
 
My hopes/expectations/goals for the end of the group sessions are: 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
332 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Session 2: Emotional Awareness 
 
 Introduce Concept of Emotion Regulation  
 
- Ability to identify, label, modulate and effectively express feelings 
- Learned/developed through monitoring of feelings & practicing the specific skills of 
identifying and labelling feelings 
- Discuss difficulties in emotion regulation: how were feelings managed in group 
members’ families? Family script of emotional inhibition?  
- If possible, put together a collective formulation for the group 
- Why it’s important to understand and manage emotions following traumatic 
experiences 
 
 Awareness and Monitoring of Feelings 
 
- How has the rape influenced feelings? 
- Brainstorming session (flipchart) exploring more specifically the emotions that 
group members have experienced 
- Grouping these emotions according to emotions felt at the time of the rape/sexual 
assault and the emotions that have been felt/experienced since then 
- How have past experiences of how emotions were/are managed in group members’ 
families impacted on how they feel about the rape? 
- Provide rationale for self-monitoring and understanding feelings: adaptive living 
(Psychoeducation re the ‘function’ of emotions) 
 
 Using Elements of Emotion to Name Feelings 
 
- Generate a list of physiological changes & link them to thoughts and feelings 
- Causal relationship between thoughts, feelings (sensations & physical reactions) and 
behaviours 
- Discrimination among different kinds of feelings 
- Use example: The Body’s Response to Fear 
- Explore group members’ understanding of what happens in their bodies when they 
are afraid/fearful. Discuss non-traumatic examples (e.g. fear of heights/spiders) 
- Why do our bodies respond in this way when we are faced with something that we 
find fearful? 
- Explore group members’ understanding of the Fight, Flight, Freeze response. Why 
have we evolved to respond in this way? How is it adaptive for survival (example of 
animals in the wild, rabbit in headlights)? 
- What might have happened if they hadn’t responded in the way they did (usually by 
freezing)? Could it have resulted in a worse outcome? Why might the way they did 
respond be considered to be more adaptive? 
- Were they physically able to respond in a different way? 
 
 Self-monitoring of Feelings Form 
 
- Practice in session together 
- Emphasise the importance of regular practice 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
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- Provide group members with the Self-Monitoring of Feelings Form (Handout 11.2) 
and a copy of the other forms (Handouts 11.1, 11.3 and 11.4) for the group 
members’ review 
- If they feel able to, ask group members to put together a more personal formulation 
for homework 
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Session 2 Handout: 11.1  
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Session 2 Handout: 11.2 
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Session 2 Handout: 11.3 
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Session 2 Handout: 11.4 
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Session 2 Handout: Why do we get anxious? 
 
Why do we get anxious? 
 
Anxiety is our natural reaction to events that make us feel in danger or unhappy about 
something we have done. We can feel in danger because of: 
 
 Something happening in the outside world that puts us in danger 
 Thinking about something where we think we have done wrong 
 Remembering something frightening from the past.  
 
Our mind responds to frightening things happening outside of us, or frightening memories in 
the same way.  
 
What happens when we get anxious? 
 
When we get anxious many things happen in our bodies (see other handout). These things 
happening (pain, being unable to breathe) can make us feel even more anxious and scared, as 
we think there is something wrong with us. This can then make us feel more anxious. 
 
ONCE WE FEEL SCARED OR ANXIOUS IT CAN TAKE OUR BODIES A LONG TIME BEFORE THE 
FEEL OF ANXIETY GOES.  
 
What to do to feel less anxious? 
 
Breathing – sitting and breathing for a few minutes can help 
 
Listening to the relaxation CD – Practising listening to the relaxation CD can help to understand 
when we feel anxious and how to recognise the signs.  
 
Talking to someone you trust – this can help make us feel better as we can feel safer and maybe 
forget for a little bit the thing we are worrying about.  
 
Coping statements – writing some statements on cards and keeping them with you can help: 
 
 I am feeling scared, but I know this will pass 
 Worrying will not help the situation, it will only make me feel worse.  
 I am feeling scared and anxious and need to take some time to do something nice for me.  
 
Making a worry plan - Worrying does not always help situations, making an action plan can help 
a bit more. 
 
 Write down what you are worrying about: -  
 Write down a plan of what you can do to help with the situation. (E.g. get advice, talk to 
someone about it) 
 If there is nothing else you can do to help the situation, ask yourself if worrying will 
really change the situation and write down something else you can do instead.  
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Session 2 Handout: Cycle of Anxiety 
 
 
 
                                          ANXIETY CYCLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRIGGER 
 Internal (e.g. images, sensations) 
 External (e.g. reminders) 
FEAR / ANXIETY 
 
THOUGHTS 
e.g.: 
 “I’m having a heart attack” 
 “I can’t cope” 
 “I’m going mad” 
 “I’m going to faint” 
 “I’m going to die” 
 
PHYSICAL SENSATIONS 
e.g.:  
 Heart pounding 
 Tight chest 
 Breathlessness 
 Sweating 
 Dizziness 
 Nausea 
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Session 2 Handout: The Body’s Reaction to Stress 
 
 
THE BODY’S REACTION TO STRESS 
 
    BIOLOGICAL REACTION        SYMPTOMS YOU FEEL 
 
    The brain sends a biochemical message to the      Headache, dizziness, 
    pituitary gland, which releases a hormone which      light-headed. 
    triggers the adrenal gland to release adrenalin.  
    Pupils dilate.           Blurred vision. 
 
   Mouth becomes dry.       Difficulty swallowing, 
          dry throat 
 
   Back and shoulder muscles tense – large skeletal             Aching neck and backache. 
   Muscles contract ready for action. 
 
  Breathing becomes faster and shallower supplying  Chest pains, tingling, 
  more oxygen to the muscles.     Palpitations, asthma, trouble 
         catching breath 
  Heart pumps faster and blood pressure rises             Pounding heart 
 
  Liver releases stored sugar to provide fuel for   Indigestion. 
   quick energy. 
   Adrenalin and noradrenalin are released. 
 
   Digestion slows down or ceases as blood is     Nausea, indigestion, butterflies 
    diverted away from the stomach.      in stomach 
 
                 The body cools itself by perspiring: blood vessels                Excess sweating, 
                and capillaries move closer to the skin surface.       blushing, feel hot. 
                         Muscles at opening of anus and bladder are relaxed.      Frequent urination, diarrhoea
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Session 3. Psychoeducation - PTSD and Memory 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Check progress with the Self-Monitoring of Feelings Form (Handout 11.2) 
and personal formuation exercise. Did anything new come up? Any 
surprises?  
- Check understanding of Handouts 11.1, 11.3 and 11.4. Any questions? 
 
Reiterate the phased approach for the group: Phase one to explore and 
better manage post-traumatic emotions and Phase two to focus more 
specifically on traumatic memories 
 
- Summary of skills and techniques learnt in first phase of group and how 
these can be used in the second phase (awareness; regulation; tolerance; 
meaning  emotion) 
- Re-introduce rationale for memory control phase of the group sessions 
- Link to model for ‘Memories and their regulation’ (memory  meaning  
emotion) – on Flipchart & Handout 
 
 Psychoeducation: PTSD and Memory 
 
- What kinds of symptoms do people experience following traumatic events? – 
Brainstorm on flip-chart and group into three categories (reliving, avoidance 
& physiological) 
- Introduce the ‘Brain’ (dual processing) model of the development of PTSD 
and use to illustrate:  
 
o Verbal vs. Non-verbal memories 
o Voluntary vs. Involuntary memories: why trauma memories intrude 
and dominate (Memory) 
o The centrality of trauma memories 
o How memory and emotion are intimately linked, through meaning 
o Maladaptive Appraisals knotted in the trauma narratives (Meaning) 
o Avoidance and Suppression; Suppression Exercise (Regulation) 
 
 Introduce Memory Control Techniques for better management of 
memories: 
 
- Recap session plan for second phase 
- Monitoring and increasing awareness of memories – e.g. notebooks, 
diaries (Awareness) 
- Processing memories – e.g. writing a narrative, sharing accounts 
(Regulation; Tolerance) 
- Updating memories and appraisals – e.g. challenging & rescripting, 
changing perspective, imagery (Meaning) 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to complete the ‘Motivation for confronting memories of 
the trauma’ handout 
- Ask group members to complete the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’ 
& go through example 
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Memory Meanings Emotions 
Control 
• Avoid memory 
 and/or cues 
• Monitor memory 
• Change memory 
• Imagery 
rescripting 
• Narrative 
updating 
• Enhance access to 
positive memories 
Change 
meanings 
• Be aware of 
emotions 
• Regulate 
emotions 
• Tolerate 
distress 
Memories and their regulation 
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Session 3 Handout: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
 
 
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
 
What is PTSD? 
 
PTSD is the name we use to describe the problems people experience after 
a traumatic event. The problems people may report are grouped under 
three types of symptoms.   
 
1. Re-experiencing symptoms – this is where people remember 
what happened during the trauma  
 
 Intrusive thoughts/reminders of the traumatic event  
 Nightmares about the event  
 Flashbacks – images, sounds, smells, sensations 
 Very upset/emotional when reminded of event  
 Body alert and anxious at reminders of the event  
 
2. Avoidance symptoms – this is where people try to avoid 
remembering what happened 
 
 Avoiding talking/thinking about the incident  
 Avoiding activities/places/people who remind you of the incident  
 Being unable to remember important parts of the event  
 Loss of interest/pleasure in previously enjoyed activities  
 Feeling numb  
 Feeling distant or cut off from people around you  
 Having a marked sense that your future will somehow be cut short  
 
3. Symptoms of increased physiological arousal – This is the 
increased level of anxiety or feeling scared that people might feel. 
 
 Difficulty sleeping  
 Feeling angry and/or irritable  
 Difficulty concentrating  
 Feeling in danger/unsafe  
 Being jumpy/easily startled in response to loud noises  
 
Why do people get PTSD? 
 
These experiences are all NORMAL REACTIONS TO ABNORMAL EVENTS. 
Sometimes people feel like they might be going mad, but they’re not. Instead it’s just 
what our minds do in trying to help us to deal with the terrible things we might have 
experienced. We understand that these things happen because of how our mind works 
during traumatic events: 
 
 During trauma, our mind doesn’t work the same as it does normally. It does 
this because we are very scared. Because of this, traumatic memories are 
stored in a different way in the mind. This means that they:  
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o Can come as nightmares, intrusive memories or flashbacks 
o Have no sense of time (feels like they are happening now, not in the 
past) 
o Can include images, sounds, smells, emotions and pain of traumatic 
event 
o Can be triggered by things that remind us of the traumatic event (e.g. 
feeling scared, seeing the colour red, seeing people in uniform). 
 
 
 We remember them so often because our minds are trying to help us to process 
and make sense of them.  
 
 Because the reminders are so scary and unpleasant, we try to push them away. 
But this just means they keep coming back…  
 
 Our mind is a bit like a cupboard. Traumatic memories are like stuffing a 
duvet into a cupboard in a rush and shutting the door. Because of the way the 
duvet has been stored, like the memories, it keeps pushing the door open and 
falling out of the cupboard (like nightmares and flashbacks). Treatment is like 
taking the duvet out of the cupboard, taking time to fold it back neatly and 
then putting it back in the cupboard. Then it is possible to take the duvet out of 
the cupboard when you want to rather than it falling out when you do not 
expect it (therefore having more control over the memories). 
 
 Treatment involves talking about the past in a slow controlled way.  
 
 Talking about the traumatic memory is like treating a wound that has become 
infected. The wound is painful to touch (like talking about a traumatic 
memory), so we don’t want to touch it. But if we do not treat it, it will remain 
infected. By treating the wound, it can begin to heal. 
 
 
Everything is linked 
 
Sometimes it feels like what is happening is unpredictable and there is nothing that 
can be done to make it better. But there are some basic things for you to understand 
that can help: 
 
 Everything is linked – Our thoughts, feelings, memories and what goes on in 
our world are all linked. For example, if you are worried about being 
responsible in some way for what happened, you will probably think more 
about what happened and then feel more frightened and upset.  
 
 You can have some control over your thoughts and feelings – You cannot stop 
memories coming back completely, but once they come back, it can help to do 
something relaxing or something that helps you to feel safe.  
 
 Thinking about things over and over doesn’t always help – Sometimes we 
can’t help but worry about things, but worrying too much can make us feel 
upset and bad. Also thinking over and over doesn’t help change a situation. 
Doing something relaxing can help.  
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Session 3 Handout: Motivation for confronting memories of the trauma 
 
It is common and very understandable to have mixed feelings about confronting 
your memories of the trauma. It can be a hard and daunting process to start. For 
this reason, it is important to clarify the specific reasons why you want to do this, 
to help you assess how motivated you are to engage in this phase of treatment. 
 
Many people also find it helpful to clarify what fears they have about confronting 
memories, and what may hold them back. Often, what holds people back are 
fears of what they think might happen if they bring on memories of the traumatic 
event. 
 
We recommend that you use this sheet to clarify the advantages and 
disadvantages (pros and cons) of changing the way you confront and process the 
memory of the trauma, versus leaving things as they are (staying the same). 
 
Whilst you are completing these questions, it’s important to consider your values 
and goals during this exercise. If you manage to confront this memory and 
tolerate the distress that comes along with it, what goals will it help you achieve? 
How will it bring you closer to what’s important to you? 
 
What are the possible advantages of 
changing the way you deal with the 
memory? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are some possible disadvantages 
of changing the way you deal with the 
memory? 
 
What are some disadvantages of 
staying the same? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are some advantages of staying 
the same? 
 
 
Motivation levels can also fluctuate during treatment. If you notice your level of 
motivation to change the way you process your memories reduces over the 
coming weeks, come back to this sheet, and consider the things that may be 
holding you back. 
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Session 3 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary 
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the intrusive 
memory? 
Intrusive Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it feel 
like it was happening 
again now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did you 
feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the intrusive 
memory mean / say 
about you? 
Coping 
What did you do? 
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Session 4. ‘Rape’ – Meaning, Myths & Other People’s Reactions 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Motivation for confronting memories of the trauma’ 
handout: pros and cons identified? Any difficulties? 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’: anyone willing to 
share an example?  
 
 Meaning of the word ‘Rape’ 
 
- Link to model (Session 3: event  meaning  emotion) 
- Brainstorm session on what thoughts/images/meanings the word 
brings to mind 
 
 Beliefs (personal vs. myths & stereotypes) re rape victims 
 
- Have these beliefs about ‘rape victims’ changed since the rape/sexual 
assault? If so, how did the group members’ beliefs differ before and 
after? 
- Where did/do these belies come from? (other people, the media) 
 
 Maladaptive Appraisals - Blame & responsibility 
 
- Since the rape/sexual assault, do group members’ have particular 
negative beliefs about themselves? (ie. beliefs related to blame and 
responsibility) 
- If so, where do these beliefs come from? 
- Are these beliefs related to pre-existing interpersonal schemas/family 
scripts re responsibility for example? (Box 14.2 Psychoeducation: 
What are Interpersonal Schemas?) Other maladaptive meanings? 
- Have these beliefs been influenced by the reactions/responses of 
others? 
 
 Projection of knowledge/beliefs in long-term memory onto new 
experience 
 
- Identifying and discussing the link between past 
experiences/memories and new experiences and emotions 
 
 Introduction to Narrative Restructuring – idea of building a new memory 
  
- How to we begin to challenge/update these beliefs?  
- Beliefs challenged through psychoeducation about and 
challenging/updating of trauma memories (focus of the second half of 
the group programme) 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to continue with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive 
Memories Diary’ and the ‘Self-Monitoring of Feelings Form’. 
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Session 4 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary 
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the intrusive 
memory? 
Intrusive Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it feel 
like it was happening 
again now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did you 
feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the intrusive 
memory mean / say 
about you? 
Coping 
What did you do? 
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Session 5: Emotion Regulation and Distress Tolerance 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’ and the Self-Monitoring of 
Feelings Form: anyone willing to share an example?  
 
 Psychoeducation on Emotion Regulation 
 
- Elaborate on concept of emotion regulation & link to session 2 
- Introduce ‘Emotions and their Regulation’ as simple framework for group 
sessions (Illustrate on flipchart & Handout) 
 
 Identify and Discuss Problematic Emotions  
 
- Identify and discuss problematic emotions that have arisen from the 
homework  
- Psychoeducation on specific emotional responses: Anxiety (state of arousal 
that signals danger); anger (adaptive when it prepares us for active coping); 
depression (sustained state of absence of pleasure or excitement); 
dissociation (escape from the pain or intensity of an emotion that is 
unbearable, continuum) 
- Disgust (physical & psychological exclusion of something abhorrent), shame 
(dishonour, disgrace, or condemnation; as seen by others), guilt 
(responsibility for a particular act viewed as a violation of values) 
 
 Introduce Idea of Distress Tolerance 
 
- ‘Distress tolerance is the ability to endure pain or hardship without resorting 
to actions or behaviours that are damaging to yourself or others’ (related to 
emotion regulation & accepting/sitting with feelings) 
- Why should we learn to recognise and tolerate distress?: distress is a 
catalyst; avoiding distress saps energy, restricts positive feelings, interferes 
with achieving desired goals, contributes to PTSD symptoms. 
 
 Identify Distress Tolerance Skills 
 
- Identify successes (e.g. exam performance, sharing feelings) 
- Identify maladaptive strategies: externalising behaviours (alcohol, drugs, 
self-injurious behaviour, binge eating and purging, unsafe, violent or 
aggressive behaviours); avoidance (link to Emotion Regulation model) 
 
 Maladaptive Strategies and avoidance 
 
- What is the function of these maladaptive strategies? 
- What is the function of avoidance? 
- Address ambivalence re avoiding distressing emotions rather than 
recognising and working through them (use specific examples from the 
group sessions so far) 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to complete the ‘Motivation for confronting difficult 
emotions’ handout 
- Continue with the ‘Self-Monitoring of Feelings’ Form  
- Continue with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories’ Diary 
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Event Meanings Emotions 
Control 
• Avoid certain 
events 
• Schedule new 
(positive) events 
 
Change 
meanings 
• Be aware of 
emotions 
• Regulate 
emotions 
• Tolerate 
distress 
• Savour and 
elaborate 
positive 
emotions 
Emotions and their 
regulation
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Session 5 Handout: Motivation for confronting the difficult emotions 
associated with your traumatic experience 
 
It is common and very understandable to have mixed feelings about confronting the 
emotions associated with your traumatic experience. It can be a hard and daunting 
process to start. For this reason, it is important to clarify the specific reasons why you 
want to do this, to help you assess how motivated you are to engage in this phase of 
treatment. 
 
Many people also find it helpful to clarify what fears they have about confronting their 
emotions, and what may hold them back. Often, what holds people back are fears of 
what they think might happen if they start processing the emotions associated with 
their traumatic experience. 
 
We recommend that you use this sheet to clarify the advantages and disadvantages 
(pros and cons) of changing the way you confront and process your emotions, versus 
leaving things as they are (staying the same). 
 
Whilst you are completing these questions, it’s important to consider your values and 
goals during this exercise. If you manage to confront your emotions and tolerate the 
distress that comes along with it, what goals will it help you achieve? How will it bring 
you closer to what’s important to you? 
 
What are the possible advantages of 
confronting your difficult emotions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are some possible disadvantages 
of confronting your difficult emotions? 
 
What are some disadvantages of 
staying the same? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are some advantages of staying 
the same? 
 
 
Motivation levels can also fluctuate during treatment. If you notice your level of 
motivation to change the way you process your emotions reduces over the coming 
weeks, come back to this sheet, and consider the things that may be holding you back
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Session 5 Handout: 11.2 
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Session 5 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary 
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the intrusive 
memory? 
Intrusive Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it feel 
like it was happening 
again now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did you 
feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the intrusive 
memory mean / say 
about you? 
Coping 
What did you do? 
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Session 6: Emotionally Engaged Living 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Check progress with the ‘Motivation for confronting difficult emotions’ & Self-
Monitoring of Feelings Form. Any difficulties? Any surprises with homework? 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’: anyone willing to share an 
example?  
 
 Emotion Regulation Skills 
 
- Identify and evaluate group members’ current emotion regulation skills: elicit 
examples of modulation strategies (“what do you do to make yourself feel better when 
you feel bad?”) 
- Connect coping strategies to the three channels of emotional responding 
(physiological, cognitive & behavioural) 
- Identify timing of strategies (At the time vs. Later once overwhelmed) 
 
 Identify and Practice Adaptive Emotion Regulation Strategies 
 
- Physiological Strategies: focused breathing, progressive muscular relaxation, 
meditation (Emotions) ~ group exercise 
- Cognitive Strategies: attention shifting, positive self-statements, positive imagery, 
reappraisal, perspective broadening (Meanings) 
- Behavioural Strategies: Grounding, Time-out, Replacement behaviours (Event) 
 
 Introduce Positive Emotions and Plan Pleasurable Activities 
 
- Review reasons to engage in pleasurable activities: as a reward for distress 
reduction efforts; a form of distress management; to direct action; to enhance 
motivation and a sense of future possibilities; to produce greater self-awareness and 
connection to others 
- Identify pleasurable or positive activities  
 
 Connect Distress Tolerance to Individual Goals 
 
- Identify/revisit specific treatment goals (may have developed/changed since the 
first session) 
 
 Present and Practice Method of Assessing Pros and Cons 
 
- Is it worth tolerating distress to reach a goal?: Identify goal, evaluate the necessity 
for distress, identify pros and cons 
 
 Distress Reduction Strategies 
 
- General strategies: self-care, getting adequate rest, eating a well-balanced diet, 
moderating alcohol intake, exercising regularly, addressing medical issues, 
managing money responsibly etc. 
- Applying negative mood regulation strategies in specific situations in order to meet 
desired goals 
- Acceptance of negative feelings in everyday life; acceptance of intense feelings and 
moods 
 
 The Role of Positive Feelings in Pursuing Goals 
 
- Experiences of positive emotions can enhance functioning (link to work on 
pleasurable activities in session 3) 
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 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- To continue with the Self-Monitoring of Feelings Form (Handout 11.2) and this time 
include the ‘Response/coping strategy’ 
- Three coping strategies for emotion regulation to be identified & practised 
- Pleasant Event Scheduling (Handout 12.2) 
- Continue with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’ 
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Session 6 Handout: 11.2 
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Session 6 Handout: Adaptive Emotion Regulation Strategies 
 
 
For homework, I am going to practice the following emotion regulation 
strategies: 
 
Emotion Regulation 
Strategy 
How I will practice  When I will practice 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3. 
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Session 6 Handout: Controlled Breathing 
How to do ‘controlled breathing’ 
 
 Let your shoulders drop and relax your body as much as you can. 
 
 Inhale slowly and deeply through your nose into the bottom of your 
lungs, filling them. 
 
 You should try to keep your mouth shut. 
 
 Your belly should move out as you breathe in. Your chest should move 
only very slightly. 
 
 When you have taken in the full breath pause for a brief moment and 
then exhale slowly through your mouth. 
 
 Keep your breathing slow and smooth and calm and even, without 
gulping or grasping. 
 
 The aim is to take about 8 to 12 breaths in a minute. In and out counts 
as one breath. 
 
 Keep this going for a couple of minutes, concentrating fully on the 
breathing 
 
 If you feel breathless or need to gasp for air this is a sign that you need 
to breathe even more slowly and gently. 
Helpful tips for controlled breathing 
 
 Sometimes it can help to imagine a balloon in your belly. As you breathe 
in through your nose the balloon should inflate and your belly rise up. 
As you breathe out the balloon deflates and your belly falls down. You 
can check this by putting a hand on your belly. 
 
 Whilst practising this kind of breathing people first feel that they aren’t 
getting enough air and want to take gulps. However with practice you 
will find that this slower rate of breathing is more comfortable and will 
reduce anxiety and other physical feelings. 
 
 As you use controlled breathing thoughts are likely to come into your 
mind.  That is just the way the mind works. Try not to push them away 
particularly but to keep going back to your breathing. Concentrate on 
the air going in and out regardless of the thought. 
 
 
 
 It is very important to practise this skill. It will only become a good habit 
if it is rehearsed time and time again. It is easier to practise when you 
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are feeling less stressed, in the same way that you would learn to swim 
in a small pool rather than the ocean. 
 
 It is important to practise for, say, two or three minutes at a time, two or 
three times a day. It can help to remind yourself by leaving a little note 
or some sign for yourself that maybe only you know about. Some people 
put a small marker on their watch so that every time they look at it they 
are reminded to practise the breathing for a few moments. 
 
 When you first practise sit in a comfortable chair, relax your body as 
much as you can, and let your shoulders drop. Sit upright; if you are 
slouched forward your chest muscles are constricted and you will not 
be able to fill your lungs properly. 
 
 Once you feel confident about doing this kind of breathing when sitting 
comfortably you can also try it just walking around, when sitting on the 
tube or waiting at the bus-stop.  Gradually it will become easier to do 
when you are feeling more anxious. 
 
 As an emergency if you are feeling panicky and not confident enough to 
take control of your breathing you can use a paper bag to breathe into. 
Cover your nose and mouth and breathe as naturally as possible into the 
bag for a few moments until the feelings pass. 
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Session 6 Handout: Progressive Muscular Relaxation 
 
How to do progressive muscular relaxation? 
 
The following exercise recommends a particular sequence of relaxing your body. 
This sequence starts with your head and ends at your feet. You will be asked to 
tense separate muscle groups, to hold the tension for about ·five seconds and 
then to let it go. The idea of this exercise is to learn the difference between how 
your muscles feel when they are tense and how they feel when they are relaxed. 
So you can identify tension when it occurs in your body and take the relevant 
action. Some people find certain muscles more difficult to relax than others, for 
example the muscles in the neck. Don't worry about this for the moment - extra 
practice is all that's needed.  
 
First of all spend a little time getting comfortable. Loosen any tight clothing, take 
your shoes off, find a comfortable position with your legs and arms slightly apart. 
Now close your eyes. Now tense every muscle in your body. Tense the muscles in 
your jaw, your eyes, your arms, your hands, your chest, your stomach, your back, 
your legs, your feet, feel the tension all over your body. Hold it - and then let it go. 
Now take a deep breath. As you breathe out say silently' to yourself: relax. Try 
and appreciate the difference between how your body felt when it was tense and 
how it feels now.  
 
As we continue you will be asked to tense different parts of your body. You will 
become aware of the feeling of tension in each part, and then of the different 
feeling of relaxation. Keeping the rest of your body relaxed, wrinkle up your 
forehead. Really feel the tension, hold it, and then let it go. Feel the tension 
slipping away. Now take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: 
relax, relax. Now screw up your eyes as if it was very windy. Feel the tension, 
hold it, and then let it go. Now take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to 
yourself: relax. Feel the relief.  
 
Now open your mouth as wide as you can. Feel the tension, hold it, and then let it 
go. Now take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax. Now 
hold your tongue against the roof of your mouth. Feel the tension in your tongue, 
hold it, and then let it go. Feel the tension slip away. Now take a deep breath and 
as you breathe out say to yourself relax, relax.  
 
Now clench your jaw. Feel the tension, and then let it go. Then take a deep breath 
and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax. Think about the top of your head, 
your forehead, your eyes, your cheeks, and your jaw. Make sure they’re all 
relaxed, just let go of the tension. The tongue is relaxed, the forehead is soft and 
smooth, and your neck and head are getting more and more relaxed. Your head 
feels as if it could roll from side to side.  
 
Shrug up your shoulders, try to touch your ears with them, feel the tension, hold 
it, and then let it go. Feel them join the relaxed part of your body. Take a deep 
breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax. Now stretch out your arms, 
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make a fist with your hands, feel the Tension, hold it, and then let it go. Let it slip 
away. Take a deep breath. As you breathe out say to yourself: relax, relax.  
 
Now bend your arms up to your shoulder as if you were showing off your 
muscles. Feel the tension under your arms, hold it, and then let it go. Relax. Now 
take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax, relax.  
 
Now we're going to move on to relaxing your chest. Begin by taking in a breath 
than totally fills your lungs. Notice the tension around your ribs and let it go. 
Take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax, relax. Now arch 
your back, hold it, and let it go. Feel the relief. Take a deep breath and as you 
breathe out say to yourself: relax, relax.  
 
Feel the relaxation in your face, your shoulders, down your back, arms, your 
chest, all relaxing more and more. Breathing in and out and getting more and 
more relaxed. Now tighten your stomach muscles, feel the tension, hold it, and 
then let it go. Feel the relief. Take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to 
yourself: relax, relax. Now push out your stomach as far as you can, feel the 
tension, hold it and then let it go. Now take a deep breath and as you breathe out 
say to yourself: relax. Now check your face again. If any areas are tense, relax 
them. Your chest, your back, relaxes them. Now we move on to your hips and 
legs.  
 
Press down on the heels of your feet, really feel the tension, hold it and then let it 
go. Take a deep breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax. Now tighten 
your calf muscles, feel the tension, and let it go. Take a deep breath and as you 
breathe out say to yourself: relax. Now curl your toes downwards, try to touch 
the bottom of your feet with them; hold it and let it go. Now take a deep breath 
and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax, relax. Now bend your toes the other 
way right up to your knees. Hold it, and let it go. Feel the relief. Take a deep 
breath and as you breathe out say to yourself: relax.  
 
Feel your whole body becoming more and more relaxed. Each time you breathe 
out you become more and more relaxed. Now clear your mind and imagine you 
are lying in a poppy field. It's a sunny day. You can see the clouds moving across 
in the sky. You can hear a stream in the distance, rustling grass, the birds singing, 
a: child laughing, you can smell the grass and flowers and fresh air. The sun feels 
warm against your skin; you can feel a gentle breeze. It feels very nice. As you 
look around you can see the poppies gently swaying in the breeze.  
 
Now I am going to count to four and you will open your eyes and sit quietly. One, 
two, three, four 
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Session 6 Handout: 12.2 
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 a.m.        
7-8 a.m.        
8-9 a.m.        
9-10 a.m.        
10-11 a.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 p.m.        
1-2 p.m.        
2-3 p.m.        
3-4 p.m.        
4-5 p.m.        
5-6 p.m.        
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 p.m.        
7-8 p.m.        
8-9 p.m.        
9-10 p.m.        
10-11 p.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 a.m.         
1-2 a.m.         
2-3 a.m.        
3-4 a.m.        
4-5 a.m.        
5-6 a.m.        
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Session 6 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary 
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the intrusive 
memory? 
Intrusive Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it feel 
like it was happening 
again now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did you 
feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the intrusive 
memory mean / say 
about you? 
Coping 
What did you do? 
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Session 7: Interpersonal Emotion Regulation 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Check progress with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’ and ‘Self-
Monitoring of Feelings Form’, including the ‘Response/coping strategy’. 
Anyone willing to share an example? Did people identified & practise three 
coping strategies? Pleasant Event Scheduling  
- Any difficulties? Any surprises with homework? 
 
 Relationship Patterns: Interpersonal Schemas/Family Scripts 
 
- Link to model (Session 3: event  meaning  emotion in interpersonal 
domain) 
- Can group members identify a particular pattern of emotional 
inhibition/emotional intolerance within their families? (link to Sessions 2: 
formulation exercise) 
- Do these identified patterns repeat themselves in situations/relationships 
with other people? 
 
 Difficulties in Relationships with other People 
 
- Brainstorm: What difficulties have group members experienced in their 
relationships with other people since the rape/sexual assault? How have 
relationships with other people changed? (emotional, physical, sexual) 
- How can we make sense of the changes in relationships with other people? 
- Is there anything that we can do to improve these relationships? What are 
the barriers to this? 
 
 Agency in Relationships: Communication, Assertiveness and Control 
 
- Psychoeducation: what is assertiveness?  
- Identify specific problems with assertiveness and control (discuss function of 
rape as being exerting power and control and therefore disempowering the 
victim) 
- Clarify the historical basis for the group members’ assumptions about 
assertiveness & emotional expression 
- Review basic assertiveness techniques: ‘I’ messages, making requests, saying 
no 
- Are there any benefits to increasing communication with other people? 
 
 Prepare for Transition to the Next Phase of Treatment 
 
- Acknowledge the end of Phase 1 and review progress in building emotion 
regulation and interpersonal skills 
- How will these skills be utilised in the next phase of treatment? 
- Address questions/anxieties about beginning the work on memory control 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Continue with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’ 
- Pleasant Event Scheduling (Handout 12.2)
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Session 7 Handout: 12.2 
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 a.m.        
7-8 a.m.        
8-9 a.m.        
9-10 a.m.        
10-11 a.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 p.m.        
1-2 p.m.        
2-3 p.m.        
3-4 p.m.        
4-5 p.m.        
5-6 p.m.        
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 p.m.        
7-8 p.m.        
8-9 p.m.        
9-10 p.m.        
10-11 p.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 a.m.         
1-2 a.m.         
2-3 a.m.        
3-4 a.m.        
4-5 a.m.        
5-6 a.m.        
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Session 7 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary 
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the intrusive 
memory? 
Intrusive Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it feel 
like it was happening 
again now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did you 
feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the intrusive 
memory mean / say 
about you? 
Coping 
What did you do? 
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Session 8. Flashbacks – Identifying Triggers and Re-Conditioning 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’: anyone willing to 
share an example?  
- Check progress with pleasant events scheduling. Any difficulties? Any 
surprises with homework? 
 
 Identify triggers to Intrusive memories 
 
- Refer to ‘Memories and their regulation’ model (Triggers  Memory 
 Meanings  Emotion) 
- Use of ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’ to identify particular 
triggers to flashbacks/intrusive memories 
- Share and group triggers on flip-chart (people, places, activities, words 
etc.) 
 
 Coping with Intrusive memories 
 
- Re-iterate idea of monitoring as a form of control; overturning 
avoidance (backfiring attempts to suppress) 
- What coping strategies have people used/identified in the diary? What 
makes things better/worse (short & longer-term) 
-  Link back to Distress Reduction Strategies 
 
 Re-Conditioning – Linking Cues with non-threatening words/images 
 
- Associating the triggers with different memories (Triggers  
Memories  Different meanings  Different emotions) 
- Discuss ideas 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to continue with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive 
Memories Diary’  
- Ask group members to write out a narrative / a small part of the 
narrative of what happened and identify the most frequently 
occurring / vivid / distressing images and associated meaning(s) -  to 
be updated in the following two sessions (Visual  Verbal memory) 
- Any other ideas re processing memories? Opportunities to talk 
through what happened with other people? 
- Pleasant Event Scheduling (Handout 12.2) 
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Session 8 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary 
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the intrusive 
memory? 
Intrusive Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it feel 
like it was happening 
again now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did you 
feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the intrusive 
memory mean / say 
about you? 
Coping 
What did you do? 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
-  
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Session 8 Handout: 12.2 
 
 
 375 
 
 
Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 a.m.        
7-8 a.m.        
8-9 a.m.        
9-10 a.m.        
10-11 a.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 p.m.        
1-2 p.m.        
2-3 p.m.        
3-4 p.m.        
4-5 p.m.        
5-6 p.m.        
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 p.m.        
7-8 p.m.        
8-9 p.m.        
9-10 p.m.        
10-11 p.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 a.m.         
1-2 a.m.         
2-3 a.m.        
3-4 a.m.        
4-5 a.m.        
5-6 a.m.        
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Session 9: Imagery & Nightmare Rescripting 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary’: anyone willing to share an 
example?  
- Check progress with pleasant events scheduling. Any difficulties? Any surprises 
with homework? 
- Review progress with writing out a narrative and identifying particular images and 
associated meanings 
 
 Psychoeducation: Imagery 
 
- Define what an image is and how images are different to verbal thoughts, with 
stronger emotional intensity (link to ‘Brain model’).  
- Ask group members to practice imagining a memory (neutral): Imagine walking 
into Paddington Station – what do they see, hear, feel, think and believe? (use to 
check understanding of what an image is) 
 
 Psychoeducation: Imagery & Nightmare Rescripting 
 
- Different kinds of perspective – across time, within a mental space 
- The need to use perspective to do something different (Image  New Image; 
Image  Verbal; Verbal  New Verbal) 
- How to create perspective – introduce some ideas 
 
 Imagery or Nightmare Rescripting Exercise 
 
- Ask group members to identify / share a particular traumatic image or nightmare 
(or unrelated to traumatic experience if too distressing) 
- Group exercise to explore options for modifying this image to increase sense of 
mastery & control – do this for each group member 
- Ask group members to write down the rescript 
  
 Positive Imagery / ‘Safe place’ exercise 
 
- Ask one group member to share a memory of a place where they felt safe and 
relaxed and practice positive imagery / ‘safe place’ exercise as a technique to 
use when overwhelmed by negative intrusive memories 
- Ask all group members to write down their own positive/safe image in 
notebooks 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to practice modifying/updating the images they 
identified 
- Ask group members to complete the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary II’ 
(go through additional columns) 
- Ask group members to practice using their positive/safe image 
- Pleasant Event Scheduling (Handout 12.2) 
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Session 9 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary II  
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the 
intrusive memory? 
Intrusive 
Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it 
feel like it was 
happening again 
now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did 
you feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the 
intrusive memory 
mean / say about 
you? 
Rescript 
How did you change 
the memory/image to 
change the meaning? 
Distress 
How distressed did 
you feel after the 
rescripting? 
 (0-100) 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 379 
 
Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 a.m.        
7-8 a.m.        
8-9 a.m.        
9-10 a.m.        
10-11 a.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 p.m.        
1-2 p.m.        
2-3 p.m.        
3-4 p.m.        
4-5 p.m.        
5-6 p.m.        
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 p.m.        
7-8 p.m.        
8-9 p.m.        
9-10 p.m.        
10-11 p.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 a.m.         
1-2 a.m.         
2-3 a.m.        
3-4 a.m.        
4-5 a.m.        
5-6 a.m.        
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Session 10: Narrative Restructuring 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary II’: anyone willing to share 
an example?  
- Review progress with rescripting images/nightmares – any change in 
distress levels? Positive/safe image helpful? 
- Check progress with pleasant events scheduling. Any difficulties? Any surprises 
with homework? 
 
 Psychoeducation re Narrative Restructuring 
 
- Recap psychoeducation on memory: brain model (meaning), appraisals 
knotted into narrative, memory reactivating threat system, leading you to 
believe the memory’s real 
- Link to session on meaning of ‘rape’: e.g. beliefs around blame and 
responsibility 
- Outline example of ‘It’s my fault because I didn’t fight back’ & challenge with 
fight, flight, freeze response  
 
 Updating memories/’hotspots’ 
 
- Time perspective – ‘time-tagging’ memories 
- Integration of what is known now into memory 
- Integration of grounding statements 
- Inserting new memory/image/understanding into old intrusive memory 
 
 Narrative Restructuring Exercise 
 
- Ask group members to identify / share a particular traumatic nightmare or image 
(or unrelated to traumatic experience if too distressing) 
- Group exercise to explore integration of what is known now into the memory 
- Ask group members to help each other and write down the updates 
 
 Narrative Restructuring Techniques 
 
- Flashcards with grounding statements 
- Diary of memories & ‘here and now’ update 
- Nightmare Protocol 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to continue with the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories 
Diary II’   
- Ask group members to practice the narrative restructuring by writing out a 
narrative of what happened and then a new narrative with ‘updates’ re what 
they know now 
- Ask group members to use the ‘Nightmare Protocol’ 
- Ask group members to continue practicing using their positive/safe image 
- Pleasant Event Scheduling (Handout 12.2) 
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Session 10 Handout: Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary II  
 
Situation 
What happened 
/triggered the 
intrusive memory? 
Intrusive 
Memory 
Image / Emotion / 
Sensation? 
‘Nowness’ 
To what extent did it 
feel like it was 
happening again 
now? (0-100) 
Distress 
How distressed did 
you feel? (0-100) 
Meaning 
What does the 
intrusive memory 
mean / say about 
you? 
Rescript 
How did you change 
the memory/image to 
change the meaning? 
Distress 
How distressed did 
you feel after the 
rescripting? 
 (0-100) 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
 383 
 
Session 10 Handout: Nightmare Protocol 
 
Nightmare Protocol 
 
 
Complete this and keep it by your bed for when you wake up after a nightmare: 
 
 
If I wake up in the night feeling_____________________________________ 
 (write in the emotion e.g. frightened, fearful, anxious)  
 
 
I will be sensing in my body________________________________________ 
(write in at least three feelings in your body, e.g. tension, heart racing)  
 
 
Because I will be remembering______________________________________ 
(name the trauma by title only - no details - e.g. the assault)  
 
 
At the same time, I will look around where I am now in__________________ 
(the current year e.g. 2014)  
 
 
Here in __________________________________________________________ 
(name the place where you are e.g. in my bedroom in London)  
 
 
And I will see _____________________________________________________ 
(describe some of the things that you can see when you wake up) 
 
 
And I will refocus my attention/’ground’ myself by_______________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________  
(e.g. smelling perfume, playing a game on my phone, stroking my cat..) 
 
 
And say to myself__________________________________________________ 
(e.g. ‘I am strong’, ‘I have survived’, ‘I can get through this’..) 
 
 
And so I will know that it was just a nightmare and ______________________ 
(name trauma) 
 
Is not happening anymore. 
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 a.m.        
7-8 a.m.        
8-9 a.m.        
9-10 a.m.        
10-11 a.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 p.m.        
1-2 p.m.        
2-3 p.m.        
3-4 p.m.        
4-5 p.m.        
5-6 p.m.        
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 p.m.        
7-8 p.m.        
8-9 p.m.        
9-10 p.m.        
10-11 p.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 a.m.         
1-2 a.m.         
2-3 a.m.        
3-4 a.m.        
4-5 a.m.        
5-6 a.m.        
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Session 11: Method of Loci 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Monitoring Intrusive Memories Diary II’: anyone willing to share 
an example?  
- Review progress with narrative restructuring – any change in the quality of 
the trauma memories/distress levels?  
- What helps: flashcards, positive self-talk, nightmare protocol, writing things 
down? 
- Check progress with pleasant events scheduling. Any difficulties? Any surprises 
with homework? 
 
 Psychoeducation on Method of Loci 
 
- Introduce use of Method of Loci as a mnemonic aid  
- Ask group members to go through example of walk from Paddington Station 
to the group room in order to remember 5 items on a shopping list 
- Practice going through & problem-solve 
 
 Use of Method of Loci to summarise useful techniques learnt in group sessions 
 
- Ask group members to derive a list of 10 helpful/positive things they have 
learnt in the group: 10 coping strategies, techniques, positive statements, 
useful pieces of information or memories 
- Draw out a map/plan of a familiar route/building & problem-solve (safer 
inside? Good to incorporate their ‘safe place’?) 
- Write a word/phrase or draw a picture to represent each of the 10 things 
identified 
- Ask each group member to imagine and talk through their route 
 
 Summarise the Goals of the Session and Plan Between-session Exercises 
 
- Ask group members to practice using the Method of Loci  
- Ask group members to complete a ‘Blueprint’ for the final Review/Summary 
session 
- Pleasant Event Scheduling (Handout 12.2) 
 387 
 
Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 a.m.        
7-8 a.m.        
8-9 a.m.        
9-10 a.m.        
10-11 a.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 p.m.        
1-2 p.m.        
2-3 p.m.        
3-4 p.m.        
4-5 p.m.        
5-6 p.m.        
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Time Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
6-7 p.m.        
7-8 p.m.        
8-9 p.m.        
9-10 p.m.        
10-11 p.m.        
11-12 a.m.        
12-1 a.m.         
1-2 a.m.         
2-3 a.m.        
3-4 a.m.        
4-5 a.m.        
5-6 a.m.        
 389 
 
Session 12. Summary & Review 
 
 Review Homework 
 
- Review the ‘Method of Loci’ 
- Check progress with pleasant events scheduling. Any difficulties? Any surprises 
with homework? 
 
 Blueprint 
 
- Go through a summary of what each of the sessions has covered 
- Ask group members to talk about what has been helpful and what has 
been less helpful  
- Action plan for the future – set longer-term goals 
 
 Feedback 
 
- Feedback forms (Haven) 
- Any feedback re improvements for future groups? Anything they think 
should be included that wasn’t? 
- Questionnaire Measures (to take home and complete before end of group 
assessment) 
 
 Ending 
 
- Talk about thoughts and feelings re the group ending 
- Acknowledge/normalise anxieties 
- Provide information re additional help/support if needed 
- Arrange end of group assessments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
